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Three topics are investigated in these chapters: the causes and consequences of lateral 
job mobility within firms, the impact of incentives on human behavior in the context 
of capital punishment and deterrence, and the development of new synthetic data 
methods for confidentiality protection of public use data. The extent and importance of 
lateral mobility is not well-established in economics and Chapter 1 contributes new 
and important findings to the literature. Using a panel of more than 500 firms and 
48,000 white-collar workers, I find relatively high rates of lateral mobility, that this 
mobility is statistically different from other transitions, and that the compensation 
growth associated with lateral mobility is economically meaningful. I also investigate 
the relationships between worker performance, compensation growth and job mobility. 
Even when controlling for productivity differences, significant earnings growth occurs 
directly through the change in jobs. The results provide some evidence that the 
observed lateral mobility may be the result of job rotation. In light of continued debate 
of whether capital punishment deters crime, Chapter 2 revisits my previous work on 
this issue and shows that the deterrence results hold under alternative measurements of 
key variables, multiple statistical specifications and subsets of the data. Chapter 3 
develops methodology that solves the need for statistical agencies to suppress certain 
data items because releasing those cells to the public yields a risk of exposing 
someone’s personal information. I show that the synthetic data adequately protect the 
confidential data and are superior in terms of its analytical validity.     
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CHAPTER 1 
LATERAL MOBILITY ON THE CAREER PATH WITHIN FIRMS 
 
1.1  Introduction 
     The extent and importance of lateral mobility within firms is not well-
established in economics. This is in part due to a lack of appropriate data sets to 
address the issue and in part due to the lack of existing theoretical models to motivate 
researchers to ask such questions.  While some evidence on lateral mobility does exist 
in the empirical literature, the lateral transition rates found vary substantially across 
studies: e.g., 1.6% in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a and 1994b), 14% in Gibbs 
and Hendricks (2004), and up to 65% (not including exits) found in the firm studied 
by Dohmen et al. (2004). Furthermore, the few studies that uncover lateral mobility in 
the data are based on single-firm analyses and therefore the representativeness of their 
results is unclear. One advantage my paper has over previous work is that I use a panel 
data set of approximately 48,000 white-collar workers and 500 firms over the eight-
year period 1981-1988. The surveyed firms cover a broad spectrum of industries and 
vary in terms of size, profits and other characteristics. As a comparison to the papers 
cited above, conditional on remaining in the same firm, the average annual lateral 
mobility rates using this more heterogeneous sample is about 35% under generous 
definitions of lateral mobility, or as low as 11.4% under more stringent requirements. 
In this paper, I describe the hierarchy, compensation structure, and mobility 
patterns of white-collar workers over a broad set of firms. I find relatively high rates 
of lateral mobility in this large sample of firms, that this mobility is statistically 
different from other transitions in a number of ways, and that the compensation 
growth associated with lateral mobility is economically meaningful. I motivate the 
main analysis by considering the firm's job assignment problem in an empirical 
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setting, and highlight the role of transition costs associated with changing jobs. 
Components of job- and task-specific capital could be important determinants of job 
mobility and worker outcomes (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004 and 2006), and should 
affect the probability of promotion, demotion or a lateral move differently. For 
example, a worker's seniority in the firm may make her more productive in the current 
job, but many years of seniority could also increase the productivity costs of changing 
jobs if seniority also captures the effects of job tenure and task-specific capital, both of 
which may be lost or under-utilized in a new position. Seniority may also make 
changing jobs less costly, since seniority can involve at least some knowledge of many 
positions in the firm even if the worker has not previously worked in those jobs. The 
firm's decision to retain the worker in the same job, promote, demote, or laterally 
move her to another position will be affected by which of these factors dominate. I 
show how these effects that determine lateral mobility are different from those that 
determine promotions, demotions or staying in the same job. 
     I also investigate the relationships between worker performance, compensation 
growth and the various mobility types. While data on relative or absolute performance 
are not available, I construct two measures of relative performance using bonus data 
that are unique to this paper. In standard statistical models of earnings growth, a 
positive and significant coefficient on a promotion or lateral move variable indicates 
that there are positive earnings associated with that transition, controlling for the other 
factors in the model. In other words, wages are, to at least some degree, attached to 
jobs. However, if worker performance is the mechanism sorting workers into jobs to 
begin with, then that positive coefficient may reflect productivity differences rather 
than differences in the wages between the two jobs. I show that while worker 
performance has a strong, positive relationship to real earnings growth, the 
relationships between the transitions and real earnings growth remain when including 
3 
measures of relative performance. That is, even when controlling for productivity 
differences, significant earnings growth occurs directly through the change in jobs. 
The result is that, even though the real earnings growth associated with lateral 
transitions is only 20% to 36% the size of the change for promotions, it is 1.6% to 
3.0% greater than for those who stay in the same job. Alternatively, demotions involve 
a 4.5% decrease in real earnings growth. This result reinforces the notion that jobs 
within reporting levels are heterogeneous, and that the observed wage variation within 
reporting levels is in part due to the fact that the jobs within those levels are simply 
different. 
     The job-to-job mobility analysis suggests that workers in these data are highly 
mobile - that is, job changes in the past are strong predictors of job changes in the 
future. Specifically, there is no real serial correlation for demotions and promotions, 
but lateral transitions with a job title change do predict future lateral transitions with a 
job title change (similar to job rotation). A lateral transition that does not involved a 
job title change (a simple transfer) is the least likely transition to be followed by 
another job change of any kind. 
     I conclude the empirical work by investigating the determinants of lateral 
mobility and other job transition rates at the firm-level. Analyses using single-firm 
case studies are unable to exploit the kind of firm-level heterogeneity that I have with 
these data. While the explanatory power of the models is modest, there are firm-
specific factors that impact the rate of lateral mobility such as the average seniority 
and education distribution of the workforce, and whether the firm is vertically or 
horizontally organized. These results provide some evidence that the lateral mobility 
observed in these data may be the result of job rotation. Most likely, there are firm-
specific and unobserved personnel policies that dictate these mobility rates such as a 
policy that, conditional on the firm and workforce characteristics, maps the firm's 
4 
turnover rate into a decision to hire from the outside (low intra-firm mobility rates) or 
fill vacancies from within (high intra-firm mobility rates). 
     Another unique aspect of this study is the manner in which transitions are 
identified. Each firm details its own organizational and hierarchical structure in a way 
that is consistently reported across firms. The amount of detail allows for the 
identification of up to eighteen different mobility types depending on the worker's 
location in the hierarchy. This information eliminates the need to empirically define 
each firm-specific hierarchy through transition matrices or the wage structure, and 
allows for the data to be meaningfully compared across firms. The interesting aspect 
of the way firms report their hierarchical structure is that there is more detail available 
than simply defining a single file job ladder through reporting levels as in previous 
work. In addition to the worker's reporting level in the firm, I also know the business 
unit (profit center) in which the worker is employed and, therefore, the hierarchies I 
incorporate are more complex than those used in other studies. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
     In a pair of seminal papers using the personnel records of management 
employees in a large US firm, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b) found that 
lateral mobility was virtually nonexistent in the single firm they investigate.1
                                                 
1 See Table 1 of Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a). 
  This is 
important for two reasons. The first is that the their findings have spawned a growing 
literature that aims to develop theoretical models consistent with their empirical results 
(e.g. Gibbons and Waldman, 1999; Gibbons and Waldman, 2006), and secondly, there 
have since been a number of studies that look for (in)consistencies between other 
individual firms and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b) (e.g., Lima, 2000; 
Seltzer and Merrett, 2000; Treble et al., 2001; Dohmen et al., 2004; Gibbs and 
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Hendricks, 2004; Lin, 2005). Few papers make any notable mention of lateral mobility 
within firms, the exceptions being Dohmen et al. (2004), Gibbs and Hendricks (2004), 
and more recently Acosta (2006). 
     One form of lateral mobility often cited as a potentially important progressive 
human resource practice is job rotation.2  Several establishment-level surveys find that 
the level of job rotation among US firms is nontrivial and that firms are adopting job 
rotation at an increasing rate. For example, Gittleman et al. (1998) use the BLS Survey 
of Employer Provided Training and find that in 1993 about 13 percent of private 
sector establishments of any size and 24 percent of establishments with 50 or more 
employees integrated job rotation as a regular practice.  Similarly, the Educational 
Quality of Workforce Survey in 1994 estimated that of private sector establishments 
with 20 or more employees, 18 percent of non-managerial workers were involved in 
job rotation nationally.3  Also employing a nationally representative sampling frame, 
Osterman (1994) conducted a survey revealing that 27 percent of private sector 
establishments with 50 or more employees rotated at least half of their core employees 
in 1992, but the proportion of establishments rotating its workforce jumps to 43 
percent if the penetration requirement is relaxed to any number of core employees.4,5
                                                 
2 I discuss the relevance of job rotation to lateral mobility below in more detail. For references on the 
determinants of the adoption of job rotation at the firm-level see Eriksson and Ortega (2006) and 
Eriksson (2000). 
 
Osterman repeats the analysis using 1997 data (Osterman, 2000) and finds that the 
proportion rotating at least half of its core employees doubled to more than 55 percent.   
3 This was a nationally representative survey of private sector establishments conducted by the US 
Census Bureau in conjunction with the University of Pennsylvania's Center on the Educational Quality 
of the Workforce. 
4 The author reports that restricting the sampling frame to those establishments with 50 or more 
employees results in only 10 percent of all establishments nationally, yet those same establishments 
employ 51 percent of non-agricultural US employment 
5 Core employees were defined as "the largest group of non-supervisory, non-managerial workers at this 
location who are directly involved in making the product or in providing the service at your location" 
[p.175].  The core group could be either blue or white collar workers. 
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     Given the frequency with which firms rotate their workers suggested by these 
surveys, it is surprising that substantial lateral mobility is not widely found in 
personnel datasets used in economics. The establishment-level research by Osterman, 
Gittleman and others suggests that job rotation is becoming a prevalent human 
resource practice among firms in the US economy. Since job rotation is only a 
particular form of lateral mobility, one should expect to observe lateral transitions in 
many personnel datasets, yet the existing literature in economics shows mobility 
patterns in firms that are not always consistent with these surveys.6  For example, the 
firm analyzed by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b) exhibited almost no 
lateral mobility (1.6% of all transitions including promotions, demotions, lateral 
moves and exits) and demotions are even rarer.7  One potential explanation for the 
lack of lateral transitions in their data is that even though the surveys mentioned above 
reflect blue and white-collar workers, the questions are intended to refer to the non-
management portion of the workforce; whereas the personnel records available to 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b) are of management employees in the 
firm.  However, the data employed by Acosta (2006) and Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) 
are comprised of the personnel records for both managerial and clerical workers and 
exhibit substantial lateral mobility (about 14 percent of transitions when including 
exits as an outcome and about 32 percent of transitions conditional on the move being 
a promotion, demotion or lateral move).8,9
                                                 
6 To identify estimated mobility rates that are consistent across papers it was sometimes necessary to 
calculate these numbers from various pieces of information in the papers' text.  I note those instances 
where the stated mobility rates are not presented directly by the authors. 
  On the other extreme, the personnel 
records analyzed by Dohmen et al. (2004) cover both production and managerial 
7 Page 931 of Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994b). 
8 The 14 percent is estimated from the bottom panel of their Table 3 on p.79.  In an attempt to be 
consistent with the lateral move rate of 1.6% in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b), a 
transition is defined as a demotion (1.5%), promotion (28.9%), lateral move (14.1%) or exit (55.5%).  
Conditional on remaining with the firm, lateral moves therefore represent 32% of transitions. 
9 Blue-collar (hourly) workers are not included in the analysis. 
7 
employees and yield perhaps the largest lateral mobility rates in the literature (65 
percent of all transitions including promotions, demotions and lateral moves but not 
exits).10
 
 
  1.2.1 Theoretical Rationale for Lateral Mobility within Firms 
     There is little economic theory that incorporates lateral mobility as an 
important facet of careers. An exception is Demougin and Siow (1994) where 
unskilled workers may move laterally if they fail an on-the-job training program. Due 
to the prospects of larger future earnings associated with successful training, young 
unskilled workers who enter the training program accept a smaller wage than those 
who are not trained. Unsuccessful trainees who then move laterally experience a pay 
increase because the wage paid to trainees is smaller than the wage earned by the 
unskilled workforce. However, the pay increase is smaller than for those who 
successfully complete the training and are promoted. In this model, lateral mobility 
occurs only in firms with fast-track promotion regimes and not firms that practice up-
or-out policies. 
     There are other economic explanations why lateral mobility may exist. 
Gibbons and Waldman (2006) discuss the notion of task-specific capital and point out 
the way in which jobs are sequenced is important when considering the job ladder. 
When changing jobs, some task-specific capital may go unutilized in the new job and 
therefore standard career paths should be structured to minimize this loss. Depending 
                                                 
10 The 65 percent is also calculated via information found in the text: they observe 5,704 promotions 
and 1,627 demotions (p.201) and 13,636 lateral transitions (p.206).  Unfortunately, I was not able to 
determine the precise number of exits in their data to calculate a lateral mobility rate that is comparable 
to Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b).  The authors acknowledge that they may be 
overestimating the number of lateral moves: about 25% of the total number of lateral transitions involve 
a change in job code and different field of activity while the remaining 75% change jobs but stay in the 
same hierarchical level and field of activity.  I explore the differences between these two types of lateral 
moves in the empirical sections. 
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on the level of specialization of jobs within a firm, this concept gives rise to the 
possibility that it may be optimal to train workers as generalists rather than specialists 
by having them gain experience in a variety of positions before promotion. 
     It is hypothesized that firms choose to incorporate job rotation as a human 
resource practice for one of three reasons: (i) employee learning, (ii) employer 
learning or (iii) employee motivation.11
 
 Regardless of the reason for adoption, this 
form of job mobility is considered to be distinct from a promotion although employee 
learning and employer learning may require rotation as a prerequisite to promotion. 
Ortega (2001) notes two empirical regularities concerning the adoption of job rotation: 
job rotation is negatively correlated with average tenure at the firm and positively 
correlated with the use of new technologies. The negative relationship with tenure is 
consistent with both employee and employer learning but not motivation. The idea 
behind the model by Ortega (2001) is that when a firm observes a worker in a single 
job it observes only one (but reliable) signal of the match quality whereas if the 
worker is rotated among jobs the firm observes more information. In this way there is 
a tradeoff between the quality of the signal and the number of signals. A primary 
result of the model is that the benefits of job rotation are more pronounced when there 
is greater uncertainty about worker abilities and job profitability. Therefore, firms 
rotate young or new workers more often those with more experience and innovative 
firms with evolving job components or users of new technology are more likely to 
rotate than firms that continue to use existing technology.   
 
 
                                                 
11 See Table 2 of Eriksson and Ortega (2004) for a review of the findings on why firms adopt job 
rotation. 
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1.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
  
The data used in this paper consist of a yearly panel of approximately 500 
firms and 48,000 workers over the eight-year period 1981-1988.12
     The panel is relatively short, with a maximum spell of employment of eight 
years, but unlike many single-firm data sets, the personnel records for every worker 
employed at the firm are not available.  Instead, each respondent (the firm) was asked 
to report information on 75 or more employees, which tend to be upper-level 
management and not lower-level workers. The sample is not nationally representative, 
but the firms do cover a broad spectrum of industries and vary in terms of size, 
ownership type, and other economic characteristics such as sales and profits.    
  These data were 
collected by a consulting firm through surveys that asked a variety of questions about 
the firm's compensation policies while gathering detailed information on workers' pay 
and individual characteristics. While participation was voluntary, each firm also paid a 
fee to the consulting company in order submit its personnel data - the return being a 
comparative analysis of the firm's compensation policies. The fact that the survey 
required a participation fee and resulted in a consultation report means that 
participating firms had incentives to report reliable data.   
     Substantial information is included about each worker such as base and bonus 
pay, age, education, year of hire, reporting level, the business unit for which the 
employee works, characteristics of the position, including eligibility for various 
compensation plans, board membership, and the total number of employees 
supervised.13
                                                 
12 These data have also been used in other contexts by Abowd (1990), Leonard (1990) and Belzil and 
Bognanno (2004, 2005). 
 Firm-level information on profits, sales, total employment, industry, 
13 The total number of employees supervised includes all employees beneath the worker in that 
particular profit center, not just those under direct supervision. 
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organizational type (public, private, subsidiary, US or foreign owned) and variables 
describing the firm's compensation policies are also merged with the worker data.   
     The data are heavily concentrated in manufacturing, capturing more than 70 
percent of firm-year observations.  The second largest industry group is Transportation 
and Utilities (9.6%) followed by Services (5.4%) and Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate (5.1%). Most firms are US owned and publicly traded (64%) but there are 
privately owned parent companies (10.3%) as well as public and private subsidiaries 
(11.2 and 2.2 percent, respectively). About 12 percent of the firms are foreign owned.   
     Overall, these firms are large in terms of employment and other economic 
characteristics, but there exists substantial heterogeneity in terms of growth and 
profitability over the sample period.  The median firm employs a total 12,000 workers, 
but the average firm is much larger (26,000 workers).  Similarly, in 1980 dollars, the 
median (average) firm had $1.2 ($4.6) billion in sales and $44 ($248) million in 
profits.14
     Table 1.1 displays the sampling characteristics of the data.  Repeated 
observations on workers is essential for analyzing job transitions: 70 percent of the 
firms appear at least twice while 35% of the firms appear for five or more years. Panel 
B shows that companies appearing for longer spells also tended to report information 
on more workers.  While some firms reported data on a relatively small number  
 Interestingly, while the median firm remained relatively stable in terms of 
employment levels, 25 percent of the firms experienced employment reductions of at 
least 21 percent while another 25 percent of firms grew by 20 percent or more. Most 
firms grew in terms of both sales and profits but there were losers as well. Twenty-five 
percent of the firms experienced non-negligible declines in profits or sales.  
 
                                                 
14 Profits are defined as net income including all after-tax earnings.  Sales include service and rental 
revenues but exclude non-operating revenues and any excise taxes collected by manufacturers. 
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Table 1.1 
Sampling Characteristics of the Data 
 
Panel A:  Distribution of Companies By Spell in the Data 
   
Years Observed in the Data Frequency Percent 
1 235 29.5 
2 141 17.7 
3 91 11.4 
4 47 5.9 
5 60 7.5 
6 53 6.7 
7 47 5.9 
8 122 15.3 
 
 
Panel B:  Distribution of the Average Number of Executives Reported per Company By Length of Company Spell 
   
# Years Company  
is in Data 
Executives 
Reported per 
Year 
Std. 
Dev. <1% 
5th
% 
  10th 25 % th 50 % 
th 75  
% 
th 90  
% 
th 95  
% 
th
>99%   % 
1 54.3 45.1 1 6 7 19 46 77 107 132 213 
2 64.8 59.0 7 8 14 31 54 81 122 148 258 
3 66.9 54.2 6 16 27 39 62 81 96 108 459 
4 81.2 83.4 16 19 26 40 62 91 116 213 475 
5 77.1 33.0 13 30 40 56 74 93 124 138 193 
6 83.9 45.9 19 34 42 58 78 93 130 168 304 
7 88.7 50.3 15 38 42 56 76 100 169 226 239 
8 87.4 42.9 13 31 41 61 82 107 140 175 209 
Note: Each Observation is the average number of executives reported over the spell for a single company.   
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workers, others report information on several hundred. Typically, firms appearing for 
at least five years provided data on 74 to 82 workers per year. 
 
1.3.1 The Hierarchy 
    An advantage of the data I use is that they contain detailed information about the 
organizational structure which is consistently reported across firms. As a result, no 
additional information is needed to identify the hierarchy by using empirical 
instruments such as job transition matrices or wage deciles. The availability of this 
information is a crucial aspect of the analysis as it allows for the identification of a 
large number of sophisticated mobility patterns including promotions, demotions, 
stayers, and several potentially different forms of lateral mobility. Note that the data 
do not include a variable specifically labeling every job transition as a promotion or 
demotion, as in Gibbs and Hendricks (2004); instead, the data provide a blueprint of 
the firm in which I am able to identify movements within and between sections.1
      Firms report three pieces of information about every worker that identifies a 
location and position in the organizational structure: the worker's reporting level, 
organizational unit level and a job code identifier, which I summarize as 
(RL
 
ijt,UNITijt,JCijt
 
).  These three variables allow me to completely identify job 
transitions within the firm and are defined as follows: 
• Reporting Level:  The reporting level is the number of levels away from the 
Board of Directors.  All positions reporting directly to the CEO are in reporting 
level 2; all positions reporting directly to those positions are in reporting level 
3, and so on.   
                                                 
1 While Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) know the transition type, they do not have information about 
reporting levels and the overall hierarchy. On the other hand, the Portuguese data used by Lima (2000) 
include a variable that indicates the date of last promotion and a level assigned to the worker. 
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• Organizational Unit Level:  The organizational unit level counts the number of 
major organizational units between the Board of Directors and the worker's 
organizational unit.  An organizational unit is a company, group, division, sales 
region, or manufacturing facility that the company counts as a separate profit 
center.  Executives with responsibilities that span the entire corporation are 
considered corporate positions and are a unit level 1.  In an organization where 
a division manager reports to a group executive who reports to a company 
president and COO, the division manager is unit level 3, the group executive is 
unit level 2 and the president and COO is unit level 1.  
 
• Job Code:  A numeric code that best describes a worker's responsibilities.2
 
 
 The meaning of the job code identifier is straightforward and the reporting 
level is how one naturally thinks of slicing a hierarchy into a single file job ladder.  
The organizational unit level deserves some discussion since the additional dimension 
of detail allows us to partition each firm's hierarchy into potentially interconnected 
branches and identify more complex transitions.  Essentially, a change in a worker's 
organizational unit often implies a change in workplace location but it can also 
represent a change in the worker's responsibility.  Consistency within this structure 
implies that an executive's organizational unit should be weakly higher (closer to the 
CEO) than her reporting level; that is, reporting levels can overlap across 
organizational units, but it is unlikely to observe a manager that has an organizational 
unit further from the CEO than her subordinates. Table 1.2 displays how 
                                                 
2 More generally we would consider an additional state variable that distinguishes new hires, 
incumbents and exits, but the data do not provide adequate information to properly identify new hires 
and exits. 
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organizational units map into reporting levels. The cells below the diagonal are 
sparsely populated, which provides assurances that the hierarchies are consistently 
reported across firms. The table also confirms that several reporting levels exist within 
each organizational unit.    
     Note that with information on organizational units, the hierarchy is no longer a 
one dimensional ladder; instead, the hierarchy more naturally reflects the complexities 
of an organization's structure and incorporates possible career paths. This additional 
information offers an opportunity to distinguish among a number of different types of 
transitions that would otherwise be undetectable or appear homogenous in other data 
sets. For example, a lateral move within a reporting level in the same organizational 
unit might be different than a lateral move within the same reporting level but to a 
different office in another organizational unit.      
     Stayers and movers are identified in each period by changes in one or any of 
the three position variables. Therefore, (ΔRLijt+1, ΔUNITijt+1, ΔJCijt+1) contains all the 
information needed to distinguish the different possible transitions between periods t 
and t+1.  Let ΔRL+ijt+1 denote a rise in reporting level closer to the CEO, ΔRL-ijt+1 a 
fall in reporting level away from the CEO and ΔRL0ijt+1 as no change in reporting 
level. Let ΔUNIT+ijt+1, ΔUNIT-ijt+1, and ΔUNIT0ijt+1 be denoted in the same way.  We 
cannot determine from ΔJCijt+1 alone whether or not it represents a rise or fall in the 
hierarchy and so denote ΔJC1ijt+1 as a change in job title and ΔJC0ijt+1
This framework yields 18 different mobility types including workers who stay 
in the same job (3×3×2 possibilities). This is not only difficult to analyze in a tractable 
manner but presents substantial ambiguity concerning the interpretation and 
meaningfulness of each type of transition.     
 as no change in 
job title.  
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Table 1.2 
How Does a Company’s Unit Level Map Into Reporting Level?  
        
Reporting Level of Company 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 or Below 
Unit Level of 
Company        
1 3.59 14.3 31.53 31.86 14.19 3.63 0.9 
2 0.01 7.65 27.08 34.31 20.81 7.73 2.41 
3 0 0.77 12.84 34.22 31.58 14.86 5.73 
4 0 0.05 1.79 17.04 34.27 28.09 18.76 
5 0 0.05 2.37 9.19 27.92 36.2 24.28 
6 0 0 0 0 3.29 31.09 65.62 
7 or Below 0.14 0.58 1.58 2.3 1.44 0.14 93.81 
        
Total 
Observations: 2,426 13,405 41,068 60,965 47,075 23,939 12,269 
Note:  Each observation is an executive-year.  The cells represent percentages and the rows sum to 100. The table shows that 
multiple reporting levels exist within each unit level. Consistency in the reporting of worker positions requires unit levels to be 
weakly closer to the top of the hierarchy than reporting levels.  Therefore, cells in the table should be mostly populated in the 
upper triangular matrix represented by the shaded area.     
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Therefore, to collapse the 18 different transitions I utilize two assumptions to classify 
promotions, demotions, lateral moves and those who are retained in the same job. 
1. A change in reporting level is a more valuable (but not exclusive) identifier to 
sort promotions, demotions and lateral moves than a change in organizational 
unit level. 
2. A change in job title signals a significant change in position.    
    Accepting these two statements allows me to collapse the 18 mobility types into 
8 transitions (and another labeled stayer) by what amounts to collapsing some of the 
movements across unit levels and putting more (but not all) emphasis on changes in 
job titles and reporting levels. These transition types, the labels I give them and a 
description of each transition are displayed in the Appendix as Table APP1.1
                                                 
1It is possible for changes in reporting or unit levels to span more than a single level.  I do not 
distinguish between such multi-level moves in this paper. 
  
Promotions are those movements up the reporting level that accompany a change in 
job title, regardless of the worker's organizational unit. Demotions are movements 
with a change in job title and a move down the reporting level, but can involve any 
change in unit level as well.  I label four transitions as potentially different forms of 
lateral mobility: Lateral-strict, Lateral-up, Lateral-down and Lateral-same job. The 
common component here is that they are all transitions within the same reporting 
level.  Additionally, each of first three involves a change in job title but the difference 
lies with the new position's organizational unit:  Lateral-strict involves no change in 
unit level, Lateral-up a rise in unit level closer to headquarters and Lateral-down a fall 
in unit level.  Lateral-same job is a transition within a reporting level that constitutes a 
change in unit level but no change in job title.  Lateral-same job could be interpreted 
literally as a transfer to another office with the same duties. Level-up same job is a 
transition up the reporting level without a change in job title but can involve any 
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change in unit level. Level-down same job is similar to Level-up same job except the 
difference is a fall in reporting level.  Finally, Stayers are those workers who exhibit 
no change in reporting level or unit level nor do they change job titles. 
     Table 1.3 presents the overall distribution of the nine mobility types by 
reporting level. Workers defined as Stayer represent 62.3 percent. Considering only 
position changes, promotions account for 8.8% of transitions, demotions 5.6%, and 
lateral transitions involving a job title change, as a group, represent 16.5%. Lateral 
moves without a job title change account for 18.4% of job transitions. Transitions 
involving no change in job title but cross levels either up or down (Level-down same 
job and Level-up same job) account for a large fraction of transitions at 50.5%. 
 
1.3.2 A Descriptive Analysis of Job Mobility and Pay 
     The relationships between worker salaries and job mobility shed important 
insights concerning how these transitions are similar and different.  Table 4 displays 
the distribution of the growth in nominal base pay associated with each type of 
transition. Some interesting patterns emerge from this table. Those transitions labeled 
Promotion stand out with a median promotion yielding a 15% increase in base pay. 
The median increase in base pay for Lateral-same job, Level-up-same job, Level 
down-same job, Stay and Demotions is roughly the same around 7.5%, but the median 
increase for Lateral-strict, Lateral-up and Lateral-down are all slightly higher at 9 to 
10 percent. Consistent with previous findings, declines in nominal wages are rare; 
however, 10% of demotions involve nominal pay declines of 18% or more. Although 
the average percentage change is positive at 5.6%, the average monetary change in 
base pay for demotions is -$1,200. There are also reductions in base pay for all 
transitions (including promotions) at the first percentile or less. To the extent that 
changes in base pay are good metrics for sorting these transitions, Table 1.4 suggests 
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Table 1.3 
Distribution of Job Transitions by Reporting Level 
 
Promote Demote Lateral - Strict 
Lateral - 
Up 
Lateral - 
Down 
Lateral - 
Same 
Job 
Level 
Up - 
Same 
Job 
Level 
Dn - 
Same 
Job 
Stayer N 
Reporting 
Level            
1 7.78 0.00 2.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 90.11 1,659 
2 6.52 0.16 6.04 1.71 1.33 1.36 10.45 0.03 72.39 8,591 
3 5.08 0.84 5.01 1.02 0.99 4.14 12.56 2.16 68.21 24,951 
4 3.06 1.93 4.78 1.07 1.06 6.95 11.06 6.69 63.40 34,821 
5 1.96 3.22 3.75 0.96 0.85 9.06 9.19 13.65 57.36 25,334 
6 1.48 3.94 2.82 1.00 0.70 11.60 7.11 18.98 52.37 11,651 
7 or Below 0.83 4.02 1.96 0.32 0.36 10.62 5.60 27.46 48.82 5,553 
           
Total Obs: 3,738 2,392 4,856 1,153 1,049 7,805 11,355 10,065 70,147 112,560 
% of Total Obs 3.3 2.1 4.3 1.0 0.9 6.9 10.1 8.9 62.3 100.0 
Percent of 
Non-stayer 
Transitions:  
8.8 5.6 11.4 2.7 2.4 18.4 26.8 23.7 100.0 -- 
Note:  Row percentages sum to 100.  All but one of the Lateral-Strict transitions in reporting level 1 are between titles “CEO” 
and “Chairman of the Board (not CEO  
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Table 1.4 
Percentage Changes in Nominal Base Pay by Transition Type 
Mobility Mean Obs <1% 5th 10  % th 25  % th 50  % th 75  % th 90  % th 95  % th >99%   % 
            
Promote 22.38 3,738 -25.00 0.00 0.30 7.69 14.94 25.93 44.00 66.67 171.54 
Demote 5.57 2,391 -70.00 -43.47 -18.03 0.00 7.74 13.80 23.20 32.02 66.67 
Lateral - 
Strict 10.67 4,856 -16.49 0.00 0.00 5.24 9.00 14.41 22.38 29.03 50.91 
Lateral - Up 11.71 1,153 -43.01 -2.04 0.00 4.94 9.76 17.71 28.80 38.89 68.60 
Lateral - 
Down 13.14 1,049 -39.13 -4.14 0.00 5.00 10.00 18.42 29.87 42.86 96.67 
Lateral - 
Same Job 7.76 7,805 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.01 7.11 10.14 15.00 19.65 31.71 
Level Up - 
Same Job 8.94 11,355 -0.28 0.00 0.00 5.00 7.81 11.24 17.38 23.15 38.89 
Level Down 
- Same Job 8.34 10,057 -1.31 0.00 0.00 5.00 7.57 10.71 15.10 20.21 36.14 
Stayer 7.88 70,135 -0.02 0.00 0.00 4.49 7.32 10.47 15.00 19.44 31.58 
Note: Percent differences are relative to previous year’s earnings.  Example: The transition Promote is related to an average 
increase in base pay of 22.38%. 
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that promotions and demotions are entirely different from the other transitions but the 
distributions for Lateral-same job, Level-up-same job and Level down-same job 
appear relatively the same.   
     Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a) showed that promoted workers tended to 
come from the top end of the reporting level's pay distribution before promotion and 
enter the lower end in the new level, but promoted workers exit and enter all parts of 
the old and new levels' pay distribution. Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) performed a 
similar analysis that included demotions and lateral transitions. They report that 
promoted workers entered the lower end of the new salary range, demoted workers 
were more often moved into the higher end of the new salary range, and lateral 
transitions resulted in a new salary levels somewhere in the middle. To investigate 
whether these same patterns exist in my data, I performed a similar analysis and 
present the results in Tables 1.5 and 1.6. For each firm, I calculated the firm-specific 
distributional ranking of real base pay at the 10, 25, 50, 75, 90 and 90th percentiles for 
every reporting level (across years) and assigned workers to the relevant position in 
the firm-level-specific salary distributions. For those transitions which did not involve 
a change in reporting level, the new and old reporting level percentiles are the same 
and therefore a change in ranking occurs because of an increase in pay within that 
level. For example, in panel A only 5.78% of promoted workers had a salary in the 
new reporting level at the 90th percentile or higher, and in panel B, 25.44% of 
promotions exited the top decile of the former pay distribution. 
The most obvious pattern is that of demotions - demotions come from the bottom part 
of their former salary distribution (34.3% from the bottom quartile) and enter the top 
in the new level (49.6% into the upper quartile). Promotions stem heavily from the 
upper part of the pay distribution (46.7% from the upper quartile) but salaries are more 
evenly distributed in the new level. The lateral transitions involving a change in job 
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Table 1.5 
Location in Reporting Level Base Pay Distribution by Transition Type 
Location in Reporting Level’s Pay Distribution After Transition 
Mobility < 10
th 10-25 
Percentile 
th 25-50 
Percentile Percentile 
th 50-75th 75-90 
Percentile 
th >90 
Percentile 
th
N  Percentile 
Promote 10.14 14.24 25.64 28.83 15.36 5.78 3,738 
Demote 4.11 7.75 15.38 23.13 22.55 27.07 2,391 
Lateral - Strict 4.20 10.18 21.11 27.54 21.03 15.94 4,856 
Lateral - Up 3.12 5.46 16.13 26.11 26.97 22.20 1,153 
Lateral - Down 4.10 6.67 20.11 30.70 23.83 14.59 1,049 
Lateral - Same Job 6.43 11.17 22.79 27.19 18.86 13.56 7,805 
Level Up - Same Job 13.46 18.65 28.14 24.45 10.96 4.34 11,355 
Level Down - Same Job 5.09 8.67 19.04 25.40 19.88 21.92 10,057 
Stayer 7.52 13.53 25.08 26.69 16.27 10.91 70,135 
Note: The percentiles are calculated individually for each firm and for every level (the percentiles are not year specific).  
Base Pay is in real 1980 dollars.  
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Table 1.6 
Location in Reporting Level Base Pay Distribution by Transition Type 
Location in Reporting Level Pay Distribution Before Transition 
Mobility < 10
th 10-25 
Percentile 
th 25-50 
Percentile Percentile 
th 50-75th 75-90 
Percentile 
th >90 
Percentile 
th
N  Percentile 
Promote 4.98 7.46 16.91 23.92 21.29 25.44 3,738 
Demote 14.67 19.65 26.46 24.54 10.20 4.47 2,391 
Lateral - Strict 8.82 12.94 23.85 26.47 18.00 9.93 4,856 
Lateral – Up 4.94 8.15 20.99 31.05 20.90 13.96 1,153 
Lateral - Down 6.96 12.77 24.31 28.98 17.54 9.44 1,049 
Lateral - Same Job 9.51 14.08 23.63 26.49 15.70 10.59 7,805 
Level Up - Same Job 6.21 9.45 19.16 24.54 19.30 21.34 11,355 
Level Down - Same Job 17.74 21.07 29.23 20.85 7.98 3.14 10,057 
Stayer 11.33 16.02 26.00 24.92 13.82 7.91 70,135 
Note: The percentiles are calculated individually for each firm and for every level (the percentiles are not year specific).  Base 
Pay is in real 1980 dollars.  
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title (Lateral-strict, Lateral-up and Lateral-down) are more evenly spread in both the 
new and old pay distributions but occur less often from the bottom quartile. Lateral-
same job exhibits patterns very similar to those who Stay.  The patterns for Level-up-
same job and Level down-same job appear similar to promotions and demotions, 
respectively, but this result should be observed with caution. 
     The descriptive analysis presented above provides hints that some of these 
transitions are more similar than others. The relationships between job mobility and 
outcomes such as salary growth and the number of employees supervised offer 
somewhat conflicting evidence as to how the various lateral transitions are related. 
The one point that seems to be clear is that a change in job title matters.  Lateral 
transitions involving a job change result in larger salary increases accompanied by 
greater supervisory responsibilities than lateral transitions which do not. A worker's 
rank in reporting level is also important. Job changes that cross reporting levels 
(promotions and demotions) are different from job changes within reporting levels. I 
explore these connections in greater detail later in the paper with a focus on 
statistically identifying meaningful differences and similarities between these 
transitions.   
 
1.4 Motivational Framework 
     To fix ideas and motivate the investigation of the relative importance of lateral 
mobility to other mobility outcomes, I expand on a framework similar to Kwon and 
Milgrom (2004) that considers the firm's assignment problem in an empirical setting.  
Suppose that in each period t, there is an outcome of interest to the firm, Yit(kit), for 
every worker i under job assignment kit. For now, assume that Yit(kit) is the expected 
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productivity of worker i in period t under job assignment kit, and that the worker's 
expected productivity net of transition costs, TCit(kit,kit-1) is given1
 
 by 
Yit(kit) = ηk + φgkEXPit + φfkSENit + γkΔSPANit(kit,kit-1
α
) +                      (1.1) 
kSPANit-1(kit-1) + Xitβk - TCit(kit,kit-1) + εit(kit
 
) 
where kit is an assignment choice for worker i in period t: promote (kit =P); demote (kit 
=D); lateral move (kit =L for lateral moves with a change in job title and kit =L’ for 
lateral moves without a job title change); or retain in the same job (kit =S).2  EXPit 
measures the general labor market experience of worker i in period t.  SENit measures 
the seniority of worker i in period t as years of tenure; SPANit-1(kit-1) is the span of 
control for worker i at the end of the previous period t-1, measured by the number of 
subordinates; ΔSPANit(kit,kit-1) is change in the span of control of worker i under 
assignment choice kit; Xit is a vector of worker and firm characteristics associated with 
worker i in period t; TCit(kit,kit-1) is the transition cost associated with worker i under 
assignment choice kit; and εit(kit) is a stochastic disturbance, interpreted as a matching 
component for worker i under job assignment kit
 In this framework, the transition costs are a key component to the firm's 
assignment decision.  While TC
. 
it(kit,kit-1
                                                 
1 The vector X contains the following controls: year indicators; firm, industry, and ownership 
indicators; firm size, sales and profits; worker education and reporting level in the firm; and indicators 
for whether the worker in the new position is bonus eligible, eligible for long-term incentive plans or is 
on the board of directors. 
) is not observable to the econometrician, it is 
likely a function of many of the same observed components that determine 
productivity.  For example, consider the decision to reassign a worker from job A to 
2 To simplify the problem conceptually and computationally, the assignment choice "Lateral w/ Job 
Title Change" aggregates the following mobility types found in appendix table APP1: Lateral-Strict, 
Lateral-Up, and Lateral-Down.  The assignment choice "Lateral w/o Job Title Change" aggregates the 
following mobility types: Lateral-Same Job, Level-Up Same Job, Level-Dn Same Job. Given the 
descriptive results in the previous section, this is a reasonable aggregation and is consistent with the two 
assumptions that collapsed the original 18 mobility types to 9 transitions. 
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job B.  Regardless of whether or not a worker has ever worked in job B, if the worker 
has many years of seniority at the firm she is likely to have at least some knowledge 
about job B, making the job transition less costly than it would be for a worker with 
less seniority.  On the other hand, a long tenure in job A would result in the loss or 
under-utilization of job-specific capital after reassignment to job B.  As another 
example, the degree to which the tasks performed in the two jobs are similar should 
determine the transition costs.   
     Kwon and Milgrom (2004) model the transition costs as a function of firm 
and/or occupation tenure but do not account for the change in the wage bill associated 
with job assignments, such as promotion.  In an environment where firms optimally 
assign workers to jobs that maximize expected productivity, this may be appropriate.  
However, since it is standard to assume the firm's goal is to maximize profits it is 
necessary to discuss the wage bill associated with job re-assignments.  In the absence 
of incentive issues related to internal labor markets and firm-specific productivity 
effects (i.e., when the effect of SENit captures only job- or task-specific skills that are 
transferable), then the equilibrium wage offer is equal to the worker's marginal 
product of labor (Lazear and Oyer, 2007).  In the framework above, productivity is a 
direct function of the job assignment, kit, and so this means that the equilibrium offer 
is an assignment-wage pair (kit,Wit). Including the change in the wage bill as part of 
the transition costs may only require a reinterpretation of Yit(kit) as the expected 
profits produced by worker i under assignment kit
     To estimate equation (1.1) (where the firm's problem is to assign workers to 
jobs that maximize the expected productivity net of transition costs), I assume a 
setting that incorporates the following assumptions and timing.  At the beginning of 
period t, workers accumulate any productivity-enhancing skills and make their 
resumes public, and firms with full and symmetric information about workers, with no 
 in period t.   
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incentive policies in place, make job-specific wage offers on an open spot market.  
Wages are, in essence, predetermined for any assignment option, and leaving them out 
of the transition costs therefore accounts only for the productivity costs of the job 
change.  At the end of period t, firms assign workers to positions and production takes 
place.3 That is, the firm chooses the assignment kit∗ for worker i in period t such that 
Yit(kit∗)=max[Yit(kit)] for k=P,D,L,L’,S. 4
The expected productivity is a latent variable, and a Type I extreme value 
distributional assumption on ε
 
it(kit) implies a multinomial logit model where the 
parameter vector Θk=(ηk,φgk,φfk,αk,γk) is specific to assignment choice k.5 Given the 
framework, the parameter φgk on variable EXPit has the standard interpretation of the 
return to general human capital accumulation, but the parameter φfk requires 
discussion. The standard interpretation is that SENit
                                                 
3 I abstract from between-firm transitions such as dismissing workers or hiring from the outside, 
because the data do not provide adequate information to indicate whether a newly observed worker was 
recently hired or was simply reported by the firm for the first time.  Similarly, the reason the worker 
exits the data is not known. 
 measures firm-specific human 
capital accumulation of worker i in period t, but in the context of job mobility it is 
important to note that seniority also captures components of job tenure and task-
specific capital accumulation. While these latter two components are thought to 
improve one's productivity, some or all of those improvements are lost or 
underutilized when one switches jobs. The extent to which the return to firm-specific 
capital accumulation does or does not dominate the loss of job/task specific 
components is important to the firm's decision making process. The sign of the 
4 Operationally, there is a latent index Yit(kit∗) such that if Yit(kit∗)- Yit(j)≥0 for k≠j then Yit(kit)=1 and 
Yit(j)=0.  Therefore, Yit(kit) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if k is chosen and 0 otherwise. 
5 I do not assume or constrain the expected contribution to output, Yit(kit), to be non-negative, since the 
transition costs associated with some assignment options could outweigh the productive abilities of the 
worker.  Furthermore, some assignment options may be feasible but destructive such as promoting a 
newly hired college graduate to CEO of a large corporation. 
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coefficient of SENit
     The span of control is a measure of the worker's command over firm resources, 
accounting both for situations in which a worker's output is a function of the 
productivity of her subordinates and those in which managers are strictly 
coordinators.
 along with a strict interpretation of the model will provide insights 
to that issue. 
6 Note the identity used in equation (1): SPANit(kit) = (ΔSPANit-1(kit-1) +  
ΔSPANit(kit,kit-1
Consider the following specification for the transition costs associated with 
changing jobs from periods t-1 to t:
)).  The span of control is decomposed in this way to explicitly 
account for the change in the command over firm resources associated with changing 
jobs. The change in span of control may also be a proxy for the change in 
responsibility or difficulty between the positions.    
7
 
 
 TCit(kit,kit-1) = ak + bkSENit + ck ΔSPANit(kit,kit-1) + νit(kit
 
)                      (1.2) 
     Here the transition cost is assumed to be solely a function of seniority, the 
change in span of control and a random component assumed to follow a Type I 
extreme value distribution. While there may be other important factors related to the 
transition cost, this specification is sufficient to illustrate the issues underlying the 
standard estimation of the assignment problem when transition costs are considered.  
Note the parameter bk
                                                 
6 Waldman (1984) considers the case where managers are strictly coordinators and total production is 
simply the product of the number of laborers the manager supervises and the output per laborer 
(Assumption 9', p. 100).  He shows (Theorem 3) that the firm's choice for N, the number of 
subordinates, is increasing in the ability of the manager who supervises them.  Rosen (1982) builds a 
model with recursive production technology where higher ability managers are placed in positions that 
have greater influence and greater span of control. 
 in equation (2). As mentioned above, seniority captures both 
firm-specific and job-specific capital.  If firm-specific capital accumulation makes job 
7For  workers who stay in the same job, I assume TC(k)it=0. 
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transitions less costly, it should pull this parameter in the negative direction whereas if 
the loss of important job-specific components dominates we would expect bk>0.  If an 
increase in the number of subordinates represents an increase in responsibility or in the 
complexity of the new position, we would expect ck
     Substituting equation (1.2) into (1.1) gives the specification for the latent 
variable, Y
>0. 
it(kit
 
), that leads to the empirical model I estimate: 
 Yit(kit)  = (ηk- ak) + φgkEXPit + (φfk - bk)SENit + αkSPANit-1(kit-1
   (γ
) +        (1.3) 
k-ck)ΔSPANit(kit,kit-1) + Xitβk - TCit(kit,kit-1) + (εit(kit)- vit(kit
 
)) 
     Equation (1.3) shows that the multinomial logit parameters for the intercept, 
seniority and the impact of a change in span of control reflect both the returns to those 
variables that directly affect productivity as well as the effect of transition costs 
associated with changing jobs. Each equation for promotions, demotions and lateral 
moves produces its own set of parameter estimates, and the signs and magnitudes of 
these estimates shed light on the differences across the various types of job transitions.  
For example, suppose the estimated coefficient for SENit in the promotion equation is 
positive, i.e. (φfP – bP)>0.  Since human capital theory predicts the productivity gains 
to seniority (φfP) to be positive, (φfP – bP)>0 implies either that bP <0 (seniority 
reduces the transition cost of promotion) or that φfP > bP >0 (overall productivity 
returns to seniority dominate any costs associated with the promotion that are related 
to seniority, such as the loss in job-specific capital).  The estimates of φfk – bk in the 
demotion equation and in both equations for lateral moves have analogous 
interpretations, and comparisons of φfk – bk across all four equations provide 
information about the relative importance of the independent variables to the firm's job 
assignment decision relative to stayers.   
29 
     Note that identification of the multinomial logit requires that the parameters of 
the base equation (i.e., the one corresponding to the worker staying in the same job) be 
normalized to zero, and therefore the parameters for promotions, lateral moves, and 
demotions measure effects that are relative to those for workers who stay in the same 
job.  Hence, the magnitude and sign of the estimate of φfk – bk
 
 in, say, the promotion 
equation is not simply the net effect of an addition year of seniority on the probability 
of promotion but rather the net effect relative to staying in the same job. 
1.5 Empirical Results 
     Table 1.7 displays the parameters of interest for the multinomial logit from 
Equation (1.3) and accounting for the wage bill associated with each transition.8 The 
first thing to note is that general labor market experience has a negative and significant 
estimated coefficient in the equations for promotions and lateral moves and is 
essentially zero for demotions.  The estimate, denoted by the parameter φgk  appears 
only in the expected productivity equation, and one might expect this coefficient to be 
positive if increases in general human capital accumulation should make one more 
productive.  However, EXPit
                                                 
8 The counterfactual wage a worker would have received under a different assignment is clearly not 
available.  Therefore, to capture the impact of the prices of promotions, demotions and lateral moves on 
the probabilities of various job assignments, I calculated the mean change in real wages associated with 
each transition separately for every firm-reporting level.  There is not enough variation to compute 
these averages each year, therefore the mean is calculated across all workers in that firm-reporting level 
who had the same transition. 
 does not appear in the transition cost equation only for 
expositional purposes. General labor market experience might affect transition costs in 
multiple ways. For example, more experienced (older) workers may have already 
peaked or have found good long term job matches, whereas younger workers are still 
moving up the career path or are being reassigned to better matches. It could also be 
more difficult for older workers to make significant job changes if younger workers 
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are more flexible and adaptive.  In either case, if those effects outweigh the 
productivity gains from experience, it would drive the estimated coefficient on 
experience in the negative direction. Note also that this coefficient in the promotions 
equation is more than twice its magnitude in the equation for lateral moves that entail 
a change in job title, and exceeds by an even greater margin the coefficient in the 
equation corresponding to other lateral transitions. This suggests that while more 
experienced workers are less likely to be both promoted or laterally moved than 
retained in the same job, younger workers are more likely to be moved laterally than 
older workers. 
     The coefficient on seniority φfk – bk reflects the productivity effect of seniority 
net of transition costs.  This estimated coefficient is positive and significant only for 
promotions and lateral moves with job title changes, although the maginitudes are 
small.  The (unreported) log-odds ratios are only 1.015 for promotions and 1.005 for 
the lateral transitions, which means that an additional year of seniority limitedly 
improves the likelihood of promotion or lateral mobility.  This positive estimate of 
seniority implies that φfk – bk >0.  As discussed above, this could lead to two 
interpretations conditional on the hypothesis that φfk ≥0: either seniority makes job 
transitions less costly (bk <0), or the overall productivity returns to seniority dominate 
any detrimental job-specific costs φfP > bP
Similarly, the coefficient on the change in span of control (γ
 >0 associated with the transition.  
k-ck
 
) is positive and 
significant for promotions and lateral moves with a job title change but negative and 
significant for demotions and is essentially zero for lateral transitions without a job 
title change.  The positive coefficients suggest that the added productivity associated 
with providing a worker with additional resources (subordinates) outweighs the costs 
involved with the job change for promotions and lateral moves.  This is not the case 
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Table 1.7 
Multinomial Logit Estimates from Equation (1.3) – Including the Expected Price of Transition   
      
Variable Estimated Parameters Promote Demote 
Lateral w/ Job 
Title Change 
Lateral w/o Job 
Title Change 
      
Intercept 
 
kk a−η  2.935*** (0.0001) 
-3.670*** 
(0.0001) 
1.343*** 
(0.0005) 
-1.283*** 
(0.0001) 
Experience (EXPit
 
) k
gφ  
 
-0.059*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006 
(0.866) 
-0.025*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Seniority (SENit
 
) kk
f b−φ  
0.014*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.004 
(0.197) 
0.006*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0002 
(0.867) 
Span of Control (SPANit-1
 
) kα  
 
-0.005* 
(0.076) 
0.025*** 
(0.0001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.003) 
Change in Span of Control 
(ΔSPANit
kk c−γ
) 
 
 
0.065*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.051*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.976) 
Mean Price of Promotion  -- 0.0006 (0.724) 
0.005 
(0.276) 
0.01*** 
(0.00001) 
0.007*** 
(0.0001) 
Mean Price of Demotion  -- 0.000009 (0.993) 
-0.003*** 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.161) 
0.0005 
(0.313) 
Mean Price of Lateral Move 
with Change in Job -- 
-0.0002 
(0.942) 
-0.02*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003* 
(0.078) 
0.013*** 
(0.0001) 
Mean Price of Lateral Move 
with no Change in Job Title  -- 
0.010** 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.286) 
-0.010** 
(0.012) 
-0.020*** 
(0.0001) 
Mean Price of Retaining the 
worker in the Same Job  -- 
0.0008* 
(0.068) 
-0.010 
(0.346) 
-0.0004 
(0.440) 
-0.01*** 
(0.009) 
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Table 1.7 (Continued) 
Number of observations 
Log-Likelihood 
86,178 
-82,804.03     
 Note: p-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  The assignment choice "Lateral w/ Job Title Change" 
aggregates the following mobility types found in Tables 9-12: Lateral-Strict, Lateral-Up, and Lateral-Down.  The 
assignment choice "Lateral w/o Job Title Change" aggregates the following mobility types: Lateral-Same Job, Level-Up 
Same Job, Level-Down Same Job. The model also includes the following controls: year indicators; firm, industry, and 
ownership indicators; firm size, sales and profits; worker education and reporting level in the firm; and indicators for 
whether the worker in the new position is bonus eligible, eligible for long-term incentive plans or is on the board of 
directors. 
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for demotions as the negative coefficient indicates that the costs associated with 
increasing the resources of a demoted worker outweighs any productivity gains.          
 Some interesting patterns appear in the price coefficients. For example, the 
Mean Price of Promotion variable has no impact on the probability of promotion or 
demotion but is positive and significant in the models for both lateral moves with and 
without a job title change.  Holding constant the firm and worker characteristics that 
are also in the model, this suggests that as promotions get more expensive, workers are 
more likely to receive lateral assignments than stay in the same job.  This could be 
because those workers would normally be considered for promotion under lower 
promotion wage spreads and are instead laterally moved.  Furthermore, when the wage 
spread for demotions increases, workers are less likely to be demoted.  Put differently, 
when wage reductions for demotions are large in absolute value, the probability of 
being demoted increases relative to staying in the same job. Also, when the price of 
lateral moves that entail a job title change increases, workers are more likely to be 
moved laterally without a job title change rather than remaining in the same position.   
     The motivational framework of this section highlights several important points 
for the empirical work in the rest of the paper.  Job changes are not costless, and these 
costs as well as the returns to standard human capital characteristics should be 
expected to vary across the range of potential assignment options available to the firm.  
This can be seen empirically by the varying magnitudes and signs of the coefficients 
across equations for the various job transitions in the multinomial logit models.  
Additionally, lateral moves with a job title change and promotions look more similar 
to one another than to those who stay in the same job or to the other transitions, while 
demotions appear distinctly different from any of the mobility outcomes.  Lastly, 
incorporating the monetary costs of job assignments suggests that there may be 
substitution across jobs when the cost of one type of assignment becomes more or less 
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expensive.  The remainder of the paper investigates the relationships between worker 
outcomes and job mobility in detail, with an emphasis on understanding the relative 
importance of lateral mobility compared to other job assignment options such as 
promotion, demotion or retention in the same job.   
 
1.5.1 The Determinants of Pay 
     I now investigate the relationship between job mobility and career outcomes by 
estimating the determinants of pay.  Following Abowd et al. (1999), consider a 
standard wage equation with matched employer-employee data that has the form:   
 
 yijt=JOBijtΩ + Xijtβ + Fjtδ + θi + ηt + εijt                       
 
                                    (1.4) 
where yijt is the logarithm of annual real base pay (or base + bonus pay) of individual i 
at firm j in year t; JOBijt is a vector of characteristics related to the job individual i 
holds in period t; Xijt is a vector of other characteristics related to the individual; Fjt is 
a vector of firm characteristics; θi is the individual effect; ηt are year effects; and εijt is 
the error term.1
The structure of the data does not allow me to track the mobility of individuals 
across firms, and so the firm and worker effects cannot be disentangled and are forced 
to collapse into a single heterogeneity component. One consequence of this is that the 
individual effects cannot be interpreted as ability or other aspects specific to the 
individual that are constant over time; instead, when θ
 
i is included it also captures the 
pure firm effect and its relationship between the variables in X and the design matrices 
that establish the person and firm effects. Thus, θi
                                                 
1 I assume the errors are i.i.d. and normally distributed. 
 should be interpreted more 
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generally as an individual effect that includes those components associated with both 
the worker and the firm that are constant over time.2
Another concern is that an individual's job is possibly endogenous to pay.  This 
would be especially problematic if promotions or one's position in the hierarchy 
simply reflected a justification for the level of compensation. That appears not to be 
the case, as Tables 1.5 and 1.6 showed that promotions and other transitions often 
come from all parts of the pay distribution. To the extent that the heterogeneity 
component θ
 
i captures those aspects in the residual related to a worker's job 
(conditional on the variables in Xijt and Fjt), assuming that JOBijt
     Table 1.8 displays the regression results for the logarithm of real annual base 
pay estimated by ordinary least squares. Column I includes only indicators for the 
worker's position in the hierarchy while columns II to VI progressively add more 
controls: column II adds year effects and dummy variables for the firm's SIC division 
as well as dichotomous indicators for firm ownership (public, private, parent 
company, subsidiary); column III adds additional variables to net out time-varying 
firm-specific heterogeneity in firm size, sales and profits; column IV adds additional 
variables to control for other aspects related to the worker's job; column V adds 
 and pay are 
exogenous may be justified; however, this is unlikely as there are important time 
varying factors such as individual performance that are omitted from equation (1.4). 
These data do not include an explicit measure of worker performance, but the bonus 
pay data may contain useful information.  In the next subsection, I construct two novel 
measures of relative performance using bonus data on workers and explore the impact 
of omitting that information on the estimates obtained here.    
                                                 
2 A second consequence is that the resulting estimates of Ω,β and δ are potentially biased without the 
ability to include a separate firm effect. Unfortunately, there is no solution to this problem with these 
data, but the impact of such an omission poses an interesting question for future research as richer data 
sets become available. 
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variables to control for human capital characteristics such as education, general labor 
market experience and tenure at the firm; and column VI includes the individual 
heterogeneity component.   
     There are several interesting aspects to this table. One is that the organizational 
unit level has explanatory power even when controlling for the reporting level, 
although these effects are mitigated in column VI when the individual effect is 
included in the model. Secondly, across all specifications, the coefficients on reporting 
level descend monotonically from the highest reporting level. These same coefficients 
also remain relatively unaffected when controlling for firm-specific attributes but are 
substantially reduced when other characteristics related to the worker's job are 
included. Once human capital characteristics are included in the model (column V) the 
coefficients on reporting levels are reduced from column I by 30-40%. The most 
significant impact on the reporting level estimates, organizational unit and other job 
variables occurs when the individual effect is added. These results suggest that while 
jobs (especially rank) are important in determining worker pay, human capital 
characteristics and especially those time-invariant traits specific to the individual play 
a large role.3
 
 
1.5.2 Pay and Performance 
     As previously noted, a worker's job in the firm may be endogenous to pay. 
Without proper instruments I assumed that conditional on other factors in the model, 
JOBijt
                                                 
3 When the dependent variable is the logarithm of real (base + bonus) pay, the overall results are 
qualitatively the same except, as expected, bonus pay is significantly larger at higher reporting levels. 
 is exogenous. While it is possible that including the individual effect may have 
satisfied that requirement by controlling for those factors that are time-invariant, there 
could be time-varying variables omitted from the model that might lead to a violation  
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Table 1.8 
Dependent Variable:  Log of Real Base Pay 
       
Variable I II III IV V VI 
Reporting 
Level 1 
2.020*** 2.034*** 2.143*** 1.537*** 1.364*** 0.477*** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Reporting 
Level 2 
1.102*** 1.113*** 1.224*** 0.873*** 0.777*** 0.198*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
Reporting 
Level 3 
0.620*** 0.626*** 0.728*** 0.470*** 0.414*** 0.100*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Reporting 
Level 4 
0.380*** 0.382*** 0.472*** 0.273*** 0.239*** 0.056*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Reporting 
Level 5 
0.241*** 0.237*** 0.307*** 0.159*** 0.139*** 0.034*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Reporting 
Level 6 
0.125*** 0.121*** 0.158*** 0.079*** 0.072*** 0.018*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Organizational 
Unit 1 
0.048 0.024 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.066** -0.033* 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.020) 
Organizational 
Unit 2 
0.157*** 0.141*** 0.279*** 0.245*** 0.147*** -0.006 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.019) 
Organizational 
Unit 3 
0.107*** 0.089** 0.250*** 0.199*** 0.120*** -0.018 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.019) 
Organizational 
Unit 4 
-0.015 -0.009 0.163*** 0.123** 0.076** -0.031 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.019) 
Organizational 
Unit 5 
0.040 0.038 0.208*** 0.138*** 0.096*** -0.021 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.019) 
Organizational 
Unit 6 
0.044 0.047 0.133*** 0.048 0.013 -0.020 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.020) 
Experience -- -- -- -- 0.034*** 0.073*** 
-- -- -- -- (0.0005) (0.0013) 
Experience 
Squared 
-- -- -- -- -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
-- -- -- -- (9.6x10-6 (0.00001) ) 
Seniority -- -- -- -- -0.0023*** 0.0028*** 
-- -- -- -- (0.0003) (0.00001) 
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Table 1.8 (Continued) 
       
Seniority 
Squared 
-- -- -- -- 0.0001*** 0.00004*** 
-- -- -- -- (7.7x10-6 (1.1x10) -7
Schooling = 
16 Years 
) 
-- -- -- -- 0.164*** -- 
-- -- -- -- (0.003) -- 
Schooling = 
17, 18 Years 
-- -- -- -- 0.228*** -- 
-- -- -- -- (0.003) -- 
Schooling > 
18 Years 
-- -- -- -- 0.265*** -- 
-- -- -- -- (0.004) -- 
# Employees 
Supervised) 
-- -- -- 0.0098*** 0.010*** 0.0053*** 
-- -- -- (0.0012) (0.001) (0.0011) 
Bonus 
Eligible 
-- -- -- 0.175*** 0.141 0.046 
-- -- -- (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Long-term 
Incentive  
-- -- -- 0.268*** 0.233*** 0.032*** 
-- -- -- (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
On Board of 
Directors 
-- -- -- 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
-- -- -- (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Total Sales 
(per $100,000) 
-- -- 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
-- -- (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Total Profits 
(per $100,000) 
-- -- 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 
-- -- (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Total 
Employees 
-- -- 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
-- -- (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Firm 
Ownership 
and Industry 
Effects 
 YES YES YES YES -- 
Year Effects  YES YES YES YES YES 
Worker 
Effects 
     YES 
       
Number of 
Observations: 
177,637 177,637 177,637 177,637 177,637 177,637 
R-Squared 0.386 0.428 0.515 0.609 0.663 0.985 
Notes: Models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are reported below the regression coefficient.  
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 percent or better.  ** indicates significance between 0.01 and 
0.05 percent and * indicates significance between 0.05 and 0.10. 
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of the conditional exogeneity assumption. One obvious exclusion would be individual 
performance.     
 Neither relative nor absolute performance ratings are available in these data. 
However, the bonus awards reported for each individual are supposed to reflect 
performance in the current year. This provides an opportunity to construct several 
measures of individual performance relative to other workers in the firm. To do so, I 
estimate the following models using OLS: 
 
 Bonusijt=αPROFITSjt + FIRMj + REPORTINGLEVELijtΠ + εijt
 
             (1.5) 
 Bonusijt=αPROFITSjt + FIRMj + REPORTINGLEVELijt
   + FIRM
Π +                  (1.6) 
j∗REPORTINGLEVELijtΨ + ν
 
ijt 
     The difference between an individual's actual bonus received and the predicted 
bonus creates a measure of relative performance (PERFORMANCEijt=Bonusijt – 
Predicted Bonusijt
     Table 1.9 displays the results of models similar to columns V and VI in Table 
7 but also includes one of the two constructed measures of relative performance.  
). Since portions of worker bonuses may be due to overall firm 
performance and not necessarily individual performance, I include a measure of firm 
profits to net out the effect of time-varying firm performance that would equally affect 
bonus awards of all workers in a firm. For example, the measure resulting from 
equation (1.5) reflects the deviation in the individual's bonus award above (or below) 
that of the average worker in her same firm and position in the hierarchy.  Equation 
(1.6) refines the model in equation (1.5) by forcing the reporting level effects to be 
firm-specific. In each case, the performance measures obtained reflect relative 
performance. 
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Since bonuses are required to construct these measures, the sample is restricted only to 
those workers the firm indicates are eligible to receive them.  Also, since performance 
is constructed with bonus data the regressions, this table utilizes only base pay as the 
dependent variable (rather than base + bonus pay). Column I reports the results for a 
benchmark specification in line with that of column V in Table 7. Columns II and III 
include the performance measure from Equation (5) (Performance A), and columns IV 
and V the measure from Equation (4) (Performance B).  Columns III and V include 
the individual effect while the others do not.   
     In each case, the performance measures have positive and significant effects on 
base pay. For example, a bonus award of $10,000 above the predicted bonus for a 
worker in the same firm and reporting level is related to a 3.1% higher salary 
(Performance B and Column IV). Also, the inclusion of the performance measures 
increases the size of the reporting level coefficients. Note that the inclusion of the 
reporting level dummies means that the effect of performance relates to the within-
reporting-level variation in pay.  A standard omitted variable bias argument states that 
good performance relative to workers in a similar job is negatively correlated with 
being in a high reporting level. These results then imply that being a standout in top 
positions is more difficult than outperforming ones peers in lesser jobs. 
     The other variables in columns II and IV are largely unaffected by including 
performance. Unlike the results in Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981), including 
relative performance has very little impact on the experience, seniority and education 
coefficients. If anything, inclusion of the performance measures slightly reduces the 
coefficients of the schooling coefficients. If the constructed measures are good 
approximations of relative performance, these estimates cannot reject the human 
capital explanation that senior workers in the same position are paid more because 
they are more productive, not only because they are more senior.  
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Table 1.9 
(Dependent Variable:  Log Real Base Pay) 
Including Performance 
 I II III IV V 
Variable Benchmark Performance A (Eqn 5) Performance B (Eqn 6) 
Performance 
Measure 
-- 0.026*** 0.0056*** 0.031*** 0.0053*** 
-- (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Reporting Level 1 1.403*** 1.528*** 0.514*** 1.472*** 0.502*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Reporting Level 2 0.806*** 0.835*** 0.208*** 0.820*** 0.201*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Reporting Level 3 0.440*** 0.452*** 0.100*** 0.446*** 0.094*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Reporting Level 4 0.260*** 0.266*** 0.053*** 0.264*** 0.049*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Reporting Level 5 0.148*** 0.151*** 0.029*** 0.152*** 0.026*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Reporting Level 6 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.012*** 0.081*** 0.010*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Unit Level 1 0.124*** 0.142*** -0.031 0.156*** -0.026 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) 
Unit Level 2 0.223*** 0.249*** 0.002 0.233*** 0.001 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) 
Unit Level 3 0.193*** 0.217*** -0.012 0.207*** -0.012 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.022) (0.036)  (0.022) 
Unit Level 4 0.155*** 0.177*** -0.021 0.169*** -0.021 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) 
Unit Level 5 0.163*** 0.186*** -0.010 0.174*** -0.012 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) 
Unit Level 6 0.044 0.057 -0.004 0.047 -0.005 
(0.041) (0.039) (0.022) (0.039) (0.022) 
Experience 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.078*** 0.034*** 0.077*** 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
Experience Squared -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
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Table 1.9 (Continued) 
Seniority -0.0026*** -0.0026*** 0.0011 -0.0027*** 0.0011 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Seniority Squared 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.00008*** 0.0001*** 0.00008*** 
(8.3x10-6 (8.0x10) -6 (0.00001) ) (8.0x10-6 (0.00001) ) 
Schooling = 16 
years 
0.151*** 0.149*** -- 0.145*** -- 
(0.003) (0.003) -- (0.003) -- 
Schooling = 17,18 
years 
0.213*** 0.210*** -- 0.205*** -- 
(0.003) (0.003) -- (0.003) -- 
Schooling >=19 
years 
0.244*** 0.242*** -- 0.240*** -- 
(0.004) (0.004) -- (0.004) -- 
 # Employees 
Supervised  
0.010*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Incentive Eligible 0.223*** 0.217*** 0.027*** 0.210*** 0.027*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Job is On Board of 
Directors 
0.044*** 0.040*** 0.013*** 0.039*** 0.014*** 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Total Sales   
(per $100,000) 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.0005*** 
(0.0003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Total Profits  
(per $100,000) 
0.009*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Total Employees  0.002*** 0.002*** -0.00002 0.002*** -0.00003 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Ownership and 
Industry YES YES -- YES -- 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Effects   YES  YES 
Number of 
Observations: 116,743 116,743 116,743 116,743 116,743 
R-Squared 0.633 0.660 0.984 0.663 0.984 
Notes: Models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are reported below the regression 
coefficient. *** indicates significance at the 0.01 percent or better. ** indicates significance between 
0.01 and 0.05 percent and * indicates significance between 0.05 and 0.10.  The benchmark model 
does not include a performance measure. 
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    Finally, columns III and V add individual effects to the models in columns II 
and IV. While the impact of relative performance is still positive and significant, the 
magnitudes of the performance variables decreases substantially. Without individual 
effects, a $10,000 deviation from the predicted bonus was associated with 2.6% 
(Column II) or 3.1% (Column III) increase in pay, but the inclusion of individual 
effects reduces theses magnitudes to around 0.5%.  There are aspects related to worker 
performance measured by the individual effects. Unfortunately, we cannot assume the 
individual effects capture only time-invariant traits related to the worker such as innate 
ability because they also reflect the omitted firm effects, but the relationship between 
ability and performance as a plausible explanation for the positive correlation is 
interesting.   
 
1.5.3 Job Mobility and Earnings Growth 
     First differencing Equation (1.4) yields the estimation model for earnings 
growth: 
 
Δyijt=ΔJOBijtΩ + ΔXijtβ + ΔFjtδ + vijt                       
 
                                        (1.7) 
The vector ΔJOBijt maps the hierarchical position indicators into transitions such as 
promotion, demotion, lateral move and stayer, which were discussed in the previous 
section. The individual effect differences out along with the education indicators, and 
experience and tenure become vectors of ones that are absorbed in the intercept. 
Similarly those time-invariant variables associated with the firm (industry and 
ownership dummies) also drop out when first differencing. The rest of the time-
varying variables are first-differenced in the standard way. As with equation (1.4) it is 
possible that ΔJOBijt (promotions, demotions, etc.) is endogenous to earnings growth, 
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but without the availability of good instruments, I assume that, conditional on the 
other right-hand-side variables, E(ΔJOBijtvijt
     Table 1.10 presents the OLS regression results for this model when the 
dependent variable is the first difference of log base pay.
)=0. To help facilitate the validity of this 
assumption, models are also estimated that reintroduce the individual effect, 
anticipating that it will capture those remaining factors in the residual that pose 
endogeneity concerns.   
4
     The economic significance of these estimates relative to stayers is important 
for Promotions, Demotions and lateral transitions that entail a change in job title 
(Lateral-Strict, Lateral-Up and Lateral-Down). For example, the change in pay 
associated with the transitions that do not include a change in job title is either zero or 
is estimated to be between -0.4% and 0.9%, but the change in pay for lateral moves 
with a job title change is much higher relative to stayers (1.5% to 3.4%).
  Similar to Table 1.8 the 
columns from I to V introduce additional controls where the only difference between 
column IV and V is that column V reintroduces the individual effect to the model. The 
variables of interest are at the top of the table (Promotion, Demotion,...,Level Down-
Same Job) where the base category for these dummy variables are those workers who 
stay in the same job. Promotions, Demotions, Lateral-Strict, and Lateral-Down are 
consistently and significantly different from those who stay in the same job. Lateral-
Up, Lateral-Same Job and Level-Up Same Job are statistically different from those 
who stay in the same job, while Level Down-Same Job is associated with essentially 
the same earnings growth as stayers. Inclusion of the individual effect does remove the 
statistical significance for the transition Lateral-Same Job. 
5
                                                 
4 Using changes in log base plus bonus pay as the dependent variable yielded similar results in the 
analysis that follows. 
 
5 I focus on the models with full controls in Columns IV and V to get the range of estimated 
coefficients. 
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Table 1.10 
Dependent Variable:  Changes in Log Base Pay 
Variable I II III IV V 
Promotion 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.082*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Demotion -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.052*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lateral -- 
STRICT 
0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Lateral  -- UP 
 
0.024*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Lateral  -- 
DOWN 
 
0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Lateral – SAME 
JOB 
 
-0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Level Up – 
SAME  
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Level Down – 
SAME   
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Δ # Employees 
Supervised  
(in thousands) 
-- -- -- 0.005*** 0.004*** 
-- -- -- (0.0001) (0.0001) 
New Job is 
Bonus Eligible 
-- -- -- 0.025*** 0.028*** 
-- -- -- (0.002) (0.003) 
New Job is 
Long-term 
Incentive 
Eligible 
-- -- -- 0.023*** 0.018*** 
-- -- -- (0.002) (0.002) 
New Job is On 
Board of 
Directors 
-- -- -- 0.069*** 0.049*** 
-- -- -- (0.004) (0.005) 
Δ Total Sales  -- -- 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0001*** 
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Table 1.10 (Continued) 
(per $100,000) -- -- (0.0003) (0.00002) (0.00005) 
 -- -- (0.0003) (0.00002) (0.00005) 
-- -- (0.0002) (0.00004) (0.0002) 
Δ Total 
Employees (in 
thousands) 
-- -- 0.0001*** -0.00003 -0.0002*** 
-- -- (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00005) 
Year Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Individual 
Effects 
    YES 
Number of 
Observations: 
100,534 100,534 100,534 100,534 100,534 
R-Squared 0.052 0.063 0.076 0.108 0.508 
Notes: Models are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are reported below the 
regression coefficient.  *** indicates significance at the 0.01 percent or better.  ** 
indicates significance between 0.01 and 0.05 percent and * indicates significance 
between 0.05 and 0.10. 
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 Alternatively, the pay change for Promotions relative to those who stay in the 
same position is 8.2% to 9.5%, and for demotions it is -5.2% to -5.9%. Therefore, 
workers who are demoted in these data are penalized heavily on average, 
Promotionhave earnings increases of 2.7 to 6.7 times the size of lateral transitions 
involving job changes, and while lateral transitions with no job change are sometimes 
statistically different from those who stay in the same job, these transitions are 
associated with little change in pay over stayers when not estimated to be zero.     
 Table 1.10 distinguishes the different types of transitions from those who stay 
in the same job. Table 1.11 displays the results for tests of the equality of the 
coefficients across mobility types. In no case are promotions or demotions statistically 
the same as any of the other transitions but the lateral transitions are sometimes 
indistinguishable from one another. Lateral transitions with a job title change are more 
similar to other lateral moves with a job title change but not lateral moves which keep 
the same job title. The same is true for lateral transitions with no change in job title. 
     As mentioned before, relative performance may be an important determinant of 
both earnings growth and job mobility. If worker performance is the mechanism 
sorting workers into jobs to begin with, then some or all of the observed pay growth 
associated with the changing jobs (i.e., the coefficients on the transition variables in 
the models of pay growth) may be due to differences in worker performance and not 
the pay difference in jobs themselves. Table 1.12 displays the results when including 
the two performance measures in the model. The sample is again restricted to workers 
who are bonus eligible, and the configuration of the table is similar to that in Table 1.9 
The results are not much different from models without performance. The coefficients 
on the transition variables are largely unaffected, and including performance does not 
significantly help or hinder the ability to distinguish the mobility types, except that 
lateral transitions with no change in job title appear more alike. This can be seen by . 
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Table 1.11 
Testing the Equality of the Mobility Coefficients 
(Dependent Variable: Changes in Log Base Pay) 
Ho: Ωi=Ωj
 
 for i,j=1, … ,9 and i ≠ j 
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Mobilityi versus Mobility I j II III IV V 
Stay Promotion <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Demotion <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Lateral – STRICT <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Lateral  -- UP <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Lateral  -- DOWN <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Lateral – SAME JOB 0.176 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.307 
Stay Level Up – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Level Down – SAME 
JOB 
0.000 0.007 0.032 0.316 0.000 
 
Promotion Demotion <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Lateral – STRICT <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Lateral  -- UP <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Lateral  -- DOWN <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Level Up – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Level Down – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 1.11 (Continued) 
Demotion Lateral – STRICT <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Lateral  -- UP <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Lateral  -- DOWN <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Level Up – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Level Down – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Lateral – STRICT Lateral  -- UP 0.5378 0.4994 0.7649 0.7875 0.8743 
Lateral – STRICT Lateral  -- DOWN <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 
Lateral – STRICT Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral – STRICT Level Up – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral – STRICT Level Down – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Lateral  -- UP Lateral  -- DOWN 0.0036 0.0031 0.0016 0.0006 0.0025 
Lateral  -- UP Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral -- UP Level Up – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0128 
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Table 1.11 (Continued) 
Lateral -- UP Level Down – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0126 
 
Lateral  -- DOWN Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral  -- DOWN Level Up – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral  -- DOWN Level Down – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral – SAME 
JOB 
Level Up – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0031 
Lateral – SAME 
JOB 
Level Down – SAME 
JOB 0.0004 <.0001 0.0003 0.0012 0.0043 
Level Up – SAME 
JOB 
Level Down – SAME 
JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9498 
Note:  The p-values in this table are for F-tests that the two coefficients in the model are equal, separate 
tests for each model I to VII.  Shaded areas are where the p-value >= 0.05; that is, when we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal.  Columns I through Column V are the tests for the 
corresponding columns in Table 17A.  
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Table 1.12 
Dependent Variable:  Changes in Log Base Pay (Including Performance) 
 I II 
 
III IV V 
Variable Benchmark Performance A  Performance B  
Performance 
Measure 
-- 0.0030*** 0.0024*** 0.0029*** 0.0021*** 
-- (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Promotion 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.083*** 0.095*** 0.082*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Demotion -0.044*** -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.045*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lateral -- STRICT 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Lateral  -- UP 
 
0.022*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Lateral  -- DOWN 
 
0.035*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Lateral – SAME 
JOB 
 
-0.004*** -0.003** 0.002 -0.003** 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Level Up – SAME 
JOB 
0.009*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Level Dn – SAME  
JOB 
0.002 -0.001*** 0.005*** -0.0003 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Change in # 
Employees 
Supervised  
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
New Job is Long-
term Incentive 
Eligible 
0.021*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
New Job is On 
Board of Directors 
0.068*** 0.066*** 0.043*** 0.066*** 0.043*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Δ Total Sales 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.00002 0.001*** 0.00002 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.0005) (0.00005) 
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Table 1.12 (Continued) 
Δ Total Profits -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.0005** 
(0.00002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Δ Total Employees -0.0001*** -0.00007*** 
-
0.00002*** 
-
0.00007*** 
-
0.00009*** 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00005) 
Year Effects X X X X X 
Individual Effects   X  X 
Number of 
Observations: 85,253 85,253 85,253 85,253 85,253 
R-Squared 0.101 0.098 0.500 0.098 0.500 
Notes: Models are estimated using OLS. Performance A corresponds to performance 
measure generated from equation (5) in the text, and Performance B is the 
performance measure from equation (6). Standard errors are reported below the 
regression coefficient.  *** indicates significance at the 0.01 percent or better.  ** 
indicates significance between 0.01 and 0.05 percent and * indicates significance 
between 0.05 and 0.10.  The benchmark model does not include a performance 
measure.  
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Table 1.13 
Testing the Equality of the Mobility Coefficients 
(Dependent Variable: Changes in Log Base Pay) 
Including Performance 
Ho: Ωi=Ωj
 
 for i,j=1, … ,9 and i ≠ j 
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Mobilityi versus Mobility I j II III IV V 
 Bench Performance A Performance B 
Stay Promotion <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Demotion <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Lateral – STRICT <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Lateral  -- UP <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Lateral  -- DOWN <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Lateral – SAME JOB 0.004 0.013 0.166 0.014 0.165 
Stay Level Up – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stay Level Down – SAME JOB 0.162 0.296 <.0001 0.732 <.0001 
 
Promotion Demotion <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Lateral – STRICT <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Lateral  -- UP <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Lateral  -- DOWN <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Level Up – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Promotion Level Down – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Demotion Lateral – STRICT <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 1.13 (Continued) 
Demotion Lateral  -- UP <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Lateral  -- DOWN <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Level Up – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Demotion Level Down – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Lateral – STRICT Lateral  -- UP 0.6167 0.8110 0.5394 0.5986 0.4299 
Lateral – STRICT Lateral  -- DOWN <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 0.0005 
Lateral – STRICT Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral – STRICT Level Up – SAME JOB <.0001 0.0001 0.0329 <.0001 0.0098 
Lateral – STRICT Level Down – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Lateral  -- UP Lateral  -- DOWN 0.0006 0.0003 0.0089 0.0016 0.0219 
Lateral  -- UP Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral -- UP Level Up – SAME JOB <.0001 0.0120 0.0556 0.0017 0.0180 
Lateral -- UP Level Down – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 0.0004 
 
Lateral  -- DOWN Lateral – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral  -- DOWN Level Up – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 1.13 (Continued) 
Lateral  -- DOWN Level Down – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Lateral – SAME JOB Level Up – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Lateral – SAME JOB Level Down – SAME JOB 0.0010 0.1915 0.1421 0.0773 0.0654 
 
Level Up – SAME JOB Level Down – SAME JOB <.0001 <.0001 0.0004 <.0001 0.0097 
Note:  The p-values in this table are for F-tests that the two coefficients in the model are equal, separate tests for 
each model I to VII.  Shaded areas are where the p-value >= 0.05; that is, when we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients are equal.  The benchmark model does not include a performance measure.  Columns I through 
Column V are the tests for the corresponding columns in Table 18A. 
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comparing the tests of equality presented in Table 1.13 to those in 1.11.  The results in 
Table 1.12 suggest that the effect of changing jobs results in real pay growth 
evenwhen accounting for worker productivity.  That is, wages are, at least to some 
extent, attached to jobs. 
 
1.5.4 Job-to-Job Mobility 
A potentially importance aspect of lateral mobility is to what extent these 
transitions affect future job changes.  Table 1.14 displays basic multinomial logit 
estimates that predict the current period's transition as a function of previous 
transitions and the worker and job characteristics in the previous period.  The base 
category is whether or not the worker remained in the same job in the previous period.  
The results are surprising and highlight the amount of mobility in these data - largely, 
mobility of any kind predicts mobility in the future.  There is no noticeable serial 
correlation in promotions or demotions, but promotions and demotions each predict 
the other.  Also, a lateral move with a job title change is strongly associated with 
future promotions and to a lesser extent future demotions and additional lateral moves 
with a job title change.  Lateral transitions without a job title change have the weakest 
predictive power.     
 
1.5.5 Firm-level Analysis of Job Mobility 
     Beyond understanding the role of lateral mobility for workers, it is also of 
interest to understand what types of firms experience more lateral mobility than others. 
The job transition rates estimated across single-firm case studies vary substantially 
from firm to firm, and the current information about the firm-specific determinants of 
lateral mobility at the firm-level pertains only to the adoption of job rotation (Eriksson 
and Ortega, 2004; Eriksson 2000; Osterman 1994, 2000).  Investigating the role of  
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Table 1.14 
Multinomial Logit Estimates For Mobility Outcomes 
(Including Performance) 
 
 Mobility Outcome 
Variable Promotion Demotion 
Lateral w/ 
Job Title 
Change 
Lateral w/o 
Job Title 
Change 
Relative Performance  1.02*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
Promotion (t-1) 0.80 1.37*** 1.17*** 1.07 
Demotion (t-1) 1.71*** 0.83 1.48*** 1.19*** 
Lateral w/ Job Change (t-1) 1.56*** 1.26*** 1.28*** 1.12*** 
Lateral w/o Job Change (t-
1) 1.11** 1.13** 1.05 0.93*** 
Reporting Level 1 or 2  (t-
1) 0.11*** 4.80*** 1.30** 0.46*** 
Reporting Level 3  (t-1) 0.31*** 4.22*** 1.20* 0.63*** 
Reporting Level 4  (t-1) 0.51*** 3.17*** 1.31*** 0.76*** 
Reporting Level 5  (t-1) 0.64** 2.36 1.13*** 0.87** 
Reporting Level 6  (t-1) 0.80** 1.76 1.10 0.98 
# Employees Supervised (t-
1) 
(in thousands) 1.00*** 1.00 1.00*** 1.00 
Bonus Eligible (t-1) 1.32*** 1.00 1.21*** 0.97 
Long-term Incentive 
Eligible (t-1) 1.31*** 0.99 1.08*** 0.99 
On Board of Directors (t-1) 2.77*** 0.41*** 0.76*** 0.39*** 
Schooling = 16 Years 1.18*** 0.99 0.97 1.00 
Schooling = 17, 18 Years 1.27*** 1.03 1.03 0.94** 
Schooling > 18 Years 1.11 0.75*** 0.90** 0.85*** 
     
Note: The performance measure is estimated from equation 6 in the text. The base 
category consists of those workers who stay in the same job. The numbers reported 
are relative risk ratios. The models also include controls for firms size, sales, 
profits, firm ownership, industry and year dummies. *** indicates significance at 
the 0.01 percent or better.  ** indicates significance between 0.01 and 0.05 percent 
and * indicates significance between 0.05 and 0.10.  The Benchmark model does 
not include a performance measure. 
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firm-level heterogeneity on job mobility rates is not feasible with single-firm data sets 
but the data I use pertains to large set of firms that are heterogeneous across a broad 
set of characteristics.       
 To investigate the determinants of job mobility rates at the firm-level, I use the 
worker-level model estimated in Table 1.7 as a benchmark and aggregate those 
worker-level variables to the firm-level. The only worker-level variable that I could 
not aggregate directly was the worker reporting level.  Instead, I include a variable for 
the total number of hierarchical levels in the firm to capture the extent to which the 
firm has a more vertical or horizontally oriented hierarchy.  I also include firm-
specific variables such as firm size, profits, sales and included industry and ownership 
indicators.1
       The model is estimated with OLS and the results are presented in Table 1.15. 
Firms reporting a high proportion of workers with the equivalent of a Ph.D. education 
have much lower job mobility rates overall (the base category is the proportion of 
workers with less than a college degree).  Firms with a high number of college 
graduates have lower demotion rates and higher rates of retaining in the same job.  
The employee learning hypothesis of job rotation suggests that rotating workers is an 
effective way to train employees, specifically as managers.  Firms with a large 
proportion of workers with the equivalent of a masters degree experience higher rates 
of lateral mobility (with a job title change). A very senior workforce is negatively  
 
                                                 
1 Recall that a limitation to the data is that I do not have information pertaining to all workers at the 
firm; instead, firms report information on workers they wish to be appraised and who tend to be 
sampled more frequently at the top of the hierarchy, down to as many as 12 reporting levels below the 
CEO.  In aggregating the individual-level transitions to firm-level transition rates, I used the following 
selection rule for including workers in the rate calculations:  Let n(L) denote the number of workers in 
the reporting level under consideration and n(L+1) the number of workers in the reporting level directly 
beneath level L.  Here, L=1 represents the CEO and those workers reporting directly to the CEO have 
L=2. If n(L)-n(L+1)≤0, I included the n(L) workers in the rate calculation.  If n(L)-n(L+1)>0 I excluded 
those workers in level L+1 and all levels below L+1.  Therefore, the mobility rates I analyze represent 
the mobility rates of the most reliable sample available for which I am relatively confident of having the 
universe of workers in levels L,L-1,...,2,1. Each observation is therefore a firm-year. 
 
 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.15 
The Determinants of Firm-level Job Mobility Rates 
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 Dependent Variable: Job Mobility Rates 
Variables Promote Demote Lateral w/ Job Change 
Lateral w/o 
Job Change Stay 
      
Intercept 5.51 6.290** 10.34** 32.07*** 45.79*** 
(4.36)  (2.886) (4.711)  (12.301) (15.021) 
Mean Experience -0.007 -0.035 -0.100 0.068 0.075 
(0.097) (0.064) (0.104) (0.273) (0.333) 
Mean Seniority 0.044 0.008 0.048 -0.359** 0.259 
(0.063) (0.041) (0.068) (0.177) (0.216) 
% of Workforce w/  
Schooling =16 Years of  
-0.025 -0.061*** 0.0048 -0.099 0.180*** 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.026) (0.069) (0.084) 
% of Workforce w/  
Schooling =17 or 18 Years 
0.014 -0.026 0.084*** -0.125* 0.052 
(0.026) (0.017) (0.028) (0.072) (0.088) 
% of Workforce w/  
Schooling >18 Years 
-0.070** -0.050** -0.050 -0.299*** 0.469*** 
(0.031) (0.020) (0.033) (0.086) (0.105) 
# of Hierarchical Levels in 
the Firm 
0.047 0.035 -0.207* 0.578** -0.454 
(0.109) (0.072) (0.118) (0.308) (0.376) 
Average # of Subordinates 
per Worker 
0.383*** 0.341*** -0.08 -0.302 -0.342 
(0.140) (0.092) (0.151) (0.395) (0.481) 
% of Workforce Bonus 
Eligible 
0.0072 0.0062 0.001 0.042 -0.056* 
(0.0092) (0.0061) (0.010) (0.026) (0.032) 
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Table 1.15 (Continued) 
% of Workforce Eligible for 
Long-Term Incentives 
0.0085 0.0088** 0.0133* -0.024 -0.0069 
(0.0066) (0.0044) (0.0071) (0.019) (0.023) 
% of Workforce on the 
Board of Directors 
0.0096 -0.012 -0.018 -0.137*** 0.158*** 
(0.013) (0.0083) (0.014) (0.036) (0.043) 
Company Sales (in 
$100,000) 
0.003 0.0005 -0.0008 0.018 -0.020 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.020) 
Company Profits  (in 
$100,000) 
-0.048 -0.004 -0.045 -0.303 0.399 
(0.091) (0.060) (0.099) (0.258) (0.314) 
Company Total Employees -0.019** -0.016*** -0.004 0.045** -0.007 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.023) (0.029) 
Public Company, US Owned -2.613* -0.068 -0.113 -2.36 5.153 
(1.468) (0.971) (1.585) (4.145) (5.054) 
Private Company, US 
Owned 
-2.433 -0.248 -0.380 -6.23 9.291* 
(1.596) (1.056) (1.723) (4.507) (5.495) 
Subsidiary Company, US 
Owned  
5.587** 1.415 -0.085 -0.398 -6.518 
(2.741) (1.813) (2.959) (7.739) (9.435) 
Mining -.373 0.077 -0.166 1.128 -0.665 
(0.939) (0.621) (1.013) (2.650) (3.231) 
Construction 2.287 0.583 -0.471 4.046 -6.446 
(1.628) (1.077) (1.758) (4.598) (5.605) 
Transportation and 
Communications 
-0.044 0.752* 1.147* 0.822 -2.677 
(0.638) (0.422) (0.689) (1.801) (2.196) 
Wholesale Trade -1.256 -0.672 -0.583 0.245 2.266 
(1.425) (0.942) (1.538) (4.023) (4.904) 
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Table 1.15 (Continued) 
Retail Trade -0.417 0.428 0.585 -1.099 0.503 
(1.657) (1.096) (1.788) (4.678) (5.703) 
Finance 0.0406 -0.756 0.896 1.149 -1.694 
(0.898) (0.594) (0.969) (2.534) (3.090) 
Services -0.389 -0.430 1.663* -2.759 1.915 
(0.913) (0.604) (0.986) (2.579) (3.144) 
      
N 1453 1453 1453 1453 1453 
R-Squared 0.037 0.035 0.037 0.089 0.082 
      
Note: Models are estimated using OLS. An observation is a firm-year.  The dependent variables are 
a percent ranging from 0-100.  The independent variables measured as a percent have the same 
scaling. * indicates significance between .10 and 0.05; ** indicates significance between 0.05 and 
0.01; *** indicates significance at better than 0.01.  
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correlated with the rate of lateral transitions that do not involve a change in job title. If 
those transitions are the result of job rotation, then this would be consistent with 
previous empirical results on the determinants of job rotation (Eriksson and Ortega, 
2004; Ortega, 2001). Since the models control for firm size, the number of hierarchical 
levels accounts for the vertical (large number of levels) or horizontal (few levels) 
structure of the hierarchy.  Firms that are more vertically oriented have fewer lateral 
transitions with job title changes and more lateral transitions without a job title change 
(transfers). This confirms expectations. For a given number of workers in a firm, a 
large number of hierarchical levels means there are fewer types of jobs in each level 
on average, whereas an accountant or marketing agent may be needed across several 
different business units or departments.       
 It should be noted that these models explain surprisingly little variation in 
firm-level mobility rates (R-squared between 0.03 and 0.09).  This suggests there are 
important determinants that explain job mobility that are omitted from the model and 
captured in the residuals.  One example would be a hypothetical variable called 
personnel policy that dictates the mobility patterns, conditional on the firm's 
workforce and company characteristics, but is unobserved to the econometrician.  
Another example would be a policy that dictates staffing decisions based on the firm's 
turnover rate (e.g., hire from the inside and high mobility rates or hire from the outside 
with low mobility rates).  The firm's distribution of worker ability may also play a 
role, as well as its individual production technology.  Therefore, the residuals of this 
model provide interesting information about how promotion rates, demotion rates and 
lateral mobility rates are correlated within firms.   
     Table 1.16 presents the cross-equation correlation matrix of the residuals from 
the models estimated in Table 1.15 along with significance tests for whether the 
correlation coefficient is equal to zero. Unobserved factors that explain promotion  
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Table 1.16 
Cross Equation Correlations for the Residuals of the Model in Table 1.15 
      
 
Promote Demote 
Lateral w/ 
Job 
Change 
Lateral 
w/o Job 
Change 
Stay 
      
Promote 1.000 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.164*** -0.527*** 
Demote  1.000 0.150*** 0.029 -0.318*** 
Lateral w/ Job Change   1.000 -0.111*** -0.312*** 
Lateral w/o Job Change    1.000 -0.839*** 
Stay     1.000 
      
Note: Null hypothesis is for ρ=0. * indicates significance between .10 and 0.05; ** 
indicates significance between 0.05 and 0.01; *** indicates significance at better than 
0.01. 
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rates are correlated with all other transition rates, but the correlation between 
promotions and lateral transitions with a job title change is the strongest. Those factors 
that explain demotion rates are uncorrelated with lateral mobility without a job title 
change. Also, unobservables that explain lateral transitions with job title changes are 
negatively correlated with lateral transitions that have no change in job title (transfers).  
It appears that the residuals reflect unobservable factors that are capturing overall high 
or low mobility rates in firms; that is, firms that have high rates of job mobility for one 
type of transition, have high mobility rates in general.   
 
1.6 Conclusion 
     Lateral mobility within firms is not a well-understood topic in the careers and 
organizations literature. Yet, the increasing use of job rotation as a human resource 
practice found in representative surveys such as Osterman (1994, 2000), and the 
relatively high lateral mobility rates found in this paper across a broad set of firms, 
suggest that more work is needed to understand both the mechanisms that generate 
these transitions as well as the impact they have on worker careers. Factors such as the 
roles of slot constraints, task- and job-specific capital, worker behavior and 
preferences over jobs, and the firm's organizational structure which may comprise of 
individual and separate career paths are all important aspects related to lateral mobility 
within firms that require more thought. 
     The motivational framework in this paper specifically highlights the role of 
transition costs in the firm's decision to assign workers to positions. Job changes are 
not costless, and these costs as well as the returns to standard human capital 
characteristics should be expected to vary across the range of potential assignment 
options available to the firm. Furthermore, in the presence of transition costs and 
lateral mobility, the firm's promotion decision is unlikely to be independent of the 
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alternative assignment options in the choice set. In such cases, an economic model of 
the firm's assignment problem and its empirical implementation requires a more 
sophisticated set up that accounts for these interdependencies and the ability to 
substitute one assignment alternative for another. 
     A primary finding of this paper is that lateral job mobility is associated with 
significantly higher real earnings growth over those workers who are retained in the 
same job, but the growth in earnings is less than for those who are promoted. One 
potential explanation of this finding is that if worker performance is the mechanism 
sorting workers into jobs to begin with, then this positive relationship may reflect 
productivity differences rather than differences in the wages between the two jobs. 
While worker performance has a separate and strong, positive relationship to real 
earnings growth, the relationships between lateral mobility and real earnings growth 
remain when including measures of relative performance. That is, even when 
controlling for productivity differences, significant earnings growth occurs directly 
through the within-reporting-level change in jobs. This result reinforces the notion that 
jobs within-reporting levels are heterogeneous, and that the observed wage variation 
within reporting levels is in part due to the fact that the jobs within those levels are 
simply different. 
     Analyses of firm-level job mobility rates suggest there are firm-specific factors 
that impact the rate of lateral mobility such as the average seniority and education 
distribution of the workforce, and whether the firm is vertically or horizontally 
organized. These results provide some evidence that the lateral mobility observed in 
these data may be the result of job rotation. Since the explanatory power is relatively 
modest, it is likely that there are also important firm-specific and unobserved 
personnel policies that dictate these mobility rates such as a policy that, conditional on 
the firm and workforce characteristics, maps the firm's turnover rate into a decision to 
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hire from the outside (low intra-firm mobility rates) or fill vacancies from within (high 
intra-firm mobility rates). 
     The job-to-job mobility analysis suggests that workers in these data are highly 
mobile - that is, job changes in the past are strong predictors of job changes in the 
future. Specifically, there is no real serial correlation for demotions and promotions, 
but lateral transitions with a job title change do predict future lateral transitions with a 
job title change (similar to job rotation). A lateral transition that does not involved a 
job title change (a simple transfer) is the least likely transition to be followed by 
another job change of any kind. 
     Finally, while the simplified structure of some organizations may negate the 
need to account for job transitions within levels, the hierarchical structure of other 
organizations can be very sophisticated. A unique aspect of this study is that the level 
of detail firms provide about their organizational structure yields a hierarchy that is 
more complex than a single file job ladder based on reporting alone, and identifies a 
number of job transitions that would otherwise be undetectable in other data sets. This 
paper shows that those transitions are meaningful. It is of interest, especially for future 
theoretical work, to understand the implications of modeling the internal workings of 
the firm in a way that incorporates more realistic hierarchies than a one dimensional 
job ladder and accounts for separate career paths and possible transitions between 
them. 
70 
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE IMPACT OF INCENTIVES ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR: CAN WE MAKE IT 
DISAPPEAR? THE CASE OF THE DEATH PENALTY  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Economists are interested in the investigation of human behavior and how 
individuals respond to prices and incentives.   Economic theory, which demonstrates an 
inverse relationship between the price of a commodity and its consumption, suggests that 
an increase in the price or cost of a behavior leads to a reduction in the intensity of that 
behavior.  Therefore, as economic analysis of consumer behavior is applicable to any 
commodity ranging from apples to cars, it is also applicable to any type of human 
behavior, ranging from drunk driving to sexual activity to marital dissolution.  Based on 
economic theory, an immense amount of empirical research has investigated the extent to 
which individuals alter their behavior in response to increases in the relevant “prices” that 
may impact that behavior. 
 
2.1.1 Rationality and Reaction to Incentives 
One common argument made by non-economists against the economic 
approach to human behavior is that people are not rational enough to behave 
according to the predictions of economic theory when it comes to behaviors such as 
smoking, consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs, sexual activity and crime.  
However, an enormous empirical literature in economics has demonstrated that even 
these behaviors are responsive to prices and incentives.  For example, consumption of 
cigarettes declines when cigarette prices rise (e.g., Becker, Murphy and Grossman, 
1994; Yurekli and Zhang 2000; Gruber, Sen, and Stabile, 2003), alcohol consumption 
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is curtailed when alcohol prices are increased (e.g., Farrell, Manning and Finch 2003, 
Manning, Blumberg and Moulton 1995), drug use responds to variations in drug prices 
(e.g., van Ours 1995; Saffer and Chaloupka 1999; Grossman 2005), pregnancies and 
childbearing are influenced by state and federal policies that alter the costs (e.g. 
Mellor 1998; Lundberg and Plotnick 1995), and the timing of births within a year is 
responsive to the tax benefit of having a child (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra, 1999).   
Such results hold true even in sub-populations such as adolescents, who are thought to 
be present-oriented and less rational (e.g., Pacula et al. 2001; Gruber and Zinman 
2001; Grossman and Chaloupka 1998; Grossman et al. 1994; Lundberg and Plotnick 
1990), and among individuals with mental health problems (Saffer and Dave 2005).   
In a different vein, research in experimental economics has demonstrated that 
individuals respond to changes in prices as predicted by economic theory, and even 
children behave rationally when modifying their behavior in response to variations in 
prices (Harbaugh et al. 2001). 
The same results are obtained from analyses of the response of criminal 
activity to the relevant costs and benefits.  The pioneering work of Becker (1968) 
indicated that criminal activity should decline as the “price” of such activity increases.  
Empirical analyses testing the economic model of crime have demonstrated that illicit 
behavior indeed responds to incentives and sanctions.  For example, Jacob and Levitt 
(2003) showed that incentives for high test scores motivated teachers and 
administrators to cheat on standardized tests in Chicago public schools. Corman and 
Mocan (2000, 2005) and DiTella and Schargrodsky (2004) demonstrated that 
increased arrests and more police officers reduce crime.   Levitt (1998a) showed that 
juvenile crime goes down when punishment gets stiffer.  Grogger (1998) and Mocan 
and Rees (2005) found that the extent of criminal involvement among high school 
students is influenced by both economic conditions and deterrence.  Corman and 
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Mocan (2005) and Hansen and Machin (2002) showed that criminal activity reacts to 
increases in the minimum wage.  Similarly, it has been shown that prison crowding, 
which generates early release of prisoners, has a significant impact on crime rates 
(Levitt 1996).  
One specific sub-analysis in this domain has received significant attention.  
Specifically, the extent to which murder rates respond to deterrence was first 
investigated theoretically and empirically by Ehrlich (1973, 1975, 1977a), who found 
a deterrent effect of capital punishment.  Some analysts questioned the robustness of 
the results (Hoenack and Weiler 1980; Passell and Taylor, 1977), and Ehrlich and 
others responded to these criticisms (Ehrlich 1977b, Ehrlich and Mark 1977, Ehrlich 
and Brower 1987, Ehrlich and Liu 1999).  In a recent article Donohue III and Wolfers 
(2006) focused on a number of recent papers that reported a deterrent effect of death 
penalty on murder, and stated that the findings of these papers were not robust. The 
purpose of this paper is to provide a new and detailed analysis of the impact of leaving 
death row (executions, commutations and other removals from death row) on state 
murder rates.  Specifically, we make various attempts to eliminate the deterrent effect 
of capital punishment and investigate if and under what conditions one succeeds in 
eliminating the impact of leaving death row on the murder rate. 
  As we demonstrate in detail below, the signaling effect of leaving death row 
and its impact on homicide is robust.  Although the impact of executions sometimes 
disappears when one estimates specifications which are inconsistent with theory, the 
impact of commutations remains significant even in those models. Furthermore, as 
summarized in Table 2.13 and detailed in the paper, in many cases the deterrence 
results do not disappear even under many specifications that have no theoretical 
foundation. 
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2.2 Data and the Empirical  Model 
The data set used in the paper is the same one as employed by Donohue and 
Wolfers (2006) and Mocan and Gittings (2003).  One distinguishing feature of the data 
set is that it contains the entire history of death sentences between 1997 and 1997, 
including the exact month of removal from death row and the reason for it (execution, 
commutation, etc.), for each death row inmate.  The data on state-level crimes, arrests, 
prison population, prison deaths, and other state characteristics such as the 
unemployment rate, urbanization, racial composition of the state, and other attributes 
are compiled from various sources (see Mocan and Gittings 2003, p. 474-76).    
The investigation of the impact of deterrence on homicide is carried out by 
estimating models of the following form: 
 
 Mit = Dit-1 α + Xit β +µi +ηt +Ρit+εit,
 
                                      (2.1) 
where Mit  is the murder rate in state i and year t.  The vector X contains state 
characteristics that may be correlated with criminal activity, including the 
unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in 
the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the 
state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, 
the party affiliation of the governor, and the legal drinking age in the state.  
Theoretical and empirical justification for the inclusion of these variables can be found 
in Levitt (1998a) and Lott and Mustard (1997).   The variable µi represents 
unobserved state-specific characteristics that impact the murder rate, which are 
controlled for by state fixed-effects, and ηt  represents common year effects.  To 
control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, a dummy variable is 
included which takes the value of one in Oklahoma in 1995 and zero elsewhere.  The 
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models also include state-specific time-trends represented by Ρit
 
.  Following Levitt 
(1998a) and Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2003), we also include the number of 
prisoners per violent crime and the prison death rate (a measure of prison conditions) 
as two additional measures of deterrence. 
2.2.1 Measurement of risks (increase and decrease in the cost of murder) 
The vector D represents deterrence variables, and includes the probability of 
apprehension, the probability of sentencing given apprehension, as well as various 
probabilities pertaining to leaving death row, conditional on sentencing.  Note that 
execution is not the only outcome for prisoners on death row.  During the period of 
1977-97 (the time period analyzed in this paper), 17 percent of inmates who 
completed their duration on death row were executed while the other 83 percent left 
for other reasons (e.g. commutation of the sentence, sentence or conviction being 
overturned, sentence being found unconstitutional).  This information allows for an 
investigation as to how the murder rate reacts to an increase in the price of crime 
(executions) as well as a decrease in the price of crime (commutation, and all removals 
other than executions and deaths).   
From a theoretical point of view, it is important to carefully consider the 
timing of events.  The probability of apprehension is a measure of the risk of getting 
caught, given that a murder is committed.  Because the unit of analysis is state-year, 
this probability is measured as the proportion of murders cleared by an arrest in a 
particular state and year; i.e. ARRATEt =(ARt/MURt), where ARt is the number of 
murder arrests in a state in year t (state subscript is dropped for ease of exposition), 
and MURt  stands for the number of murders in year t.   The second risk variable is the 
probability of receiving a death sentence given that a murder arrest took place.   After 
a person is arrested for murder, he/she does not automatically end up on death row; 
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instead, a trial takes place in which not all defendants are found guilty nor do they all 
receive a capital sentence.  Therefore, one can calculate the probability of being found 
guilty and sentenced to death, conditional on being arrested for murder.  The average 
duration between the date of a murder arrest and the date on which an inmate is 
sentenced to death is more than one year.1  Thus, the risk of receiving the death 
sentence is defined as the number of death sentences handed out in a year divided by 
the number of murder arrests two years prior. That is, SENTRATEt= (SENTt/ARt-2), 
where SENTt  
Following Mocan and Gittings (2003), three death penalty-related deterrence 
variables are created. When constructing the capital punishment variables it is useful 
to realize that if a person receives the death sentence, he/she is not executed instantly; 
instead, it has been demonstrated that the average duration from sentencing to 
execution (across states) is about six years during the period studied in this paper 
(Bedau 1982, Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd 2003, Mocan and Gittings 2003, 
Argys and Mocan 2004).  As was done in Mocan and Gittings (2003), this information 
suggests that the risk of execution should be calculated as the number of executions 
divided by the proper cohort of death sentences six years earlier; i.e. EXEC
 represents the number of death sentences handed out in year t. 
t/SENTt-6
                                                 
1 For example, a person who is arrested in October 1990, is likely to receive a death sentence after 
February 1992. 
.  
Also, about 83 percent of the inmates are removed from death row for reasons other 
than execution. One such reason is commutation, where the inmate is granted 
clemency and the sentence is changed to a prison term, typically life.   Because 
commutation implies a reduced risk of death, and therefore a reduced cost of 
committing murder, an increase in the probability of commutations should 
theoretically increase the murder rate.    The same argument is true for all removals 
from death row (other than executions and other deaths while on death row). Figure 
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2.1 displays the average duration on death row by execution, commutation and other 
removals from death row and shows that the proper cohort to use in calculating the 
risk of commutation and risk of removal is about the same as that for executions.2
Not all previous research has considered the relevant cohorts when calculating 
these risk variables.  For example, Donohue III and Wolfers (2006) employ the data 
and methods of Mocan and Gittings (2003), but they create these variables as the ratio 
of executions (or removals) in a given year to the number of death sentences in that 
same year, i.e. as (EXEC
    
t/SENTt) or (REMOVEt  / SENTt
                                                 
2 Note that the duration on death row for removals other than execution is less than that for executions 
and approximately 5 years on average.  For this reason, Mocan and Gittings (2003) used the sentencing 
cohort 5 years ago in models that include removals; that is, (EXECt/SENTt-5), or (REMOVEt  / SENTt-
5).   
).  These variables have no 
real meaning because the numerator and denominator of the ratio have no connection 
to each other: employing the ratio of executions in year t to the death sentences in year 
t incorrectly assumes that execution of each inmate takes place in the same year of 
sentencing.  removals from death row and shows that the proper cohort to use in 
Figure 2.1 
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calculating the risk of commutation and risk of removal is about the same as that for 
executions.3
Not all previous research has considered the relevant cohorts when calculating 
these risk variables.  For example, Donohue III and Wolfers (2006) employ the data 
and methods of Mocan and Gittings (2003), but they create these variables as the ratio 
of executions (or removals) in a given year to the number of death sentences in that 
same year, i.e. as (EXEC
    
t/SENTt) or (REMOVEt  / SENTt
Although calculating the risks this way is not sensible, it would be reasonable 
to ask if the results were sensitive to variations in their proper measurement.  
Specifically, we consider variations in the probability of execution, the probability of 
commutation, and the probability of removal from death row in three different 
dimensions and investigate if these variations make the deterrence results disappear.  
We deviate from the existing analyses of Mocan and Gittings (2003) (EXEC
).  These variables have no 
real meaning because the numerator and denominator of the ratio have no connection 
to each other: employing the ratio of executions in year t to the death sentences in year 
t incorrectly assumes that execution of each inmate takes place in the same year of 
sentencing.   
t/SENTt-
6) and Donohue II and Wolfers (2006) (EXECt/SENTt) and vary the sentencing cohort 
of the risk variables. For this exercise, we calculate the risks of execution, 
commutation and removals as (EXECt/SENTt-5), (COMMt/SENTt-5), 
(REMOVEt/SENTt-5), assuming a five-year wait on death row, and (EXECt/SENTt-4), 
(COMMt/SENTt-4), (REMOVEt/SENTt-4
                                                 
3 Note that the duration on death row for removals other than execution is less than that for executions 
and approximately 5 years on average.  For this reason, Mocan and Gittings (2003) used the sentencing 
cohort 5 years ago in models that include removals; that is, (EXECt/SENTt-5), or (REMOVEt  / SENTt-
5).   
), assuming a four-year wait.   
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The discussion above concerns variations in the denominator of the risk 
variable, but proper measurement of the numerator is important as well. If executions, 
commutations or removals from death row send signals to potential criminals, then the 
timing of the signal needs to be addressed. An advantage of these data is the 
availability of the date of each execution and removal, which enables one to create 
execution, commutation and removal measures that are consistent with theory.   
Mocan and Gittings (2003) considered a monthly adjustment to the capital punishment 
events where executions, commutations and removals are prorated based on the month 
in which they occurred. For example, an execution which took place in January of 
1980 can have an impact on the murder rate for the full year of 1980.  However, if the 
execution took place in November 1980, it will have a trivial impact on the 1980 
murder rate.  Rather, the impact of this November execution on murder will primarily 
be felt in 1981. Thus, this November execution counts as 2/12 of an execution for 
1980 and 10/12 of an execution for 1981.  The same algorithms are applied for 
commutations and removals.   We call these the first measure of executions, 
commutations and removals (EXEC, COMM, REMOVE).4
The second dimension to vary the measurement of the risk variables is through 
the numerator. We consider a means of allocating the capital punishment events that 
uses a coarser algorithm than previously described: If an execution took place within 
the first three quarters of a year, we attributed that execution to the same year.  If the 
execution took place in the last quarter of a year (October-December) we attributed 
that execution to the following year under the assumption that the relative impact on 
murders would be felt in the following year.  The same was done for removals and 
  
                                                 
4  This is the measure employed by Mocan and Gittings (2003), and also Donohue III and Wolfers 
(2006). 
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commutations.  We name these the second measures of executions, commutations and 
removals (EXEC2, COMM2 and REMOVE2).5
The third dimension in which we vary the risk measures is by experimenting 
with the wide range of other denominators to calculate the risk of leaving death row. 
Some of these measures have been used previously in the literature (e.g., executions 
per state population, executions per prison population) while others haven’t, such as 
the total number of inmates on death row.  Despite the fact that the measurement of 
these particular risk variables is inherently flawed, we incorporate them into the 
analysis to further examine the robustness of the results.  Beyond measurement issues 
associated with the risk probabilities, we push the robustness check further by 
estimating these models across different samples (e.g. dropping various states) and 
using alternative weighting schemes.  
 
 
2.3 Results 
We estimate various versions of Equation (2.1).  Following Corman and 
Mocan (2000), Levitt (1998a), Katz Levit and Shistorovich (2003), and Mocan and 
Gittings (2003), the deterrence variables are lagged by one year to minimize the 
concerns of simultaneity.  For example, if the risk variable is (EXECt/SENTt-5), its 
lagged value is employed in the regressions [i.e. (EXECt/SENTt-5)-1 = (EXECt-
1/SENTt-6
                                                 
5  In sensitivity tests below, we also employ other measures such as raw counts. 
)].  The models are estimated by weighted-least squares, where the weights 
are state’s share in the U.S. population.  Robust standard errors, which are clustered at 
the state level, are reported in parentheses under the coefficients.  In the interest of 
space, only the coefficients and standard errors pertaining to executions, 
commutations and removals are reported. 
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Table 2.1 displays the results where the first measures of execution, 
commutation and removal are employed.  The top panel of Table 2.1 measures the 
relevant risks as (EXECt/SENTt-5), (COMMt/SENTt-5), (REMOVEt/SENTt-5).  That 
is, it calculates the rates of execution, commutation and removal per death sentences 
imposed 5 years earlier (assuming that the average duration on death row is 5 years).  
The models presented in the middle panel of Table 2.1 are identical, except, the 
average duration on death row is assumed to be 4 years.  Thus, the variables are 
calculated as (EXECt/SENTt-4), (COMMt/SENTt-4), and   (REMOVEt/SENTt-4).6
A number of aspects of the results in Table 2.1 are noteworthy.  First, the point 
estimates are very robust between specifications reported in the top two panels.  
Second, the execution rate has a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
murder rate.  Third, the commutation and removal rates have positive impacts on the 
murder rate.  Fourth, these results are consistent with the specifications reported in 
Mocan and Gittings (2003), despite utilizing different sentencing cohorts as the 
denominator. 
    
The bottom panel of Table 2.1 displays the results of the model estimated by  
Donohue III and Wolfers (2006) using the same data.  In this specification, the 
execution, commutation and removal rates are calculated by dividing executions, 
commutations and removals in a year to the number of death sentences in that same 
year. Thus, it is assumed that the duration on death row is less than one year.  
Similarly, in this specification, the sentencing rate is calculated as the ratio of death 
sentences in a year to murder arrests in that same year, assuming that the time length 
from arrest-to-trial-to-sentencing is also less than one year.  Consequently, measuring
                                                 
6 Mocan and Gittings (2003) employed risk variables that take the average duration on death row as six 
years (denominator SENT lagged six years) in models for executions and commutations.  Because the 
time between sentencing and REMOVE from death row is about 5 years, they employed SENT lagged 
five years in the denominator when the model included removals.  Dohonue III and Wolfers (2006), on 
the other hand, use zero lags of SENT in the denominator. 
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Table 2.1 
Determinants of the Murder Rate 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on death row: 5 years 
(EXECt/SENTt-5 )
-0.0056** 
(0.0027) -1   
-0.0058**  
(0.0028) 
-0.0066**   
(0.0029) 
      
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )  -1 
0.0065 
(0.0047)  
0.0070 
(0.0046)  
      
(REMOVEt/SENTt-5 )  -1  
0.0024*** 
(0.0008)  
0.0027*** 
(0.0009) 
      
N 734 743 691 733 688 
Duration on death row: 4 years 
(EXECt/SENTt-4 )
-0.0054** 
(0.0022) -1   
-0.0055**  
(0.0022) 
-0.0047**   
(0.0021) 
      
(COMMt/SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0036* 
(0.0021)  
0.0038** 
(0.0019)  
      
(REMOVEt/SENTt-4 )  -1  
0.0004 
(0.0007)  
0.0005 
(0.0007) 
      
N 785 790 744 781 741 
 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years;  Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years  
(EXECt/SENTt  )
0.0003 
-1 (0.0014)   
0.0001 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.0014) 
      
(COMMt/SENTt  )  -1 
0.0041*** 
(0.0013)  
0.0041*** 
(0.0013)  
      
 
(REMOVEt/SENTt  )
 
-1 
 0.0002 (0.0003)  
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
N 986 984 921 977 918 
 Note: See Section II for the explanation of the measurement of variables.   Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** 
statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or 
better.  aa Specification estimated by Donohue and Wolfers (2006). 
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 the risk variables this way allows the execution result disappear, but the mis-
specification cannot eliminate the impact of commutations on the murder rate.
Table 2.2 reports results obtained from models where the executions, 
commutations and removals are measured using the second set of variables that 
allocates events by the quarter in which they occur as described in Section II above.  
In other words, the only difference between results reported in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 
is the measurement of the numerator of the execution, commutation, and removal 
rates.  Once again, the impact of the execution rates does not disappear, unless one 
estimates the specification promoted by Donohue and Wolfers (2006).  And, even in 
that case, similar to Table 2.1, the impact of the commutation rate on the murder rate 
remains positive and statistically significant. 
  
 
2.3.1 All Executions are in Texas! 
It can be argued that California and Texas are interesting states which contain 
potentially useful information for establishing the deterrent effect of the death penalty, 
and it could be that the deterrence results in the literature may be sensitive to exclusion 
of Texas and California from the analysis.  Of course, dropping an observation 
arbitrarily from the analysis is not very sensible, especially when the observation is 
known to contain information and when it is not an outlier.  Nevertheless, dropping 
these two states and re-estimating the models provided results that are reported in 
Table 2.3.  As the table demonstrates, the impact of executions and commutations or 
removals are still significant when Texas and California are omitted from the 
analysis.7
  
 
                                                 
7  We also omitted Texas and California individually.  In neither case could we make the results 
disappear.  See Mocan and Gitting (2006) pp. 38-9. 
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Table 2.2 
Determinants of the Murder Rate 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on death row: 5 years 
(EXECt/SENTt-5 )
-0.0058*** 
-1 (0.0020)   
-0.0062***  
(0.0022) 
-0.0073***   
(0.0022) 
      
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )  -1 
0.0044 
(0.0047)  
0.0056     
(0.0040)  
      
(REMOVEt/SENTt-5 )  -1  
0.0018*** 
(0.0007)  
0.0021*** 
(0.0007) 
      
N 737 743 712 736 709 
Duration on death row: 4 years 
(EXECt/SENTt-4 )
-0.0069* 
(0.0035) -1   
-0.0070**  
(0.0035) 
-0.0063*   
(0.0033) 
      
(COMMt/SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0034* 
(0.0019)  
0.0036** 
(0.0016)  
      
(REMOVEt/SENTt-4 )  -1  
0.0002 
(0.0008)  
0.0005 
(0.0007) 
      
N 785 792 761 783 758 
 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years;  Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years  
(EXECt/SENTt  )
-0.0002 
-1 (0.0020)   
-0.0001 
(0.0019) 
-0.00004 
(0.0019) 
      
(COMMt/SENTt  )  -1 
0.0039*** 
(0.0010)  
0.0039*** 
(0.0001)  
      
 
(REMOVEt/SENTt  )
 
-1 
 -0.0002 (0.0006)  
-0.0002 
(0.0006) 
N 989 990 952 984 949 
 Note: See Section II for the explanation of the measurement of variables.   Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** 
statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or 
better.  aa Specification estimated by Donohue and Wolfers (2006). 
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Table 2.3 
Determinants of the Murder Rate (Excluding Texas and California) 
The First Measure of Executions, Commutations, and Removals 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )
-0.0029 
(0.0019) -1   
-0.0030**  
(0.0020) 
-0.0041*   
(0.0023) 
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )  -1 
0.0048 
(0.0043)  
0.0051     
(0.0042)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )  -1  
0.0024*** 
(0.0008)  
0.0026*** 
(0.0009) 
n 704 713 662 703 659 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )
-0.0041** 
(0.0019) -1   
-0.0042**  
(0.0019) 
-0.0036*   
(0.0018) 
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0042*** 
(0.0011)  
0.0043**     
(0.0019)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )  -1  
0.0007  
(0.0007)  
0.0008 
(0.0007) 
n 753 758 713 749 710 
The Second Measure of Executions, Commutations, and Removals 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )
-0.0039** 
(0.0016) -1   
-0.0042**  
(0.0017) 
-0.0054***   
(0.0019) 
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0037 
(0.0040)  
0.0046     
(0.0034)  
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )  -
1 
 0.0018*** (0.0006)  
0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
n 707 713 682 706 679 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )
-0.0055 
(0.0034) -1   
-0.0056*  
(0.0033) 
-0.0051   
(0.0031) 
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0039*** 
(0.0011)  
0.0040***     
(0.0010)  
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )  -
1 
 0.0004  (0.0008)  
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
n 753 760 730 751 727 
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance 
between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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2.3.2 The Importance of the Denominator Once Again 
Why is it the case that omitting Texas does not make the results disappear 
despite the fact that Texas executes a disproportionately large number of death row 
inmates?  One explanation is that it is incorrect to focus on execution counts when the 
correct measure is not the number of executions, but the risk of the execution.  Despite 
the fact that a particular state has a large number of executions, the execution risk may 
not be high if the cohort of inmates that was sentenced to death is also large.  Put 
differently, the number of executions needs to be adjusted by the appropriate 
denominator to obtain an actual measure of risk. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the number of executions, commutation, and removals 
from death row between 1977 and 1997 for selected states; it also presents the average 
execution risk in each state during that period.  The first measure is the number of 
executions in year t divided by number of death sentences 4 years earlier.  The second 
measure deflates the number of executions by death sentences 5 years prior.  The third 
and fourth measures displayed in the table are additional measures of risk used in the 
literature: the number of executions divided by prison population (EXECt/PRISONt), 
and the number of executions deflated by the number of inmates on death row in the 
same year (EXECt/ROWt), respectively.  While Texas executes a large number of 
inmates annually, it is not the highest ranked state by any of these measures of 
execution risk.  It is ranked 4th or 5th, depending on the risk measure, behind Virginia, 
Arkansas, and Louisiana.  Missouri is generally ranked as the 5th
Tables 2.5-2.7 present the results obtained from models when Virginia, 
Arkansas or Louisiana are dropped, respectively.  In each case, dropping these states 
does not influence the results.  That is, even when we remove the high-risk states from 
.  Therefore attempts 
to make the deterrence results disappear might be more productive if one were to omit 
high risk states rather than states with large absolute counts of executions. 
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Table 2.4 
Execution Risk by State 
 Exits from Death Row Execution Risk Execution Risk Ranking 
State EXEC COMM REMV 
4−t
t
SENT
EXEC
 
5−t
t
SENT
EXEC
 
t
t
PRISON
EXEC
 
t
t
ROW
EXEC
 
4−t
t
SENT
EXEC
 
5−t
t
SENT
EXEC
 
t
t
PRISON
EXEC
 
t
t
ROW
EXEC
 
AL 16 1 130 0.116 0.099 0.072 0.009 8 8 7 8 
AR 16 1 46 0.49 0.327 0.157 0.031 2 2 3 3 
GA 22 6 150 0.136 0.127 0.057 0.012 7 7 8 7 
LA 24 2 78 0.345 0.315 0.226 0.056 3 3 1 2 
MO 29 1 30 0.301 0.245 0.114 0.023 5 6 5 5 
NV 6 3 32 0.079 0.08 0.072 0.007 10 9 6 9 
OK 9 1 95 0.082 0.074 0.053 0.005 9 10 9 12 
SC 13 3 49 0.28 0.31 0.05 0.014 6 4 10 6 
TX 144 44 166 0.307 0.304 0.135 0.026 4 5 4 4 
VA 46 5 15 0.612 0.652 0.162 0.059 1 1 2 1 
Note: PRISON is the total number of prisoners in the state. ROW is the number of death row inmates.  The numbers in the execution risk 
columns are average annual values for the states. 
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Table 2.5 
Determinants of the Murder Rate (Excluding Virginia) 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )
-0.0066* 
-1 (0.0035)   
-0.0068* 
(0.0037) 
-0.0084** 
(0.0036) 
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1  ) 
0.0087** 
(0.0038)  
0.0091** 
(0.0039)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )  -
1 
 0.0025*** (0.0008)  
0.0029*** 
(0.0010) 
n 719 728 676 718 673 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )
-0.0052** 
-1 (0.0025)   
-0.0052** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0045* 
(0.0024) 
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0044*** 
(0.0016)  
0.0045*** 
(0.0015)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )  -
1 
 0.0004 (0.0007)  
0.0005 
(0.0007) 
n 769 774 728 765 725 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-5 )
-0.0063** 
-1 (0.0026)   
-0.0061** 
(0.0026) 
-
0.0083*** 
(0.0024) 
 (COMM2t / SENTt-5 )  -1 
0.0083*** 
(0.0030)  
0.0083*** 
(0.0031)  
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-5 )  -
1 
 0.0019*** (0.0007)  
0.0023*** 
(0.0008) 
n 722 728 697 721 694 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )
-0.0066 
-1 (0.0040)   
-0.0067 
(0.0040) 
-0.0060 
(0.0037) 
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0043*** 
(0.0013)  
0.0044*** 
(0.0012)  
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )  -
1 
 0.0003 (0.0008)  
0.0005 
(0.0007) 
n 769 776 745 767 742 
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. 
*** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
 
 
88 
 
 
Table 2.6 
Determinants of the Murder Rate (Excluding Arkansas) 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )
-0.0055* 
-1 (0.0028)   
-0.0056* 
(0.0029) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0031) 
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )  -1 
0.0065 
(0.0047)  
0.0068 
(0.0046)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )  -1  
0.0023*** 
(0.0008)  
0.0026*** 
(0.0009) 
n 719 728 676 718 673 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )
-0.0053 
-1 (0.0035)   
-0.0054 
(0.0035) 
-0.0043 
(0.0033) 
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0036* 
(0.0021)  
0.0038** 
(0.0019)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )  -1  
0.0004 
(0.0008)  
0.0005 
(0.0008) 
n 769 774 728 765 725 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-5 )
-0.0058*** 
-1 (0.0021)   
-0.0063*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0074*** 
(0.0024) 
 (COMM2t / SENTt-5 )  -1 
0.0044 
(0.0047)  
0.0057 
(0.0040)  
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-5 )  -
1 
 0.0017** (0.0007)  
0.0021*** 
(0.0007) 
n 722 728 697 721 694 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )
-0.0064 
-1 (0.0039)   
-0.0065 
(0.0039) 
-0.0057 
(0.0036) 
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0034* 
(0.0019)  
0.0036** 
(0.0016)  
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )  -
1 
 0.0002 (0.0008)  
0.0005 
(0.0008) 
n 769 776 745 767 742 
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. 
*** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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Table 2.7 
Determinants of the Murder Rate (Excluding Louisiana) 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )
-0.0059 
-1 (0.0035)   
-0.0063* 
(0.0036) 
-0.0071* 
(0.0038) 
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )  -1 
0.0080* 
(0.0041)  
0.0086** 
(0.0041)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )  -1  
0.0022** 
(0.0009)  
0.0024** 
(0.0009) 
n 720 728 678 719 675 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )
-0.0041* 
-1 (0.0023)   
-0.0042* 
(0.0023) 
-0.0041* 
(0.0024) 
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0041*** 
(0.0015)  
0.0042*** 
(0.0014)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )  -1  
0.0006 
(0.0007)  
0.0008 
(0.0007) 
n 770 774 730 766 727 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-5 )
-0.0060** 
-1 (0.0026)   
-0.0067** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0063** 
(0.0026) 
 (COMM2t / SENTt-5 )  -1 
0.0058 
(0.0043)  
0.0072** 
(0.0034)  
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-5 )  -
1 
 0.0017** (0.0008)  
0.0018** 
(0.0008) 
n 722 728 699 721 696 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )
-0.0039 
-1 (0.0027)   
-0.0040 
(0.0027) 
-0.0039 
(0.0028) 
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )  -1 
0.0039*** 
(0.0014)  
0.0040*** 
(0.0013)  
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )  -
1 
 0.0005 (0.0007)  
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
n 770 776 747 768 744 
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. 
*** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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the analysis, the results are still robust.  This may not be all that surprising, as the 
coefficients are estimated through within state variation when including state fixed 
effects. 
This analysis shows that attempts to make the deterrence results disappear are 
ineffective.  Even if one estimates an unusual specification that takes the numerator 
and denominator of the risk variables contemporaneously (in the bottom panels of 
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2) the estimated impact of executions becomes statistically 
insignificant, but the positive impact of commutations on the murder rate does not 
disappear. 
 
2.4 The Impact of Death Penalty Laws 
Donohue III and Wolfers (2006) argued that the murder rates were higher in 
Kansas and New Hampshire after these states adopted the death penalty; lower in New 
York and New Jersey after their adoption of the death penalty; and that murder rates 
declined in Massachusetts and Rhode Island after these states abolished the death 
penalty.  We estimated various models in an effort to substantiate this statement.  
Because they indicate the impact of the death penalty laws are estimated separately for 
each of the mentioned states while controlling for the same variables as in the main 
specification, we estimated models separately for Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Kansas, New Hampshire, New York and New Jersey.   
For each state a dummy variable is created that takes the value of one if the 
death penalty is legal, and zero otherwise.  Kansas legalized the death penalty in 1994.  
New Hampshire legalized it in 1991.  Legalization took place in 1982 and 1995 for 
New Jersey and New York, respectively.  Massachusetts and Rhode Island abolished 
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the death penalty in 1984.1  Because the sample runs from 1977 to 1997, estimating 
regressions for each state separately is complicated by a degrees-of-freedom problem.  
The results are summarized in Table 2.8.  The reported coefficients pertain to a lagged 
dummy variable indicating the legality of the death penalty.2
 
   
TABLE 2.8 
The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Murder Rate 
The Coefficient (std err) of Death Penalty Legal (t-1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Kansas -0.0214 -0.0044 -0.0007 -0.008* -0.0011 (0.0220) (0.0183) (0.0061) (0.0040) (0.0033) 
New 
Hampshire 
-0.0226 -0.0253** -0.0125 -0.0206** -0.0213** 
(0.0119) (0.0099) (0.0105) (0.0080) (0.0078) 
Massachusetts -0.0055 -0.0059 -0.0082* -0.0075 -0.0066 (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0065) (0.0051) 
Rhode Island -0.0087 -0.0051 -0.0043 -0.0034 -0.0063 (0.0046) (0.0096) (0.0070) (0.0076) (0.0067) 
New York 0.0087 0.0165 0.0113 0.0119 0.0145 (0.0183) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0108) (0.0194) 
New Jersey -0.0101 -0.009* -0.0085*** -0.0132** -0.0132** (0.0140) (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0030) 
Note: Each cell reports the coefficient (standard error) of Death Penalty Legal (t-
1) variable in the murder rate regressions. Robust and clustered standard errors in 
parentheses.  * statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 
significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level or better. 
 
As the table shows, inclusion or exclusion of control variables has no 
substantial impact on the estimated coefficients of legal death penalty indicator.  In 
these regressions, the coefficient of the death penalty indicator is not statistically 
                                                 
1  Massachusetts abolished the death penalty in October 1984.  Thus, 1985 is the first year with no death 
penalty in Massachusetts in the data since abolishment took place.  Similarly, 1985 is the first full year 
where the death penalty is illegal in Rhode Island. 
2 Complete set of results can be found in Mocan and Gittings (2006).  The number of control variables 
differs between the specifications to investigate the sensitivity.  The sentencing rate could only be 
included in the regressions for New Jersey, because there is no variation in the number of death 
sentences in the five other states.  Similarly, the drinking age cannot be included in the models. 
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different from zero in Rhode Island and New York.  It is negative and significant in 
New Hampshire and New Jersey.  In Kansas and Massachusetts, the coefficients are 
always negative, and significant in one specification for each state. 
 
2.4.1 Evidence from Panel Data 
In this section, we investigate whether the existence of the death penalty in a 
state has a separate impact on the murder rate in addition to the risks associated with 
being on the death row.  To that end, we estimated the same models as those presented 
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, but we added a dichotomous indicator if death penalty is legal in 
a given state in a particular year.  Furthermore, we interacted this dummy variable 
with the execution rate, commutation rate and removal rate variables.  
The results are displayed in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, where the two alternative 
measures of execution, commutation and removal risks are employed.  In each case, 
models are estimated with 4 and 5-lags of the death sentences in the denominator of 
the risk variables as before.  The results demonstrate that the existence of the death 
penalty in a state has a negative and statistically significant impact on the murder rate.  
In addition, the execution rate has a negative impact on the murder rate, and 
commutations and removals have a positive impact, although not always statistically 
significant. 
 
2.5 The Denominator of the Risk Variables Again 
Individuals do not exit the death row in the same year as they received the 
death sentence.  To make the point more visible, the average duration on death row is 
calculated each year for those inmates who are removed that year, and plotted in 
Figure 2.1 by the reason of exit.   As can be inferred, individuals who were commuted, 
executed or otherwise removed from death row had spent an average of about six 
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Table 2.9 
Determinants of the Murder Rate  
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
 (1)  
 
(2)  
SENT
(3)  
t-4 SENT
(4)  
t-4 SENT
(5)  
t-5 SENTt-5 
Death Penalty Legal (-1). -0.0152** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0148** 
(0.0060) 
-0.0123** 
(0.0056) 
-0.0135** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0116** 
(0.0056) 
Murder Arrest Rate (-1) -0.0009 
(0.0032) 
-0.0019 
(0.0026) 
-0.0020 
(0.0024) 
-0.0028 
(0.0026) 
-0.0021 
(0.0026) 
Sentencing Rate (-1) -0.0026 
(0.0216) 
0.0093 
(0.0222) 
0.0112 
(0.0236) 
-0.0105 
(0.0198) 
-0.0171 
(0.0198) 
Prisoners per Violent Crime (-1) -0.0401*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0397*** 
(0.0083) 
-0.0378*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0391*** 
(0.0086) 
-0.0375*** 
(0.0087) 
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x  
Execution Rate (-1)  
-0.0056** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0050** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0061** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0069** 
(0.0029) 
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 
Commutation Rate(-1)  
0.0038** 
(0.0019)  
0.0067 
(0.0046)  
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 
Removal Rate (-1)   
0.0005 
(0.0007)  
0.0028*** 
(0.0009) 
n 894 781 741 733 688 
Note:  The column headings SENTt-4 and SENTt-5 mean that execution, commutation and removal rates are calculated by 
deflating EXECt, COMMt and REMOVEt by SENTt-4 or SENTt-5. Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * 
indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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Table 2.10 
Determinants of the Murder Rate  
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
 (1)  
 
(2)  
SENT
(3)  
t-4 SENT
(4)  
t-4 SENT
(5)  
t-5 SENTt-5 
Death Penalty Legal (-1). -0.0152** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0147** 
(0.0060) 
-0.0126** 
(0.0056) 
-0.0136** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0131** 
(0.0057) 
Murder Arrest Rate (-1) -0.0009 
(0.0032) 
-0.0018 
(0.0026) 
-0.0028 
(0.0028) 
-0.0029 
(0.0026) 
-0.0028 
(0.0028) 
Sentencing Rate (-1) -0.0026 
(0.0216) 
0.0092 
(0.0222) 
0.0121 
(0.0237) 
-0.0069 
(0.0209) 
-0.0105 
(0.0199) 
Prisoners per Violent Crime (-1) -0.0401*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0398*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0387*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0399*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0388*** 
(0.0085) 
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x  
Execution Rate (-1) 
 -0.0070** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0064* 
(0.0032) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0022) 
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 
Commutation Rate(-1) 
 0.0036** 
(0.0016)  
0.0054 
(0.0040)  
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 
Removal Rate (-1) 
  0.0005 (0.0007)  
0.0022*** 
(0.0007) 
n 894 783 758 736 709 
Note:  The column headings SENTt-4 and SENTt-5 mean that execution, commutation and removal rates are calculated by 
deflating EXECt, COMMt and REMOVEt by SENTt-4 or SENTt-5. Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * 
indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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 years on death row.  On the other hand, those who were executed or commuted in 
1997 had completed about 11 years on death row.   Given this picture, one can use 
time-varying durations on death row to calculate the risks of execution, commutation 
or removals.  For example, the execution risk in year 1981 can be calculated as the 
number of executions in 1981 divided by the number of death sentences in 1980 
(because the duration on death row was one year in 1981).  On the other hand, the risk 
of execution in 1990 can be measured as the number of executions in 1990 divided by 
the number of death sentences in 1982 (because the average duration on death row for 
those who were executed in 1990 was 8 years. See Figure 10).  More generally, the 
execution, commutation and removal rates are calculated as (EXECt / SENTt-i), 
(COMMt / SENTt-j), and (REMOVEt / SENTt-k), where i, j and k are average 
durations on death row for spells ending in year t for executions, commutations and 
removals, respectively.  Calculating the risks this way produced the results displayed 
in Table 2.11.  Once again, we are unsuccessful in eliminating the impact of the 
execution risk on the murder rate.1
Some researchers calculated the execution risk as the number of executions in 
a year divided by the number of prisoners in that state in that year (e.g. Katz et al. 
2003).  This calculation assumes that every prisoner in state correctional facilities is at 
risk of being executed.  This assumption has little validity as about 99.7 percent of the 
inmates in state prisons are incarcerated for non-capital offenses, and therefore they 
are not at risk of being executed. The difference is not simply a matter of scaling.  The 
number of total prisoners to the number of death row inmates is not a constant  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Another extreme is to uniformly increase the lag length of the denominator.  For example, when lag-
length seven is imposed the same results are obtained, but not surprisingly, the statistically significance 
is lowered. 
96 
Table 2.11 
Determinants of the Murder Rate 
With Time Varying Durations on Death Row 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
(EXECt / SENTt-i) -0.0058* -1 
(0.0031)   
-0.0058* 
(0.0034) 
-0.0055* 
(0.0029) 
(COMMt /SENTt-j)  -1 0.0014 (0.0064)  
0.0009 
(0.0067)  
(REMOVEt/SENTt-k)  -1  0.0003 (0.0008)  
0.0001 
(0.0008) 
N 830 642 784 629 773 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
(EXEC2t / SENTt-i) -0.0049* -1 
(0.0026)   
-0.0050 
(0.0032) 
-0.0049* 
(0.0027) 
(COMM2t /SENTt-j)  -1 0.0009 (0.0054)  
0.0004 
(0.0059)  
(REMOVE2t/SENTt-
k)  1  
0.0007 
(0.0007)  
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
n 833 643 806 632 797 
Note: .  Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. 
*** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  i, j and k are average durations 
on death row for spells ending in year t for executions, commutations and removals, 
respectively. 
 
proportion over time or across states.2
A more appropriate way of calculating the risk of execution would be to use 
the ratio of executions to the number of inmates on death row rather than deflating by 
the prison population in the state, although this measure is still inappropriate since a 
particular death row inmate is not at risk of execution if he just entered death row.  
Nevertheless, deflating by the stock of death row inmates is much more reasonable  
 Nevertheless, the results when introducing the 
total number of prisoners as the denominator is provided in Table 2.12.  Although this 
inaccurate measure makes the impact of commutations disappear, it cannot make the 
impact of executions go away. 
                                                 
2 For example, in 1997 there were a total of 1,127,686 inmates in state prisons, and there were 3,328 
death row inmates.  The number of total prisoners was 1,316,302 in 2004 and the number of people on 
death row was 3,314 in the same year. 
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Table 2.12 
Determinants of the Murder Rate 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
deflated Total Prisoners/1,000 
(EXECt / PRISt) -0.0258** 
(0.0101) 
-1   -0.0255** (0.0102) 
-0.0257 **  
(0.0101) 
(COMMt / PRISt)  -1 0.0085 (0.0077)  
0.0075 
(0.0083)  
(REMOVEt / PRISt  )  0.0007 (0.0008)  
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
n 894 894 894 894 894 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
deflated by Total Prisoners/1,000 
(EXEC2t / PRISt) -0.0208** 
(0.0083) 
-1   -0.0206** (0.0083) 
-0.0208** 
(0.0083) 
(COMM2t / PRISt)  -1 0.0065 (0.0067)  
0.0056 
(0.0073)  
(REMOVE2t / 
PRISt
 ) 
 0.0003 (0.0007)  
0.0028 
(0.0007) 
n 894 894 894 894 894 
Note: PRIS stands for the number of total prisoners. Each model includes the variables in 
the footnote to Table 2.7. 
 
than deflating by total prisoners.  Results obtained from this exercise are reported in 
Table 2.13.  Once again, executions have a negative impact on the murder rate in the 
state and commutations are positively related to murder.  
Two other denominators are promoted as deflators to the number of 
executions. For example, Donohue III and Wolfers (2006, p. 815) write “A very 
simple alternative that avoids this scaling issue is measuring executions per 100,000 
residents.”   They also write: “Another alternative scaling –and perhaps the one most 
directly suggested by the economic model of crime—is to analyze the ratio of the 
number of executions to the (lagged) homicide rate.” (p. 815).  Although it is evident 
that these suggested measures are poor indicators of the relevant risks, we estimated 
the models with these denominators as well.  The first panel of Table 2.14 displays the 
results when the annual count of executions, commutations and removals are deflated  
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Table 2.13 
Determinants of the Murder Rate 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
deflated by Death Row Inmates 
(EXECt / ROWt) -0.0465* -1 
(0.0277)   
-0.0463* 
(0.0276) 
-0.0466 
(0.0284) 
(COMMt / ROWt)  -1 0.0098*** (0.0014)  
0.0097*** 
(0.0015)  
(REMOVEt / ROWt  )  -0.0026 (0.0062)  
-0.0021 
(0.0062) 
n 894 894 890 894 890 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
deflated by Death Row Inmates 
(EXEC2t / ROWt) -0.0501* -1 
(0.0287)   
-0.0500* 
(0.0285) 
-0.0485 
(0.0298) 
(COMM2t / ROWt)  -
1 
0.0084*** 
(0.0017)  
0.0083*** 
(0.0017)  
(REMOVE2t / 
ROWt
 ) 
 -0.0043 (0.0051)  
-0.0039 
(0.0052) 
n 894 894 893 894 893 
Note: ROW stands for the number of death raw inmates. Each model includes the variables listed in 
the footnote to Table 2.13 
 
by state population, and the second panel presents the results when they are deflated 
by lagged homicide rate. 
Note that the dependent variable for the analysis is the murder rate, which is 
measured as murders deflated by population; thus, deflating executions by the state 
population means that population enters into the denominator of both the dependent 
and independent variables, inducing a positive bias in the estimated coefficient of the 
execution rate. Nevertheless, the coefficient of the execution rate remains negative and 
significant.   Because the dependent variable of the analysis is the murder rate, to use 
the murder rate as the deflator of executions is not meaningful either.3
                                                 
3 Donohue III and Wolfers seem to recognize this, and write that in their analysis they employ the 
lagged homicide rate as the deflator (Donohue and Wolfers 2006, ft. 63).  However, if the homicide rate 
has any path-dependence, such as a simple AR(1) model, using the lagged-dependent variable in the 
denominator of the independent variable does not avoid a bias. 
 However, as the 
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second panel of Table 2.15 demonstrates, using the lagged murder rate as the 
denominator did not make the results disappear. 
 
Table 2.14 
Determinants of the Murder Rate 
The Raw Count of Executions, Commutations, and Removals 
Deflated by Population/100,000 
( #EXt / POPt ) -0.055* -1 
(0.0281)   
-0.0055*  
(0.028) 
-0.0051*   
(0.0028) 
( #Ct / POPt )  -1 0.0099 (0.0212)  
0.0011 
(0.020)  
( #Rt / POPt )  -1  0.0037 (0.0061)  
0.0037 
(0.0063) 
n 894 894 894 894 894 
The Raw Count of Executions, Commutations, and Removals 
Deflated by Lagged Murder Rate x 1000 
( #EXt / MURDERt-1 ) -0.0543** 
(0.0251) 
1   -0.0542**  (0.0022) 
-0.0543**   
(0.0021) 
( #Ct / MURDERt-1  )  -1 -0.0120 (0.0254)  
-0.0098 
(0.0252)  
( #Rt / MURDERt-1 )  -1  -0.0004 (0.0122)  
0.0001 
(0.0127) 
n 894 894 894 894 894 
Note: #EXt denotes the raw counts of executions. #Ct denotes the raw counts of commutations, and 
#Rt  stands for the raw counts of death row removals. POP is the population in the state. MURDER 
is the murder rate.  Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical 
significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
 
2.6 Further Attempts to Make the Results Disappear 
The risk measures employed in this paper are calculated such that if there is an 
execution in a given state in a given year, but if it so happens that no individual 
received a capital sentence five years prior, then the risk (EXECt/SENTt-5
One can adopt an algorithm where observations are dropped from the data 
when the corresponding executions and death sentences are both zero.  This algorithm 
 ) is set to 
missing because the denominator is zero.  On the other hand, in cases where nobody 
was sentenced and nobody was executed, the execution risk was taken as zero. 
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assumes that the risks cannot be calculated in situations when they should be zero, 
such as the cases where there is no legal death penalty.  Even so, and despite the fact 
that this algorithm eliminates about half of the legitimate observations, the impact of 
the death penalty on the murder rate remains as shown in Tables 2.15 and 2.16.   
What happens to the results if we go to the extreme where the count of 
executions, commutations and removals are considered as appropriate signals to 
individuals, rather than the rates at which they occur (as defined by the correct 
denominator)?  While we do not agree that this is the correct specification, estimation 
of this model showed that even this modification does not eliminate the impact of 
prices on human behavior.   Although the coefficients of commutations and removals 
become statistically insignificant, the coefficient of execution remains significant even 
in this model.4
It may be possible that the deterrent impact of the death penalty which exists in 
states with large populations such as New York and New Jersey exerts 
disproportionate influence in a population-weighted regression and overwhelms the 
no-deterrence result that would have been obtained in regressions with no weighting.  
To investigate if the results are driven by this hypothesis, we estimated the models 
presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 without population weights.
 
5
                                                 
4 The results are reported in Mocan and Gittings (2006)  p.59. 
  In models where the 
duration of death row is taken as 5 years, the results are actually stronger with the 
coefficients of the commutation rate being statistically significant.  In the models 
where the duration of death row is taken as 4 years, the execution rate is insignificant, 
but the removal rate becomes significant when it was insignificant in the weighted 
regression displayed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.  Finally, the results of the regression 
5 The results, which are not reported in the interest of space, can be found in Mocan and Gittings 
(2006), pp. 60-1. 
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Table 2.15 
Determinants of the Murder Rate  
Dropping Observations Where Risk is Not Well Defined. 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on death row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5) -0.0043 
(0.0027) 
-1   -0.0045‡  (0.0029) 
-0.0061**   
(0.0026) 
(COMMt /SENTt-5)  -1 0.0057 (0.0050)  
0.0061 
(0.0050)  
(REMOVEt/SENTt-
5)
 
1 
 0.0022** (0.0008)  
0.0025*** 
(0.0009) 
n 398 398 398 398 398 
Duration on death row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4) -0.0053** 
(0.0022) 
-1   -0.0053* (0.0022) 
-0.0054**   
(0.0021) 
(COMMt /SENTt-4)  -1 0.0018 (0.0025)  
0.0019 
(0.0023)  
(REMOVEt/SENTt-
4)
 
1 
 0.0002 (0.0006)  
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
n 426 426 426 426 426 
Donohue III & Wolfers Specification 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years; Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years 
 (EXECt / SENTt  ) 0.0000 -1 
(0.0012)   
-0.0000 
(0.0012) 
-0.0000 
(0.0013) 
 (COMMt / SENTt  )  -1 0.0034* (0.0019)  
0.0034* 
(0.0013)  
(REMOVEt / SENT  t )-  0.0004 (0.0003)  
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
n 543 543 543 543 543 
Note: Observation are dropped when risk=0 and denominator=0. Robust and clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 
significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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Table 2.16 
Determinants of the Murder Rate  
Dropping Observations Where Risk is Not Well Defined. 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on death row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5) -0.0052** -1 
(0.0022)   
-0.0058**  
(0.0023) 
-0.0068***   
(0.0024) 
(COMMt /SENTt-5)  -1 0.0041 (0.0045)  
0.0054     
(0.0037)  
(REMOVEt/SENTt-5)  -
1 
 0.0017** (0.0006)  
0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
n 398 398 398 398 398 
Duration on death row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4) -0.0069* 
(0.0035) 
-1   -0.0069*  (0.0036) 
-0.0071**   
(0.0034) 
(COMMt /SENTt-4)  -1 0.0019 (0.0021)  
0.0021 
(0.0019)  
(REMOVEt/SENTt-
4)
 
1 
 0.00002 (0.0007)  
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
n 426 426 426 426 426 
Donohue III & Wolfers Specification 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years; Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years 
 (EXECt / SENTt  ) -0.0006 -1 
(0.0020)   
-0.0007 
(0.0020) 
-0.00005 
(0.0019) 
 (COMMt / SENTt  )  -1 0.0034** (0.0013)  
0.0034** 
(0.0013)  
(REMOVEt / SENT  t )-  -0.0005 (0.0005)  
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
n 543 543 543 543 543 
Note: Observation are dropped when risk=0 and denominator=0. Robust and clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 
significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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estimated by Donohue and Wolfers (2006) using contemporaneous numerators and 
denominators remain unchanged whether the regressions are weighted or not.   
In Table 2.17 we present the results obtained from the models that exclude 
New York and New Jersey, and estimate the models without weighting. As can be 
seen, the impact of leaving the death row on the murder rate cannot be eliminated by 
dropping New York and New Jersey from the analysis and running the regressions 
with no weighting.  The same conclusion is obtained, when we ran the models 
displayed in Tables 2.2-2.6 with no weights.  Thus, the results are not an artifact of 
weighting.6
 
 
2.7 Ph.D. Economists versus Criminals 
In his Nobel lecture, Gary Becker described his inspiration for 
modeling economic behavior of crime as follows. 
 
“I began to think about crime in the 1960s after driving to Columbia 
University for an oral examination of a student in economic theory.  I 
was late and had to decide quickly whether to put the car in a parking 
lot or risk getting a ticket for parking illegally on the street.  I 
calculated the likelihood of getting a ticket, the size of the penalty, 
and the cost of putting the car in a lot.  I decided it paid to take the 
risk and park on the street.  (I did not get a ticket.)   
 
As I walked the few blocks to the examination room, it occurred to 
me that the city authorities had probably gone through a similar 
analysis.  The frequency of their inspection of parked vehicles and the 
size of the penalty imposed on violators should depend on their 
estimates of the type of calculations potential violators like me would 
make.” (Becker 1992, p.42). 
 
 
                                                 
6  Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (2007) conduct extensive analyses on similar issues as well as others to 
investigate the sensitiv 
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Table 2.17 
Determinants of the Murder Rate (Excluding New York and New Jersey) 
Unweighted Regressions 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 ) -0.0043** 
(0.0022) 
-1   -0.0044**  (0.0021) 
-0.0056**   
(0.0025) 
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )  -1 0.0077*** (0.0022)  
0.0079***     
(0.0021)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )  -1  0.0027*** (0.0008)  
0.0030*** 
(0.0009) 
n 704 713 665 703 662 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 ) -0.0038 
(0.0023) 
-1   -0.0036  (0.0023) 
-0.0033*   
(0.0022) 
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )  -1 0.0050*** (0.0007)  
0.0049***     
(0.0007)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )  -1  0.0017**  (0.0008)  
0.0018** 
(0.0008) 
n 753 758 716 749 713 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 ) -0.0044** 
(0.0022) 
-1   -0.0046**  (0.0022) 
-0.0054**   
(0.0027) 
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )  -1 0.0064** (0.0026)  
0.0068***     
(0.0022)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )  -1  0.0019*** (0.0006)  
0.0021*** 
(0.0007) 
n 707 713 685 706 682 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 ) -0.0048 
(0.0038) 
-1   -0.0048  (0.0038) 
-0.0049   
(0.0036) 
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )  -1 0.0046*** (0.0008)  
0.0045***     
(0.0009)  
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )  -1  0.0013*  (0.0007)  
0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
n 753 760 732 751 729 
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance 
between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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One standard objection to economic analysis of crime is whether potential 
criminals are as astute as Ph.D. economists to evaluate these probabilities accurately.  
This objection is invalid so long as the researcher believes that empirical research 
should be conceptually consistent with the underlying theory.  If one assumes a priori 
that individuals are incapable of calculating the risks as they are defined by theory, 
then there is no room to conduct proper empirical research.  For example, if one 
rejects the theoretically-proper measure of the execution risk as executions within a 
cohort of death row inmates in a given year divided by death sentenced handed out to 
that cohort in some earlier year (because one believes that potential criminals do not 
observe either the executions or the death sentences), then one ought to claim that they 
cannot observe and evaluate other variables either, including the arrest rates, the size 
of the police force or police spending.  Thus, there would be no need to conduct 
research investigating whether people react to deterrence, under the belief that people 
could not evaluate variations in deterrence risks to begin with.   
Furthermore, attempts to justify the use of inappropriate variables based on the 
claim that individuals cannot observe, measure, or determine the values of decision 
parameters will produce peculiar analyses that cannot be defended theoretically.  For 
example, if the theory indicates that the real wages should matter in a particular 
context, it would be silly to suggest the use of nominal wages in a regression (instead 
of real wages) on the grounds that people cannot observe and predict accurately the 
level of the consumer price index.  If the theory indicates that the accident risk in a 
state is best measured by the number of accidents per vehicle miles traveled, it would 
be incorrect to promote deflating accidents by other measures such as the square miles 
of the state or the number of car dealerships, on the grounds that vehicle miles traveled 
is difficult to observe. 
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It should be noted, however, that in our context, the results are robust even to 
the use of measures that are inconsistent with theory.  A summary of the findings is 
provided in Table 2.18, which displays the results obtained from estimating various 
versions of Equation (1) along with the description of the measurement of the 
execution, commutation and removal rates in each specification.  The table displays 
results that are obtained from specifications where the key variables (execution, 
commutation and removal risks) are measured as dictated by theory.  The table also 
presents results from the models where they are measured incorrectly.  Examples are 
the specifications where executions, commutations and removals are deflated by 
lagged murder rate, by population; where the raw count of executions, commutations 
and removals are used; or the specifications promoted by Donohue and Wolfers 
(2006) (reported in rows 5 and 6 of Table 2.18).  As the table demonstrates, the results 
are remarkably stable even across models that substantially deviate from theory. 
 
2.8 Conclusion and Discussion 
Do people respond to incentives?  An economist’s answer to this question is a 
resounding “yes,” not only because economic theory indicates that incentives matter, 
but because an enormous empirical literature shows that they do.  An especially 
confusing dimension for non-economists is the behavior of individuals in such 
domains as the consumption of addictive substances, sexual activity and criminal 
behavior.  In the case of criminal behavior, non-economists frequently express the 
belief that human beings are not rational enough to make calculated decisions about 
the costs and benefits of engaging in crime, and that criminal activity cannot be altered 
by incentives.  Of course personal beliefs should not determine the answers to 
scientific questions.  Rather, answers should be provided by careful and objective 
scientific inquiry.   
  
107 
Table 2.18 
Summary of the Results 
A B (A/B) Exec Comm Rem 
First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed out 5 years prior 
(duration on death row=5 years) 
(EXECt/SENTt-5), 
(COMMt/SENTt-5
(REMOVE
), 
t/SENTt-5
 
) 
--* 
 
+ 
 
+* 
First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed out 4 years prior 
(duration on death row=4 years) 
(EXECt/SENTt-4), 
(COMMt/SENTt-4
(REMOVE
), 
t/SENTt-4
 
) 
--* 
 
+* 
 
+ 
Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed out 5 years prior 
(duration on death row=5 years) 
(EXEC2t/SENTt-5), 
(COMM2t/SENTt-5
(REMOVE2
), 
t/SENTt-5
 
) 
--* 
 
+ 
 
+* 
Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed out 4 years prior 
(duration on death row=4 years) 
(EXEC2t/SENTt-4), 
(COMM2t/SENTt-4
(REMOVE2
), 
t/SENTt-4
 
) 
--* 
 
+* 
 
+ 
First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(D-III&W Specification) 
Death Sentences handed out the same 
year (duration on death row=0 years) 
(EXECt/SENTt), 
(COMMt/SENTt
(REMOVE
), 
t/SENTt
 
) 
-- 
 
+* 
 
+ 
Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(D-III&W Specification) 
Death Sentences handed out the same 
year (duration on death row=0 years) 
(EXEC2t/SENTt), 
(COMM2t/SENTt
(REMOVE2
), 
t/SENTt
 
) 
-- 
 
+* 
 
+ 
First or Second Measures of 
Executions, Commutations, 
Removals 
Death Sentences handed out i, j, or k 
years prior for spells ending in year t 
(duration on death row=changes by year) 
(EXECt/SENTt-i), 
(COMMt/SENTt-j
(REMOVE
), 
t/SENTt-k
 
) 
--* 
 
+ 
 
+ 
First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Row Inmates (ROW) (EXECt/ROWt), 
(COMMt/ROWt
(REMOVE
), 
t/ROWt
 
) 
--* 
 
+* 
 
+ 
Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Row Inmates (ROW) (EXEC2t/ROWt), 
(COMM2t/ROWt
(REMOVE2
), 
t/ROWt
 
) 
--* 
 
+* 
 
+ 
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Table 2.18 (Continued) 
First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Total Prisoners (PRIS) (EXECt/PRISt), 
(COMMt/PRISt
(REMOVE
), 
t/PRISt
 
) 
--* 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Total Prisoners (PRIS) (EXEC2t/PRISt), 
(COMM2t/PRISt
(REMOVE2
), 
t/PRISt
 
) 
--* 
 
+ 
 
+ 
The Raw Count of Executions 
(#EX), Commutations (#C), 
Removals (#R) 
Population (POP) (#EXt/POPt
(#C
),  
t/POPt
(#R
), 
t/POPt
 
) 
--* 
 
+ 
 
+ 
The Raw Count of Executions 
(#EX), Commutations (#C), 
Removals (#R) 
Lagged Murder Rate (MURDER) (#EXt/MURDERt
(#C
),  
t/MURDERt
(#R
), 
t/MURDERt
 
) 
--* 
 
-- 
 
+ 
The Raw Count of Executions 
(#EX), Commutations (#C), 
Removals (#R) 
 (#EXt
(#C
),  
t
(#R
), 
t
 
) 
--* 
 
-- 
 
+ 
First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(Unweighted Regression) 
Death Sentences handed out 5 years prior 
(duration on death row=5 years) 
(EXECt/SENTt-5), 
(COMMt/SENTt-5
(REMOVE
), 
t/SENTt-5
 
) 
--* 
 
+* 
 
+* 
First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(Unweighted Regression) 
Death Sentences handed out 4 years prior 
(duration on death row=4 years) 
(EXECt/SENTt-4), 
(COMMt/SENTt-4
(REMOVE
), 
t/SENTt-4
 
) 
-- 
 
+* 
 
+* 
Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(Unweighted Regression) 
Death Sentences handed out 5 years prior 
(duration on death row=5 years) 
(EXEC2t/SENTt-5), 
(COMM2t/SENTt-5
(REMOVE2
), 
t/SENTt-5
 
) 
--* 
 
+* 
 
+* 
Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(Unweighted Regression) 
Death Sentences handed out 4 years prior 
(duration on death row=4 years) 
(EXEC2t/SENTt-4), 
(COMM2t/SENTt-4
(REMOVE2
), 
t/SENTt-4
 
) 
-- 
 
+* 
 
+ 
Note: A  + (--) indicates that the coefficient is positive (negative) in at least 2 of the 3 regressions pertinent to that specification.   A * 
indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant in at least 2 of the 3 specifications.  The details are reported in various tables in the 
paper.   
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In the economic approach to crime, decades of empirical research has 
demonstrated that potential criminals indeed respond to incentives.  It has been 
documented that improved labor market conditions reduce the extent of criminal 
activity (recent examples include Grogger 1998, Freeman and Rodgers 2000, Gould et 
al. 2002), and criminal activity reacts to deterrence (e.g. Ehrlich 1975, Levitt 1998b, 
Kessler and Levitt 1999, Corman and Mocan 2000, Mustard 2003, Corman and Mocan 
2005).  For example, Levitt (1998b) showed that deterrence is empirically more 
important than incapacitation in explaining crime, and that increases in arrest rates 
deter criminal activity.  Kessler and Levitt (1999) show that Proposition 8 in 
California, which introduced sentence enhancements for certain crimes, reduced 
eligible crimes by 4 percent in the year following its passage and 8 percent 3 years 
after the passage, providing strong evidence that crime rates react to the severity of 
punishment.  In an analysis of the relationship between crime and punishment for 
juveniles, Levitt (1998a) finds that changes in relative punishment between juveniles 
and adults explain 60 percent of the differential growth rates in juvenile and adult 
crime, and that abrupt changes in criminal involvement with the transition from 
juvenile to adult courts indicate that individuals do respond to the expected 
punishment (as economic theory suggests).  Corman and Mocan (2005, 2000) show 
that criminal activity responds to variations in arrests and the size of the police force. 
As discussed in the introduction, the signal provided by leaving death row is no 
different from any other change in expected punishment.  That is, an execution is a 
signal of an increase in expected punishment, and a commutation represents a decrease 
in expected punishment.   However, it is sometimes claimed that because executions 
are infrequent events, they cannot possibly be a strong enough signals to alter the 
behavior of people.  Yet, the same analysts have no difficulty in believing that a 
prospective criminal observes correctly and accurately the extent of the increase in the 
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number of arrests, and coupled with the information about the level of crime, he 
calculates the enhanced risk of getting caught, and changes his behavior.   Similarly, 
the suggestion that if the local authority hires 20 new police officers, the associated 
increase in the risk of getting caught by this move is properly evaluated by potential 
criminals does not raise objections.   Even prison deaths are believed to provide 
signals to people who are not in prison.  Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2003) find that 
the death rate in prisons constitutes deterrence, and an increase in prison deaths has a 
negative impact on crime rates.  It is very difficult to argue that an increase in prison 
deaths would be a signal of deterrence, but an increase in the executions would not.   
Clearly, analysts’ personal beliefs regarding what should and should not 
constitute a strong signal are irrelevant.  Whether or not police, arrests, prison deaths, 
executions, or commutations provide signals to people about the extent of expected 
punishment is an empirical question.  In this paper we estimate a large number of 
models in an effort to make the relationship between murder rates and death penalty 
related outcomes (executions, commutations and removals) disappear.  We change the 
measurement of the risk variables by altering the numerator and the denominator of 
the variables in a variety of ways (see Table 2.18 for a summary); we also investigate 
how the results change when we exclude various states from the analysis.  The basic 
results are insensitive to these and a variety of other specification tests performed in 
the paper.    
It is understandable that the death penalty may evoke strong feelings which 
could be due to political, ideological, religious, or other personal beliefs.  It could also 
be because of the fear that a scientific paper which identifies a deterrent effect could 
be taken as an endorsement or justification of the death penalty.  This should not be 
the case for any scientific research.  This point is highlighted by Mocan and Gittings 
(2003) and Katz,Levitt and Shustorovich (2003).  For example, Katz, Levitt and 
111 
Shustorovich (2003) find that the death rate among prisoners (a proxy for prison 
conditions) deters crime.   This finding obviously does not suggest that the society 
should increase the death rate of the prisoners by worsening the prison conditions to 
reduce the crime rate.    Nevertheless, the authors feel the need to state the obvious, 
and write that: 
 
“We cannot stress enough that evidence of a deterrent effect of poor 
prison conditions is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
arguing that current prison conditions are either overly benign or 
unjustifiably inhumane.  Efficiency arguments related to deterrence 
are only one small aspect of an issue that is inextricably associated 
with basic human rights, constitutionality, and equity considerations.  
Our research is descriptive, not proscriptive.” (p.322)   
 
Similarly, Mocan and Gittings (Mocan and Gittings 2003, p. 474) write that the 
fact that there exists a deterrent effect of capital punishment, should not imply a 
position on death penalty.  There are a number of significant issues surrounding the 
death penalty, ranging from potential racial discrimination in the imposition of the 
death penalty (Baldus et al., 1998) to discrimination regarding who is executed and 
who is commuted once the death penalty is received (Argys and Mocan 2004).   
Given these concerns, it is critically important to preserve objectivity in 
scientific research on a subject matter in which opinions may have been formed 
without, or sometimes despite the evidence.  This unfortunate phenomenon is 
described succinctly by Sunstein and Vermeule (2006), where they write in their reply 
to Donohue and Wolfers (2006): 
 
“We cannot help but add that as new entrants into the death penalty 
debate, we are struck by the intensity of people’s beliefs on the 
empirical issues, and the extent to which their empirical judgments 
seem to be driven by their moral commitments.  Those who oppose the 
death penalty on moral grounds often seem entirely unwilling to 
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consider apparent evidence of deterrence and are happy to dismiss such 
evidence whenever even modest questions are raised about it.  Those 
who accept the death penalty on moral grounds often seem to accept the 
claim of deterrence whether or not good evidence has been provided on 
its behalf.” 
   
In summary, the detailed analysis in this paper demonstrates the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment.  Yet, this finding does not imply that capital punishment 
is good or bad, nor does it provide any judgment about whether capital punishment 
should be implemented or abolished.  It is just a scientific finding which demonstrates 
that people react to incentives.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
COMBINING SYNTHETIC DATA AND NOISE INFUSION FOR 
CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION OF THE QUARTERLY WORKFORCE 
INDICATORS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since 2003, the U.S. Census Bureau has published a new and novel statistical 
series: the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). The underlying data infrastructure 
was designed by the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program (Abowd 
et al.; 2004) and is described in detail elsewhere (Abowd et al.; 2005). At its core, the 
QWI system uses administrative records data collected by a large number of states for 
both jobs and employers. These administrative databases are integrated and enhanced 
with other data from Census Bureau censuses and surveys. Consequently, the QWI 
offer unprecedented demographic and economic detail on the local dynamics of labor 
markets. 
Due to the fine detail offered by the published statistics and the confidential 
nature of the micro-data used to compile the statistics, confidentiality protection is a 
critical and integral part of the design of the QWI system. Application of a state-of-
the-art dynamically-consistent noise infusion protection system allows the Census 
Bureau to publish these statistics. Even so, at very detailed levels of industry and 
geography, there are still many suppressions, which hinder the effective use of the 
released data. To eliminate these suppressions, we have developed a synthetic data 
model that replaces the suppressions with draws from an appropriate posterior 
predictive distribution. In this article, we summarize the layers of confidentiality 
protection in the QWI system and discuss the experimental enhancements. We show 
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that confidentiality protection provided by the experimental system (which has no 
suppressions at all) is comparable to the protection afforded by the suppressions, but 
the analytic validity of the experimental system is better because the synthetic data are 
better than the best inference an external user can make regarding the suppressions. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly 
describes the QWI variables and the relationships between them. Section 3.3 briefly 
discusses the current protection methods. Section 4 presents the details of the 
synthesizer. Section 3.5 details the algorithm used to create the synthetic data.  Section 
3.6 presents the existing disclosure avoidance protocol and the new layer introduced 
by the synthetic data. Section 3.7 discusses the results and Section 3.8 concludes. 
 
3.2 QWI Notation and Definitions  
In order to present an integrated description of the combination of noise 
infusion and synthetic data to protect the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI), we 
develop some notation for the establishment-level micro data. The QWI are presented 
for categories of employees classified according a=1,...,8 (age groups) and s=1,2 (sex). 
These micro-data are built up from job-level records relating an individual i to his or 
her employer establishment j. In the notation below, use of the a,s subscripts implies 
summation over all persons i satisfying the conditions for a particular employment 
category (B,E,etc.) at establishment j in quarter t. 
The basic employment variables subject to micro-data protection are: 
• Basjt
• E
, beginning-of-period employment  
asjt
• H
, end-of-period employment 
asjt
• R
, new hires 
asjt
• A
, recalls  
asjt, accessions 
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• Sasjt
• M
, separations 
asjt
• JF
, flow employment  
asjt  = Easjt-Basjt
• JC
, net job flows 
asjt  = max(0,JFasjt
• JD
), job creations 
asjt  = max(0,-JFasjt
 
), job destructions 
     The following identities connect the employment and job flow concepts: 
 
Aasjt=Hasjt  + Rasjt
S
                             (3.1) 
asjt = Aasjt - (JCasjt - JDasjt) = Aasjt - JFasjt
E
                          (3.2) 
asjt = Basjt + Aasjt - Sasjt
M
                            (3.3) 
asjt = Aasjt + Basjt
 
                             (3.4) 
     Thus, there are four basic employment flow quantities, Basjt, Easjt, Hasjt, Rasjt
 
, 
only three of which may vary independently. When time-varying demographic factors 
are not applied, the following intertemporal identity always holds: 
B•sjt=E•sjt-1
 
                              (3.5) 
The • subscript indicates summation over that dimension. However, when age-
specific employment variation is measured, this identity need not hold because 
individuals change relevant age groups on the first day of the new period (the 
reference date for Basjt). For a complete description of how the establishment-level 
micro data are computed from the integrated longitudinal employer-employee data, 
see Abowd et al. (forthcoming). 
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     The QWI also consist of full-quarter employment measures that are linked to 
the variables above through inequality constraints.   
 
• Fasjt
• FA
, full-quarter employment 
asjt
• FS
, accessions to full-quarter employment 
asjt
• H3
, separations with full-quarter employment 
asjt
• FJF
, new hires to full-quarter employment 
asjt = F asjt - F asjt-1
• FJC
, net job flows 
asjt = max(0,FJF asjt
• FJD
), job creations 
asjt = max(0,-FJF asjt
 
), job destructions 
     These variables are related to each other and those above through the following 
identities and constraints: 
 
FSasjt = FAasjt - (Fasjt-Fasjt-1) = FAasjt - FJFasjt
H3
                          (3.6) 
asjt ≤ FAasjt ≤ Aasjt
H3
                             (3.7) 
asjt ≤ Hasjt
FS
                              (3.8) 
asjt ≤ Sasjt
F
                              (3.9) 
asjt ≤ min[Easjt,Basjt
 
]                           (3.10) 
     Of the three full-quarter variables, Fasjt, FSasjt, FAasjt, only two may vary 
independently while H3asjt
 
 is constrained only by the inequalities.  Note that the 
inequalities contain quantities from the both the full-quarter and basic employment 
variables.  This joint determination of the variables adds an additional layer of 
complexity to the synthesis.   
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3.3 Overview of Current Protection Methods 
     Currently, confidentiality of the underlying micro-data is ensured through 
several layers of protection: multiplicative noise infusion, weighting and cell 
suppression.  The first two layers (noise and weighting) sufficiently protect the vast 
majority of cells. Distribution preserving noise is infused to all workplace estimates at 
the establishment level.  The noise factor is constructed as having the appropriate 
distributional properties so that cross-sectional and time-series attributes of the data 
are maintained after aggregation, except for the increase in the cross-sectional 
variance arising from the noise infusion. 
     Draw noise factor δj from the appropriate distribution. Denote Xasjt as the 
complete set of QWI employment count variables and define X∗asjt=δjXasjt
 
. One can 
verify that all of the identities still hold. See Abowd, Stephens and Vilhuber (2005) for 
a complete description of how the noise infusion is constructed. The data are then 
aggregated from the workplace to higher levels of sub-state geography and industry 
using a time-varying establishment-level weight designed so that beginning quarter 
employment (B) of the QWI matches the first monthemployment of the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW).  This second layer of protection 
produces estimates that differ even further from the underlying confidential micro-
data.  However, the extraordinary detail of the QWIs still produces some sparsely 
populated aggregate cells. Cell suppression is then used when those cell counts are 
determined to be too small. The problem is then that users of the data must model the 
missing data based on publication counts.  The synthetic data methods we develop 
here will replace the suppressed values in the publication tables, using the methods we 
develop here but with confidential parameters for the actual implementation.   
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3.4 Synthetic Data Model 
     To synthesize the core set of variables and maintain dynamic consistency we 
need a model that satisfies all of the definitions and identities. However, the process is 
complicated by the desire to use the synthetic data only when the noise infusion does 
not adequately protect an estimated employment count. Since all of the released data 
will be based on either noise infusion or synthesis, preserving dynamic consistency 
requires that the noise-infused values and the synthetic values be consistent.  This is 
done by choosing an appropriate conditioning set of variables and sampling from the 
posterior to ensure the identities hold (see below for details). 
     Our synthetic data model is based on a multinomial likelihood with a Dirichlet 
on the priors. Specifically, denote Yasjt as the set of QWI variables to be jointly 
synthesized (e.g. Yasjt = (Basjt,Hasjt,Rasjt)) and Yasjtr as the resulting set of synthetic 
values. Each element of Yasjt takes on the values of 0,1,2,3 or 4⁺. We denote the 
conditioning set as Ωasjt that contains Yasjt-1,Yasjt+1 as well as job flows, JF∗asjt, which 
has a feasible range of -4 to 4.  Letting θ be the vector of multinomial probabilities and 
α1|asjt,...,αL|asjt
 
 be the shape parameters of the Dirichlet for the L possible outcomes. 
The likelihood and Dirichlet prior can be summarized by the following two equations: 
 ρ�nasjt�Ωasjt, θasjt� ∝ Πl=1L [θl|asjt]
nasjt                                    (3.11) 
 θasjt ~ Dirichlet(α1|asjt,…,αL|asjt )sjt 
 
                                    (3.12) 
where nasjt are the counts of Yasjt
 
 for characteristics a,s in establishment j in quarter t. 
The prior shape is given by α. The resulting posterior can then be written as: 
 θasjt
pos ~ Dirichlet(α1|asjt+ n1|asjt ,…,αL|asjt+ nL|asjt )                                  (3.13) 
 ρ �nasjt
pos�Ωasjt,θasjt
pos �  ∝ Πl=1L [θasjt
pos]nasjt                                    (3.14) 
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     Filling the suppressions then requires first sampling from the posterior on the 
probabilities then using that draw to sample an outcome Yrasjt for establishment j.1
 
 
With the resulting outcome, it remains to compute the remaining QWI variables using 
the identities. 
3.4.1 Estimation of the Likelihood Component 
To illustrate the construction of the likelihood, consider the synthesizer that 
draws Yrasjt conditional on Ωasjt.  For each age group and sex (a,s) with data 
configuration Ωasjt we estimate the likelihood contribution separately for each quarter t 
as follows. In quarter t, select only those establishments for which the values of Yasjt 
lie in the allowable outcome space. Stratify these establishments according to the 
observed combinations of Yasjt-1,Yasjt+1 and JF∗asjt. Let ηl|asmt be the establishment 
count for each possible combination l in the feasible outcome space of Yasjt, where m 
designates each unique combination of Yasjt-1,Yasjt+1 and JF∗asjt. Then, η•|asmt is the total 
number of establishments with configuration m and θl|asmt = ((ηl|asmt) / (η•|asmt
 
)) are the 
maximum likelihood estimates of the feasible outcome probabilities. 
3.4.2 Specification of the Dirichlet Prior 
     We want to use a data-based informative prior for the probabilities. To do this 
we aggregate by first dropping the conditioning variables Yasjt-1 and Yasjt+1 so that the 
conditioning set consists of age/sex groups and job flow counts, JF∗asjt. The data are 
then pooled across the current quarter being synthesized along with three additional 
seasonally-consistent quarters-- historical if available, future otherwise--designated by 
the set of quarters Qt
                                                 
1 Empirically computing the Dirichlet posterior is relatively simple.  An algorithm for doing so can be 
found in the text "Bayesian Data Analysis" by Gelman, Carlin and Stern (2003). 
. To ensure that the posterior receives positive weight on all 
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feasible outcomes, we blend the data-based prior with a uniform prior denoted as u. 
The Dirichlet prior shape parameters are estimated by 
     
 ρl|asmt=0.99×((∑t∈Qtηl|asmt)/(∑t∈Qtη∙|asmt)+ 0.01×u                                        (3.15) 
 
     The specification of the Dirichlet is completed by assigning a prior sample 
size. The results shown below are for a prior sample size of 1; however, the exact prior 
sample size used in production will be confidential. Denoting the prior sample size by 
α₀, the Dirichlet prior can be completely specified by α l|asmt=α₀ρl|asmt
 
, where l ranges 
over all values in the feasible set that have positive prior probability. 
3.4.3 Sampling from the Posterior 
For each observed value of (a,s,m,t), the probabilities θposl|asmt are Dirichlet 
with parameters α1|asmt + n1|asmt,...,αL|asmt + nL|asmt, where events with zero posterior 
probability have been removed from the feasible outcome space. For each (a,s,m,t), 
sample θl|asmt from the Dirichlet and then for each establishment j, sample Yrasjt
 
 from 
these probabilities. Compute the remaining QWI variables from the identities and 
definitions above.  If the computed values from the identities are infeasible (i.e., are 
negative), reject and draw again. The synthetic data sampling can be performed 
multiple times; however the results reported below are for single synthetic data 
samples. 
3.5 Algorithm 
     Since the QWIs are linked through a series of identities and inequality 
constraints, the quantities must be partitioned into a subset that is synthesized and a 
subset that is evaluated using the identities.  Furthermore, this allows for the creation 
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of multiple sets of synthetic data depending on which subsets are synthesized and 
calculated.  A decision rule on which set to use minimizes the amount of synthesis 
necessary for protection.   
     The synthesis is conducted in two stages with the full-quarter variables being 
synthesized last. Let (Basjt,Hasjt,Rasjt) be group 1 variables to synthesize and 
(Easjt,Aasjt,Sasjt) be group 2 variables to synthesize.  When group 1 is synthesized, 
Easjt,Aasjt,Sasjt,Masjt are evaluated using the identities and likewise, and when group 2 
is synthesized, Basjt,Hasjt,Rasjt,Masjt are evaluated. The second stage consists of 
synthesizing the values (Fasjt,FAasjt,H3asjt) and evaluating FSasjt
     Let Y
.  Note that the second 
stage draws the full-quarter synthetic values conditional on the synthetic set obtained 
from the first stage.   
1r
asjt denote the synthetic value of variables Basjt,Easjt,Hasjt,Rasjt,JFasjt, 
JCasjt, JDasjt,Aasjt,Sasjt,Masjt resulting from group 1 synthesis, and let Y2rasjt denote the 
values from group 2 synthesis. Let Z1rasjt denote the synthetic values of full-quarter 
variables Fasjt,FAasjt,FSasjt,H3asjt,FJFasjt, FJCasjt, FJDasjt that result from conditioning 
on Y1rasjt in the second stage, and Z2rasjt the synthetic values that result from 
conditioning on Y2rasjt in the second stage. This results in two full sets of synthetic 
data we label X1rasjt = [Y1rasjt Z1rasjt] and X2rasjt = [Y2rasjt Z2rasjt
     The overall synthesizing algorithm, which is based on partially synthetic data 
(Reiter, 2004 and Raghanathan, Reiter, and Rubin, 2003) can be summarized by the 
following. 
]. 
In stage 1, draw (Brasjt, Hrasjt, Rrasjt) conditional on (Basjt-1, Hasjt-1, Rasjt-1), 
(Basjt+1,Hasjt+1,Rasjt+1), JF∗asjt.  Also draw (Erasjt, Arasjt, Srasjt) conditional on (Easjt-1,Aasjt-
1,Sasjt-1), (Easjt+1, Aasjt+1,Sasjt+1),  JF∗asjt.  For each synthesized group, evaluate the 
remaining variables using the identities (note that use of the definitions insures that 
JCrasjt = JC*asjtand JDrasjt = JD*asjt). 
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Next check that Y1rasjt,Y2rasjt ≥ 0 for all variables.  If not, redraw the 
appropriate synthesis group and reevaluate the identities.  For Yrasjt=JFasjt,JCasjt,JDasjt 
calculate Yr•sjt=Y*•sjt,Yra•jt=Y*a•jt, and Yr••jt=Y∗••jt.  For the remaining variables in 
Yrasjt, calculate Yr•sjt, Yra•jt, and Yr••jt
In stage 2, draw (F
.  
r
asjt, FArasjt, H3rasjt) given (Fasjt-1,FAasjt-1,H3asjt-1), 
(Fasjt+1,FAasjt+1,H3asjt+1)  and note that conditioning on FJF∗asjt here would fully 
constrain Frasjt).  Evaluate FSrasjt, FJCrasjt, FJDrasjt , and FSrasjt. Check that Z1rasjt, Z2rasjt 
≥ 0 for all variables.  If not, redraw the appropriate synthesis group and reevaluate the 
identities.  Finally, for the remaining variables in Zrasjt, calculate Zr•sjt, Zra•jt, and Zr••jt
 At the end of the synthesizing algorithm, each establishment has a complete 
set of X
. 
asjt, X*asjt, X1rasjt, and X2rasjt
 
 and all dynamic identities hold. Furthermore, the 
dynamic identities and the intraestablishment marginal employment counts are all 
consistent between the noise-infused and synthetic data. 
3.6 Forming the Quarterly Workforce Indicators 
     The QWI are created by aggregating the micro-data for establishments j into 
ownership × geography × industry categories using the establishment weight wjt. Call 
a cell of a particular aggregation k. Thus, the subscript k replacing the establishment 
subscript indicates that all the establishments meeting a particular set of ownership, 
geography, and industry criteria have been summed. For each k, consider the QWI 
Xaskt, X*askt, and Xraskt
     At each level of aggregation, the QWIs are evaluated for confidentiality 
protection. Cells are suppressed that are composed too few individuals or too few 
establishments and are given a status flag of 5. Cells are flagged as 9 if the protection 
. 
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mechanisms have distorted the data past a particular threshold, and the remaining cells 
are released with a status flag of 1.2
     Given the experiments with synthetic data described in this paper, the 
experimental rules are the following.
 
3  If Xaskt ∈{1,2} then release the appropriate 
Xraskt and set status to 9.  Else if abs ((Xaskt-Xaskt) / (Xaskt)) ≥ β then release Xaskt* and 
set status to 9.  Else release Xaskt*
     Under the experimental rules with a synthetic data protection component, 
there are no data with status 5 (i.e., there are no suppressions); however, significant 
distortion can arise from either noise infusion or synthesis. Hence, the revised release 
rules meet either the magnitude inference distortion or the probability inference 
distortion conditions set forth in the introduction. 
 and set status to 1. 
 
3.7 Results for Experimental Protection Rules 
These results summarize the effects of the various layers of the protection 
system. The data item to be protected is the value in the unweighted, undistorted 
micro-data, which corresponds to a particular variable in Xaskt
                                                 
2 The threshholds that determine whether cells are flagged with a 5 or 9 are confidential. 
 for aggregations k and 
individuals in demographic category (a,s). The aggregations presented here are for 
county-level geography and NAICS industry group (4-digit), although the tables have 
been computed for the other industry classifications as well.  The 4-digit NAICS 
classification is chosen because it naturally has the largest number of small cells 
among the QWI publication tables and therefore more suppressions in the released 
data. The first set of results are cross-tabulations that show how the values of the 
3 Evans, Zayatz, and Slanta (1998) proposed a noise infusion protection system using the Research and 
Development survey.  In doing so, they did not reveal the actual rules for any particular release of data, 
but they did detail the parameters of their experiments and rules they used to evaluate their methods. 
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unprotected microdata are perturbed by each of the protection layers. The second set 
of results illustrate the how the time series properties the data are affected. 
 
3.7.1 Cross-Tabulations 
     The following tables have been computed for each of the eleven synthesized 
variables Basjt,Easjt,Hasjt,Rasjt,Aasjt,Sasjt,Masjt,Fasjt,FAasjt,FSasjt, and H3asjt for the states 
of Maryland and Illinois but only the results for Basjt
     Table 3.1 to 3.3 show how the unweighted, undistorted data are affected by 
distortion, distortion plus weighting and then synthesis, respectively, for the variable 
B
 are shown here for each state. 
The remaining tables have the same conclusions. 
asjt
     By reviewing the rows of Table 3.1, it is clear that the noise infusion does not 
adequately protect single individuals in an age/sex category and, by extension, 
beginning-of-period employment in the establishment of 1. It is also clear that values 
of 2 are adequately protected if the required inference error rate is set at 10% or more. 
Of course, one cannot suppress only values of 1 which is why more than one cell must 
be suppressed in the current protocols. Table 3.2 shows the effects of combining noise 
infusion with weighting. Again, the percentage on the diagonal for values of 1 is still 
high, but Table 3.3 shows that introducing our synthetic data methods now adequately 
protects the small values and suppression is no longer needed. The remaining tables 
 in the Maryland data. Tables 3.4 to 3.6 show the same data for Illinois. The data 
are rounded to the nearest unit in the column, where 5⁺ contains data values of 5 or 
more. The main elements of interest in the tables are the percentages along the 
diagonal, which shows how often the value of the confidential micro data (the rows of 
the table) is unchanged by the particular protection method (the columns of the table).  
If the value on the diagonal is too high, the data are insufficiently protected. 
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Table 3.1 
Variable: B 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Unweighted/Distorted 
 0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
0 99.61 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0.00 98.57 1.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 1.04 96.10 2.85 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 2.19 93.21 4.60 0.00 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.30 82.52 10.18 
5+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 98.40 
       
Note: The data represent county data for Maryland/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent 
row percentages and sum to 100. 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Variable: B 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Weighted/Distorted 
 0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
0 99.19 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0.14 89.29 10.56 0.01 0.00 0.00 
2 0.04 1.39 67.45 30.70 0.42 0.00 
3 0.03 0.04 2.19 50.99 42.76 3.99 
4 0.03 0.02 0.03 3.07 41.04 55.81 
5+ 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.33 99.64 
       
Note: The data represent county data for Maryland/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent 
row percentages and sum to 100. 
 
 
Table 3.3 
Variable: B 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Synthesized 
 0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
0 99.17 0.82 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 7.85 84.74 6.62 0.78 0.01 0.00 
2 0.51 11.93 61.06 24.14 2.24 0.12 
3 0.06 0.76 7.53 47.50 39.13 5.02 
4 0.03 0.11 0.93 7.40 38.84 52.69 
5+ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.71 99.16 
       
Note: The data represent county data for Maryland/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent 
row percentages and sum to 100. 
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Table 3.4 
Variable: B 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Unweighted/Distorted 
 0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
0 99.64 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0.00 98.71 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 1.28 95.98 2.74 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 2.63 92.89 4.48 0.00 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.07 81.81 10.12 
5+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.13 97.87 
       
Note: The data represent county data for Illinois/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent row 
percentages and sum to 100. 
 
 
Table 3.5 
Variable: B 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Weighted/Distorted 
 0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
0 99.47 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0.16 94.86 4.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 2.81 80.74 16.30 0.14 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 5.88 67.79 24.73 1.59 
4 0.00 0.00 0.13 8.51 55.64 35.73 
5+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.20 98.74 
       
Note: The data represent county data for Illinois /NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent row 
percentages and sum to 100. 
 
 
Table 3.6 
Variable: B 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Synthesized 
 0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
0 99.45 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 7.36 87.45 4.70 0.48 0.00 0.00 
2 0.40 12.99 70.81 14.52 1.23 0.06 
3 0.02 0.67 10.62 63.33 22.97 2.39 
4 0.00 0.07 1.11 12.68 52.13 34.00 
5+ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.20 1.69 98.09 
       
Note: The data represent county data for Illinois /NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent row 
percentages and sum to 100. 
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display the same patterns and the results for the variables not presented here are also 
similar. 
 
3.7.2 Analytical Validity of Time-Series Properties 
     The conclusion that the synthesizer sufficiently protects the QWI micro data is 
positive, but it is also of interest how the statistical properties of the data hold up.  The 
current use of suppression is problematic for users of the data because they are forced 
to model the missing data themselves based on the released data or ignore it.  Here we 
show that replacing the suppressions with synthetic data not only retains the statistical 
properties of the underlying data but also yields an improvement over modeling the 
missing data externally. 
     Our test of the time-series properties computes the first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient using maximum likelihood for each variable for age/sex groups at the 
county/NACIS Industry Group (4-digit) level of aggregation. To judge the analytical 
validity we look at the distribution of the difference between the autocorrelation 
coefficient using the unweighted/undistorted data and the estimate produced when 
using one of the layers of protection. A difference of zero between these two estimates 
would indicate no bias and preservation of the time-series properties. Tables 3.7 to 3.9 
show the distribution of this difference for each variable under each protection scheme 
for Maryland.  Tables 3.10 to 3.12 show the results for Illinois. Table 3.7 shows the 
difference between the autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the 
unweighted/undistorted data versus the unweighted/distorted data.  Table 3.8 
compares the underlying micro data with the weighted/distorted data that suppresses 
the appropriate small values, and Table 3.9 displays the results when the suppressions 
are replaced with synthetic data.   
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Table 3.7 
Distribution of the Difference Between Autocorrelation Coefficients 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Unweighted/Distorted 
Percentile B H R E A S M F FA FS H3 
99 0.067 0.058 0.042 0.066 0.061 0.061 0.079 0.059 0.056 0.054 0.056 
95 0.036 0.035 0.025 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.042 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.035 
90 0.025 0.025 0.015 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.021 0.024 0.023 0.024 
75 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 
50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25 -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 
10 -0.023 -0.028 -0.016 -0.023 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.022 -0.026 -0.024 -0.026 
5 -0.035 -0.038 -0.025 -0.037 -0.036 -0.038 -0.041 -0.033 -0.037 -0.035 -0.038 
1 -0.061 -0.063 -0.045 -0.065 -0.059 -0.065 -0.074 -0.061 -0.061 -0.059 -0.062 
            Note: The data represent county data for Maryland/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent the difference between the autocorrelation coefficients the 
percentile designated by the rows.  
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Table 3.8 
Distribution of the Difference Between Autocorrelation Coefficients 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Weighted/Distorted w/ Suppressions 
Percentile B H R E A S M F FA FS H3 
99 0.318 0.592 0.538 0.325 0.602 0.652 0.330 0.366 0.606 0.656 0.648 
95 0.153 0.326 0.221 0.158 0.294 0.304 0.134 0.181 0.317 0.352 0.359 
90 0.086 0.196 0.136 0.084 0.173 0.181 0.063 0.108 0.196 0.218 0.229 
75 0.021 0.060 0.049 0.019 0.053 0.053 0.017 0.025 0.068 0.070 0.087 
50 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
25 -0.029 -0.075 -0.063 -0.031 -0.071 -0.078 -0.037 -0.026 -0.070 -0.084 -0.082 
10 -0.085 -0.188 -0.162 -0.091 -0.170 -0.190 -0.099 -0.077 -0.169 -0.200 -0.190 
5 -0.150 -0.289 -0.242 -0.154 -0.258 -0.288 -0.176 -0.141 -0.262 -0.300 -0.286 
1 -0.393 -0.551 -0.474 -0.426 -0.505 -0.531 -0.489 -0.419 -0.499 -0.538 -0.527 
            Note: The data represent county data for Maryland/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent the difference between the autocorrelation coefficients the 
percentile designated by the rows.  
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Table 3.9 
Distribution of the Difference Between Autocorrelation Coefficients 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Weighted/Distorted w/ Synthetic Replacements 
Percentile B H R E A S M F FA FS H3 
99 0.107 0.246 0.223 0.096 0.238 0.263 0.210 0.227 0.260 0.157 0.294 
95 0.056 0.144 0.126 0.051 0.134 0.166 0.123 0.112 0.145 0.076 0.185 
90 0.036 0.104 0.092 0.033 0.099 0.120 0.084 0.075 0.108 0.049 0.133 
75 0.011 0.050 0.043 0.010 0.047 0.058 0.037 0.031 0.051 0.018 0.066 
50 -0.004 0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.007 -0.003 0.009 
25 -0.030 -0.043 -0.013 -0.030 -0.032 -0.032 -0.017 -0.018 -0.030 -0.034 -0.037 
10 -0.065 -0.109 -0.067 -0.064 -0.089 -0.095 -0.049 -0.056 -0.095 -0.082 -0.128 
5 -0.092 -0.167 -0.120 -0.093 -0.142 -0.145 -0.081 -0.088 -0.144 -0.116 -0.194 
1 -0.166 -0.295 -0.257 -0.176 -0.257 -0.268 -0.168 -0.187 -0.277 -0.233 -0.343 
            Note: The data represent county data for Maryland/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent the difference between the autocorrelation coefficients the 
percentile designated by the rows.  
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Table 3.10 
Distribution of the Difference Between Autocorrelation Coefficients 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Unweighted/Distorted 
Percentile B H R E A S M F FA FS H3 
99 0.070 0.060 0.040 0.070 0.060 0.060 0.080 0.070 0.060 0.050 0.060 
95 0.040 0.030 0.020 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 
90 0.020 0.020 0.010 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
75 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25 -0.010 -0.010 0.000 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
10 -0.020 -0.020 -0.010 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
5 -0.030 -0.040 -0.020 -0.040 -0.030 -0.040 -0.040 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 
1 -0.070 -0.060 -0.050 -0.070 -0.060 -0.060 -0.070 -0.060 -0.060 -0.050 -0.060 
            Note: The data represent county data for Illinois/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent the difference between the autocorrelation coefficients the 
percentile designated by the rows.  
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Table 3.11 
Distribution of the Difference Between Autocorrelation Coefficients 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Weighted/Distorted w/ Suppressions 
Percentile B H R E A S M F FA FS H3 
99 0.350 0.700 0.570 0.390 0.650 0.700 0.340 0.420 0.660 0.670 0.670 
95 0.190 0.390 0.260 0.190 0.360 0.380 0.150 0.230 0.380 0.390 0.400 
90 0.110 0.260 0.150 0.110 0.230 0.230 0.080 0.140 0.240 0.230 0.270 
75 0.030 0.090 0.050 0.030 0.070 0.070 0.020 0.030 0.090 0.080 0.110 
50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25 -0.030 -0.080 -0.070 -0.040 -0.090 -0.090 -0.040 -0.030 -0.080 -0.090 -0.080 
10 -0.120 -0.200 -0.180 -0.130 -0.200 -0.220 -0.140 -0.110 -0.200 -0.220 -0.220 
5 -0.240 -0.290 -0.270 -0.230 -0.290 -0.330 -0.250 -0.220 -0.320 -0.330 -0.330 
1 -0.690 -0.570 -0.490 -0.710 -0.540 -0.610 -0.700 -0.650 -0.550 -0.600 -0.600 
            Note: The data represent county data for Illinois/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent the difference between the autocorrelation coefficients the 
percentile designated by the rows.  
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Table 3.12 
Distribution of the Difference Between Autocorrelation Coefficients 
Unweighted/Undistorted vs. Weighted/Distorted w/ Synthetic Replacements 
Percentile B H R E A S M F FA FS H3 
99 0.140 0.250 0.260 0.120 0.250 0.270 0.250 0.250 0.260 0.180 0.300 
95 0.070 0.150 0.150 0.060 0.150 0.170 0.140 0.120 0.160 0.090 0.190 
90 0.040 0.110 0.110 0.040 0.110 0.120 0.100 0.080 0.120 0.060 0.130 
75 0.010 0.050 0.050 0.010 0.050 0.060 0.050 0.030 0.060 0.020 0.060 
50 0.000 0.000 0.010 -0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.010 
25 -0.030 -0.040 -0.010 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.020 -0.020 -0.030 -0.030 -0.040 
10 -0.070 -0.120 -0.070 -0.080 -0.110 -0.110 -0.060 -0.070 -0.110 -0.080 -0.130 
5 -0.110 -0.170 -0.140 -0.110 -0.160 -0.170 -0.090 -0.110 -0.180 -0.130 -0.200 
1 -0.210 -0.310 -0.270 -0.220 -0.290 -0.300 -0.210 -0.240 -0.340 -0.260 -0.390 
            Note: The data represent county data for Illinois/NAICS Industry Group. Cells represent the difference between the autocorrelation coefficients the 
percentile designated by the rows.  
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It is no surprise that there is almost no bias when only distortion is used since it was 
designed to preserve these properties.  However, the results comparing the synthetic 
data (Table 3.9) are clearly superior those with suppressions (Table 3.8).  Using the 
synthetic data introduce very little bias compared to Table 3.7 with almost all of the 
bias in the tails whereas the difference is largely zero for much of the distribution.  
Across the board this bias is less than that shown in Table 3.8 and the results clearly 
demonstrate that the time-series properties of the data are preserved with the 
synthesizer.   
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This paper describes a data synthesizer developed to replace sensitive values 
that are suppressed in the Quarterly Workforce Indicators. The sensitive values are 
necessarily suppressed in the QWI because the current methods (estimation, noise 
infusion, and weighting) may not provide adequate confidentiality protection for 
certain small cells.  This paper shows that the synthetic data that replace the 
suppressed cells offer sufficient protection and the synthetic data also preserves the 
time-series properties of the underlying confidential data.  In particular, noise infusion 
and weighting alone often do not yield a high enough error rate for small cells but the 
synthesizer clearly masks those values sufficiently.  Furthermore, not only are the data 
protected but the time-series properties are retained in the synthetic data and yield a 
substantial improvement over the current published data with suppressions.   
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APPENDIX  
 
Table APP1 
Mobility Definitions 
   
Label Definition 
Notation: 
( )JCUNITRL ∆∆∆ ,,  
Promotion A rise in reporting level closer to the CEO 
that also entails a change in job title.  
( )
( )
( )10
1
1
,,
,,
,,
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
+
−+
++
 
Demotion A fall in reporting level away from the 
CEO that also entails a change in job title. 
( )
( )
( )10
1
1
,,
,,
,,
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
−
−−
+−
 
Lateral - 
Strict 
A transition within the same reporting 
level, the same organizational unit level 
and also entails a change in job title. 
( )100 ,, JCUNITRL ∆∆∆  
Lateral - 
Up 
A transition within the same reporting 
level, a rise in organizational unit level 
closer to the CEO and also entails a 
change in job title. 
( )10 ,, JCUNITRL ∆∆∆ +  
Lateral - 
Down 
A transition within the same reporting 
level, a fall in organizational unit level 
away from the CEO and also entails a 
change in job title. 
( )10 ,, JCUNITRL ∆∆∆ −  
Lateral - 
Same Job 
A transition within the same reporting 
level, but does not entail a change in job 
title. 
( )
( )00
00
,,
,,
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
−
+
 
Level Up - 
Same Job 
A rise in reporting level closer to the 
CEO, but does not entail a change in job 
title. 
( )
( )
( )00
0
0
,,
,,
,,
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
+
−+
++
 
Level Dn - 
Same Job 
A fall in reporting level away from the 
CEO, but does not entail a change in job 
title. 
( )
( )
( )00
0
0
,,
,,
,,
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
JCUNITRL
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
∆∆∆
−
−−
+−
 
Stayer No change in reporting level, no change 
in organizational unit level and does not 
entail a change in job title. 
( )000 ,, JCUNITRL ∆∆∆  
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Definitions of Fundamental LEHD concepts 
We briefly explain some of the basic concepts underlying QWI processing, and 
indeed, much of the LEHD Infrastructure. A more exhaustive list of definitions can be 
found on theLEHD website at http://lehd.dsd.census.gov. 
 
Fundamental Concepts 
Dates 
The QWI is a quarterly data system with calendar year timing. We use the 
notation YYYY:Q to refer to a year and quarter combination. For example, 1999:4 
refers to the fourth quarter of 1999, which includes the months October, November, 
and December. 
 
Employer 
An employer in the QWI system consists of a single Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) account in a given state's UI wage reporting system. For statistical purposes the 
QWI system creates an employer identifier called an State Employer Identification 
Number (SEIN) from the UI-account number and information about the state (FIPS 
code). Thus, within the QWI system, the SEIN is a unique identifier within and across 
states but the entity to which it refers is a UI account. 
 
Establishment 
For a given employer in the QWI system, an SEIN, each physical location 
within the state is assigned a unit number, called the SEINUNIT. This SEINUNIT is 
based on the reporting unit in the ES-202 files supplied by the states. All QWI 
statistics are produced by aggregating statistics calculated at the establishment level. 
Single-unit SEINs are UI accounts associated with a single reporting unit in the state. 
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Thus, single-unit SEINs have only one associated SEINUNIT in every quarter. Multi-
unit SEINs have two or more SEINUNITS associated for some quarters. Since the UI 
wage records are not coded down to the SEINUNIT, SEINUNITs are multiply 
imputed as described in Abowd et al. (2005). A feature of this imputation system is 
that it does not permit SEINUNIT to SEINUNIT movements within the same SEIN. 
Thus, for multi-unit SEINs, the definitions below produce the same flow estimates at 
the SEIN level whether the definition is applied to the SEIN or the SEINUNIT. 
 
Employee 
Individual employees are identified by their Social Security Numbers (SSN) on 
the UI wage records that provide the input to the QWI. To protect the privacy of the 
SSN and the individual's name, a different branch of the Census Bureau removes the 
name and replaces the SSN with an internal Census identifier called a Protected 
Identity Key (PIK). 
 
Job 
The QWI system definition of a job is the association of an individual (PIK) 
with an establishment (SEINUNIT ) in a given year and quarter. The QWI system 
stores the entire history of every job that an individual holds. Estimates are based on 
the definitions presented below, which formalize how the QWI system estimates the 
start of a job (accession), employment status (beginning- and end-of-quarter 
employment), continuous employment (full-quarter employment), the end of a job 
(separation), and average earnings for different groups. 
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Unemployment Insurance wage records (the QWI system universe) 
The Quarterly Workforce Indicators are built upon concepts that begin with the 
report of an individual's UI-covered earnings by an employing entity (SEIN). An 
individual's UI wage record enters the QWI system if at least one employer reports 
earnings of at least one dollar for that individual (PIK) during the quarter. Thus, the 
job must produce at least one dollar of UI-covered earnings during a given quarter to 
count in the QWI system. The presence of this valid UI wage record in the QWI 
system triggers the beginning of calculations that estimate whether that individual was 
employed at the beginning of the quarter, at the end of the quarter, and continuously 
throughout the quarter. These designations are discussed below. Once these point-in-
time employment measures have been estimated for the individual, further analysis of 
the individual's wage records results in estimates of full-quarter employment, 
accessions, separations (point-in-time and full-quarter), job creations and destructions, 
and a variety of full-quarter average earnings measures. 
 
Employment at a point in time 
Employment is estimated at two points in time during the quarter, 
corresponding to the first and last calendar days. An individual is defined as employed 
at the beginning of the quarter when that individual has valid UI wage records for the 
current quarter and the preceding quarter. Both records must apply to the same 
employer (SEIN). An individual is defined as employed at the end of the quarter when 
that individual has valid UI wage records for the current quarter and the subsequent 
quarter. Again, both records must show the same employer. The QWI system uses 
beginning and end of quarter employment as the basis for constructing worker and job 
flows. In addition, these measures are used to check the external consistency of the 
data, since a variety of employment estimates are available as point-in-time measures. 
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Many federal statistics are based upon estimates of employment as of the 12th day of 
particular months. The Census Bureau uses March 12 as the reference date for 
employment measures contained in its Business Register and on the Economic 
Censuses and Surveys. The BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW)3 series, which is based on the ES-202 data, use the 12th of each month as the 
reference date for employment. The QWI system cannot use exactly the same 
reference date as these other systems because UI wage reports do not specify 
additional detail regarding the timing of the wage payments. QWI research has shown 
that the point-in-time definitions used to estimate beginning and end of quarter 
employment track the QCEW month one employment estimates well at thelevel of an 
employer (SEIN). For single-unit SEINs, there is no difference between an 
employerbased definition and an establishment-based definition of point-in-time 
employment. For multiunit SEINs, the unit-to-worker imputation model assumes that 
unit-to-unit transitions within the same SEIN cannot occur. So, point in time 
employment defined at either the SEIN or SEINUNIT level produces the same result. 
 
Employment for a full quarter 
The concept of full quarter employment estimates individuals who are likely to 
have been continuously employed throughout the quarter at a given employer. An 
individual is defined as fullquarter- employed if that individual has valid UI-wage 
records in the current quarter, the preceding quarter, and the subsequent quarter at the 
same employer (SEIN). That is, in terms of the point-intime definitions, if the 
individual is employed at the same employer at both the beginning and end of the 
quarter, then the individual is considered full-quarter employed in the QWI system. 
    Consider the following example. Suppose that an individual has valid UI wage 
records at employer A in 1999:2, 1999:3, and 1999:4. This individual does not have a 
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valid UI wage record at employer A in 1999:1 or 2000:1. Then, according to the 
definitions above, the individual is employed at the end of 1999:2, the beginning and 
end of 1999:3, and the beginning of 1999:4 at employer A. The QWI system treats this 
individual as a full-quarter employee in 1999:3 but not in 1999:2 or 1999:4. Full-
quarter status is not defined for either the first or last quarter of available data. 
 
Point-in-time estimates of accession and separation 
An accession occurs in the QWI system when it encounters the first valid UI 
wage record for a job (an individual (PIK)-employer (SEINUNIT) pair). Accessions 
are not defined for the first quarter of available data from a given state. The QWI 
definition of an accession can be interpreted as an estimate of the number of new 
employees added to the payroll of the establishment (SEINUNIT) during the quarter. 
The individuals who acceded to a particular employer were not employed by that 
employer during the previous quarter but received at least one dollar of UI-covered 
earnings during the quarter of accession. 
A separation occurs in the current quarter of the QWI system when it 
encounters no valid UI wage record for an individual-employer pair in the subsequent 
quarter. This definition of separation can be interpreted as an estimate of the number 
of employees who left the employer during the current quarter. These individuals 
received UI-covered earnings during the current quarter but did not receive any UI-
covered earnings in the next quarter from this employer. Separations are not defined 
for the last quarter of available data. 
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